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Abstract 
Construction supply chains have a high level of specialism and involve loosely-coupled 
and relatively self-contained subsystems. Value is always co-created in networks of 
relationships. Effective relationships between those representing their respective 
organisations in the project are necessary for effective integration and healthy 
interdependencies to grow and be maintained. Relationships in construction supply chains 
have been featured as transactional and do not always generate effective working. 
Collaboration has been repeatedly proposed to counteract these trends and trust has been 
identified as a key success indicator. Yet less research interest has been in trust 
dynamically co-created through service interactions and levering value for those 
involved. This thesis aims to demonstrate the dynamic value of trust in construction 
supply chains, in particular relationships between main contractors and second-tier 
subcontractors, an under-researched area by supply chain and project management bodies 
of knowledge (BoKs). Taking the perspective of structuration theory and service-
dominant logic (S-DL), this process-based research focuses on supply chain relationships 
in service ecosystems. Seventy-one semi-structured interviews were conducted at the 
preconstruction, then execution and finally completion stage of three construction 
projects. The findings reveal that trust development is both an intended and unintended 
process and involves various types of interaction. It is found that the interplay between 
different types of interactions can form the trust phenomenon in which the value of trust 
unfolds. Trust helps increase service value by improving the service experiences of those 
involved; the better service enables higher performance levels. The study also 
demonstrates the conditions for trust in terms of structures of service ecosystems and 
time. This study contributes to knowledge in that it 1) theoretically and empirically 
demonstrates the value of trust and relationship in construction project management and 
supply chain disciplines, 2) advances the relational approach in both disciplines and 3) 
links trust and relational concepts with S-DL.  
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Impact statement 
This research aims to explore the value of trust in construction supply chains. The concept 
of value goes beyond mainstream economics towards perceived benefits for individual 
experiences, organisation performance and service effectiveness including public service. 
The research produced findings in three themes: 
1) Interactions between construction-related organisations in delivering public and 
private projects, including construction project businesses, their supply chains and 
stakeholders in public and private sectors; 
2) The process of trust and relationship development between construction project 
businesses and supply chains in delivering projects; 
3) The value of trust in terms of improving individuals’ service experiences, service 
effectiveness and organisation performance. 
Research findings from each of these themes have provided a range of benefits for 
academia and industry: 
1) Individuals and organisations participating in the research: research presentation 
transferred knowledge about service-dominant logic that can be used to improve 
practices and service effectiveness; multiple-wave interviews at different stages of 
project lifecycle helped individuals and organisations reflect their own practices in 
on-going projects, identify value co-created with their partners as well as problems, 
and thereby enhance project performance;  
Evidence of interactions, trust development and value can be used to develop 
relationship and knowledge management programmes, systems, practices and codes 
of behaviour to develop project and organisation dynamic capabilities, improve 
supply chain relationships, reach higher performance and lever value in future service 
for society. 
2) Academia: the research has produced one book chapter, two conference papers and 
one journal article that is currently under review. Extant publications and 
presentations combined theories and approaches from multiple disciplines including 
construction and project management, sociology, organisational studies and 
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marketing, which can benefit researchers who are interested in the above disciplines 
as well as cross-discipline theories and methods. 
Beyond current impacts, pathways to future impacts on wider stakeholder and academic 
communities include: 
1) Journal article publication, conference presentation and dissemination: continuing the 
dialogues on relationship-centric and service-driven management approach, value co-
creation and trust in the academic community, mapping out a future research agenda 
that is relevant to the needs of researchers and practitioners. 
2) Action research based on the findings of this research that involves public and private 
organisations in the construction industry: this research will transfer knowledge about 
value co-creation in the service ecosystem and dynamic capabilities to support value 
co-creating activities, including trust and relationship management with stakeholders, 
learning between different levels of service ecosystem, between projects and the 
organisation, and across projects and structuring systems to facilitate top-down and 
bottom-up transferring of rules and resources.  
In doing so, organisations can enhance the awareness of relationships and relationship 
value, develop the capability of executing relational contracting, delivering effective 
service and co-creating value for themselves, their partners and ultimate service 
beneficiaries – the society. In the long term, the action research can improve the 
effectiveness of collaborative procurement and execution of public and private 
construction projects, change the arms-length, if not adversarial, relationships 
between construction organisations, and cultivate a collaborative and 
transformational culture in the industry for continuous improvement. 
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Introduction 
The value of trust 
“A complete absence of trust would prevent [one] even getting up in the morning.” 
(Luhmann, 1979, p. 1) 
Trust is a social phenomenon that enables interactions among actors and organisations. 
In the broadest sense, trust sustains institutional, social and organisational life (Luhmann, 
1979; Giddens, 1990; Kramer and Tyler, 1996). Trust in abstract systems, consisting of 
expert knowledge, involves faceless commitment that sustains everyday life, for example 
travelling by aeroplane from London to Beijing without concern as to who the pilot is. 
The continuity and transformation of faceless commitment and trust in systems need 
recursive production and reproduction of face-to-face commitment and trust in 
organisations and individuals as ‘access points’ of abstract systems (Giddens, 1990). 
Taking the example of travelling by aeroplane, trust in aviation and other expert systems 
is strengthened and transformed by interactions between passengers and crew during the 
10-hour journey from London to Beijing, such as the way the pilot deals with emergencies 
and the service provided by flight attendants. In other words, trust in systems enables the 
“working of knowledge of which the lay person is largely ignorant” and is sustained or 
transformed by trust in persons that seeks “indicators of the integrity of others (within 
giving arenas of action)” (Giddens, 1990, p. 88). As such, trust relations are basic to both 
social systems and individuals; as O’Neill (2002, p. 3) observed, “without trust we cannot 
stand”.  
At the meso- and micro-levels, trust draws attention in the practice of inter-organisational 
and interpersonal relations especially where actors and organisations are interdependent, 
and collaboration is necessary for creating value. A relationship can be interpersonal. It 
can also be inter-organisational based upon the sum of the key interactions and 
individuals. This thesis focuses on inter-organisational trust in construction supply chain 
relationships. Inter-organisational trust is regarded as the collective-held trust by 
members in one organisation towards another organisation (Zaheer, McEvily and 
Perrone, 1998). In this thesis, actors in main contractors have a collective or aggregate 
view of trust towards subcontractors as organisational entities. In this vein, inter-
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organisational trust is believed to be an appropriate governance mechanism for enhancing 
communication quality, reducing transaction costs and increasing project efficiency 
(Zaheer, McEvily and Perrone, 1998). Once established, trust may align separate interests 
into a collective unit and generate an environment of integrity and openness where actors 
are willing to share risks, commit resources and work jointly, though it is recognised that 
blind and unconditional trust is unwise (Sydow, 1998; Zaheer, McEvily and Perrone, 
1998; Nooteboom, 2002; Smyth and Thompson, 2005; Pinto, Slevin and English, 2009). 
In contexts of increasing complexity and uncertainty, increased specialism and 
interdependence, such as the construction industry, trust is needed not least because of 
the call for non-adversarial working and integrated supply chains (Egan, 2002; 
Wolstenholme et al., 2009). It helps improve individuals’ service experiences and the 
efficiency and effectiveness of service provision, which has implications for performance. 
Trust helps lever service value for actors and organisations involved in construction 
activities as well as clients and end users.  
“You may be deceived if you trust too much, but you will live in torment if you do not 
trust enough.” 
(Frank Crane, as quoted in Business Education World, Vol. 15, 1935, p. 172) 
The value of trust is not without interest. Sociology and psychology point out the intrinsic 
value of trust, which can be hedonic or based on self-identity (Blau, 1964; Giddens, 1990; 
Erikson, 1993). Intrinsic value means that trust and trust relations are valued for 
themselves in that they improve the wellbeing or quality of life of actors and collective 
actors. It is not hard to understand that many people find it more pleasurable to have trust-
based relations than to have to deal with suspicion and opportunism. There is also a social 
and psychological urge to find others to trust, to be trusted and to be recognised. The 
diminution of community and kinship networks means that interpersonal trust needs to 
be earned by the parties involved and requires self-disclosure and self-enquiry; that is, 
demonstrating openness and integrity to the other while discovering oneself in a reflexive 
way. As such, self-identities are socially constructed as a reflexive project for individuals. 
The social construction of identities also establishes a social footing that serves as a point 
of reference and supplies meaning in communications (White, 1992; Luhmann, 1995). At 
the organisation level, though they are less likely to have an intrinsic urge, collective 
actors can have socially-oriented motives, in the will to be recognised and achieve 
satisfaction from excellent outcomes. Social recognition is not necessarily served by 
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being trustworthy and trusting; accumulating power may be another way. The point is 
that social orientation can bridge the intrinsic value and extrinsic value of trust in that 
social recognition can help achieve goals in a way not independent from the relationship, 
parties involved and the exchange process (Nooteboom, 2002).  
It is the exchange process that increases the relevance of trust in the delivery of 
construction projects. The extrinsic value of trust builds upon interactions, which are in 
turn enabled by trust between actors and organisations in the face of institutional 
arrangements in the business environment (Nooteboom, 2002; Bachmann and Inkpen, 
2011). Most economists tend to assume the impersonality of the transaction and ignore 
the exchange process (Nooteboom, 2002), in which actors and organisations build 
networks of relationships, share resources and learn from experiences, and, in doing so, 
they co-create value for the present and future (Vargo and Lusch, 2004; Smyth, Lecoeuvre 
and Vaesken, 2017). Service exchange involves interactions that are vital to the creating 
of value and trust (Ballantyne and Varey, 2006; Payne, Storbacka and Frow, 2008). This 
is especially true in the delivery of construction projects in that the exchange process is 
complex too, taking a long duration of time. Good or excellent outcomes need 
collaboration and cooperation in complex and uncertain contexts (Smyth, Gustafsson and 
Ganskau, 2010). Investing in social relations embeds resources in social networks and 
yields social capital as a relational asset enhancing the outcomes of actions (Bourdieu, 
1986; Portes, 1998; Granovetter, 2005; Nooteboom, 2007; Laud et al., 2015). Trust 
affects actors’ and organisations’ opportunities for constructing and maintaining social 
capital, hence the outcomes of collaboration (Lin, 2002). The latter, in turn, motivates the 
continuity of relationships and trust. In other words, extrinsic value can drive the initiation 
and maintenance of relationships in the form of increased profits and allocable resources 
in transactions for instance (Laud et al., 2015). Managing relationships in this way is 
aligned with the theoretical paradigm of transaction cost economics (Nooteboom, 2007). 
On the other hand, actors and organisations can be bonded by intrinsic value that 
generates social recognition and reputation going beyond transactions. Social capital also 
has a role of maintaining and developing relationships and trust (Nooteboom, 2007).       
Extrinsic and intrinsic value, nevertheless, are not necessarily perceived as distinct, 
though they are analytically distinguishable. An important question is how they are 
related to the perception of trustworthiness, behavioural orientations and behaviour of 
actors. In relation to construction project management, Smyth (2008) presented a 
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framework of trust drawing conceptual, philosophical and methodological elements 
together to deepen the understanding of trust in project businesses. Later, Smyth (2010) 
conceptually and empirically explored the value of trust between project businesses. 
While trust among project-based organisations is essential, it is particularly challenging 
to develop and sustain in projects, especially between contractors and suppliers. Firm-
level trust depends on performance and relationships at the project level. Main contractor 
and second-tier subcontractor relationships were identified to be worse than client and 
main contractor relationships (Alderman and Ivory, 2007).  
Trust, including trust-related perceptions, orientations and behaviour of actors and 
organisations, and its value in construction supply chains is the focus of this thesis. The 
overarching aim of the thesis is to explore the value of trust in construction supply chains, 
in particular relationships between main contractors and second-tier subcontractors.  
Collaboration in construction supply chains 
Chapter 1 discusses the context of the research and stresses the significance and the 
difficulties of inducing and maintaining collaboration in construction supply chains. 
Construction supply chains have a high level of specialism and consist of loosely-coupled 
and relatively self-contained subsystems such as specialist contractors and suppliers 
(Dubois and Gadde, 2002b; Pryke, 2009). The increased complexity and societal demands 
for the value delivered through construction projects render difficulties, if not 
impossibilities, for a single firm to reconcile unfolding uncertainties, let alone lever value 
in the construction project lifecycle. Specialisation and subcontracting enable project 
businesses at each level to concentrate on their own core business, and to share risks and 
liabilities with other actors, so that they become more flexible and capable of meeting 
changing demands and providing an effective service (Lai, 2000; Manu et al., 2013). 
Main contractors, subcontractors and suppliers are interdependent with each other and 
collaboration among supply chains is necessary if projects are to be delivered and project 
businesses are to survive (Dubois and Gadde, 2002b; Bygballe and Jahre, 2009).  
However, achieving coherent teams and collaborative practices in the process of service 
delivery is not self-evident. Fragmented approaches to managing construction projects 
and supply chains have caused inefficient production and communication, arms-length 
relationships, blame cultures and opportunism, which ultimately reduce value for clients, 
contractors, suppliers, end users and society (Kadefors, 2004; Fulford and Standing, 
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2014). One barrier to improving supply chain relationships is the institutional logic of 
goods-dominance and project-focus that emphasises transactional efficiency and 
promotes practices maximising short-term profits and assessing performance in a project-
by-project way (Kadefors, 2004; Smyth, 2015a). Under goods-dominant logic (G-DL) 
and project-focused logic (P-FL), partnering projects and collaborative mechanisms 
simply move the singular transactions to multiple transactions over time in order to profit 
from supply chains (Alderman and Ivory, 2007; Smyth, 2015b). Trust relations are 
viewed as a temporary vehicle to increase project efficiency, and terminate with the 
project; trust is said to be mostly built from scratch (Dubois and Gadde, 2002b). In some 
cases, partnering has been used as a guise by main contractors to reap the profits from 
second-tier subcontractor (Alderman and Ivory, 2007; Bresnen, 2007), which 
dramatically worsens supply chain relationships and leads to the perception that 
partnering projects “are only paying lip-service to the principles of partnering” (Brown 
et al., 2001, p. 195).  
A considerable body of construction project management studies has focused on 
collaborative mechanisms and tools (e.g., Rahman and Kumaraswamy, 2008; Bygballe, 
Dewulf and Levitt, 2015). The effects of such mechanisms and tools vary (c.f. Cicmil and 
Marshall, 2005; Brady and Davies, 2014). The lack of empirical studies on supply chain 
relationships, especially the process of relationship development in project delivery, 
might contribute to the difficulties of implementing partnering arrangements into practice 
(Bresnen and Marshall, 2000; Eriksson, 2015; Ahola, Vuori and Viitamo, 2017). Most 
studies have concentrated on client and main contractor relationships (Bygballe, Jahre 
and Swärd, 2010). It has been identified that second-tier subcontractors and suppliers 
have less understanding of collaborative mechanisms and question the benefits they can 
attain through collaborating with main contractors (Mason, 2007). This points to the 
necessity of supplying a relationship-based approach to managing supply chains that 
places supply chain relationships at the centre of analysing and theorising, focuses on 
value-in-use for both main contractors and supply chains, and prepares to handle 
uncertainties and dynamics in a social context over time. Trust is fundamental to 
relationships and enables collaboration between actors and organisations. The desired 
result is to form trust among supply chains that motivates actors and organisations to 
share resources and risks, learn from experiences, take responsibilities and co-create 
value.  
17 
Research objectives and questions 
Based on the research context of construction supply chains, the overarching aim is 
broken down into detailed objectives: 
(1) Identifying the process of trust development in construction supply chains; 
(2) Providing an institutional logic, at least complementary to G-DL and P-FL, as a lens 
by which to analyse value and value-creating activities in construction;  
(3) Shedding light on the value of trust for those involved, including main contractors 
and subcontractors, as well as a broader view on value beyond points of transactions 
towards value-in-use over time (Vargo and Lusch, 2004; Saxon, 2005).  
To achieve the aim and objectives, primary research questions are formulated as follows: 
(1) Whether and if so how does trust from main contractor to second-tier subcontractor 
develop during service interactions between the two? 
(2) Whether and if so how does trust from main contractor to second-tier subcontractor 
dynamically help increase service value during service interactions between the two? 
Problem statement 
Chapter 2 reviews extant trust theories in various domains and disciplines. Literature has 
produced a kaleidoscope of concepts of trust, which require some clarification. This 
research has conceptualised trust as an actor’s current intention to rely on the actions of 
or to be vulnerable to another party, based on the expectation that the other party can 
reduce risks and co-create value in a relationship. The focus is inter-organisational trust 
from main contractor to second-tier subcontractor. Inter-organisational trust reflects the 
collectively-held trust intention by members in one organisation towards another 
organisation (Zaheer, McEvily and Perrone, 1998). It has been recognised that trust 
develops in the face of institutions and institutional arrangements (Zucker, 1986; 
Bachmann and Inkpen, 2011); it also needs interactions. In a business context, interaction 
is a mutual or reciprocal process in which two or more parties are involved in each other’s 
practices or in contact with each other (Grönroos and Ravald, 2011). It can be direct, 
meaning that interacting parties are co-present in a context and can simultaneously 
influence the process (Echeverri and Skålén, 2011; Grönroos and Voima, 2013); it can 
also be indirect, though a medium or media.  
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Interactions enable actors and organisations to know more about the other party’s ability, 
benevolence and integrity, which can lead to trusting behaviour (Mayer, Davis and 
Schoorman, 1995) and demonstrates the practical significance of trust (Lewicki and 
Bunker, 1996). Developing trust in interactions between actors and organisations is 
dynamic and needs cognition, intuition and behavioural enactment (Lewis and Weigert, 
1985; Lewicki and Bunker, 1996; Rousseau et al., 1998; Smyth, Gustafsson and Ganskau, 
2010). The phenomenon of trust that has been formed in such interactions can be 
demonstrated in dimensions of perception, orientation and behaviour. Under different 
extents of trust, actors and organisations might perceive the trustworthiness of another 
party’s competence and intentions differently. The orientation of engaging in trust-based 
relationships might be self-interested or socially-oriented (Lyons and Mehta, 1997; 
Smyth and Edkins, 2007). The perception and orientation can lead to behaviour that 
demonstrates different values of trust.  
In the domains of construction project and supply chain management, some studies have 
built upon sociological and organisational models to seek antecedents and outputs of trust 
in projects (e.g., Hartman, 2000; Wong et al., 2008; Pishdad-Bozorgi and Beliveau, 
2016). Whereas this stream of trust research illustrates a comprehensive map of trust-
related factors, the results are static snapshots of trust. Like Zeno’s arrow, an individual 
snapshot gives a glance of trust in a given point of time and space but sheds little light on 
the understanding of the essence of trust. The dynamic process of trust development in 
contexts and over time needs further investigation.  
Inspired by transaction cost theory (Williamson, 1985, 1996), some studies perceive trust 
as a governance mechanism at the project and corporate levels that complements or 
substitutes market price and hierarchical authority (e.g., Winch, 2001). Based on trust as 
a governance mechanism and drawing upon social contract (Macneil, 1980), some 
researchers draw attention to relational contracting and the design of formal mechanisms 
for promoting trust relations in order to promote project efficiency (e.g., Rahman and 
Kumaraswamy, 2012). This line of research, however, faces internal and external 
challenges of transferring trust at the governance level to operational and behavioural 
levels and maintaining a consistent service (Bresnen, 2007; Smyth, 2015a). Moreover, 
relational contracting is largely reactive on the supply chains’ side and, without the 
support from relationship management, is insufficient for sustaining healthy 
interdependent and effective relationships (Smyth, 2015b).  
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Also related to Macneil's (1980) theorising of relational norms in contractual 
relationships, the conditions of trust – that is, the atmosphere and culture derived from 
specific trusting behaviour conducted by actors in interactions – has been demonstrated 
(e.g., Smyth and Thompson, 2005). However, how the phenomenon of trust and norms 
of behaviour form and how the phenomenon helps lever the performance of those 
involved remain unanswered. Many studies have viewed trust as a mechanism for 
reducing perceived risks and transaction costs (Winch, 2001; Doloi, 2009). Reducing 
risks is important for project organising, but value creation is the fundamental driving 
force behind business activities. To investigate the value of trust, it is necessary to link 
trust with value-creating activities between construction supply chain partners.  
Chapter 3 introduces service-dominant logic (S-DL) and compares S-DL with goods-
dominant logic (G-DL) and project-focused logic (P-FL) in the context of construction 
projects and supply chains. G-DL and P-FL emphasise the economic value determined at 
the point of transaction or series of transactions – that is, value-in-exchange, the active 
role of suppliers in producing the value proposition as ‘quantifiable evidence’ of the 
value, temporary nature and uniqueness of projects. Managerial approaches based on G-
DL and P-FL neglect exchange processes, interactions and relationships between 
customers and suppliers (Skålén et al., 2015). In the context of construction projects, 
subcontractors are suppliers of specialist projects and main contractors are the 
intermediate customer of these subcontracted projects. Main contractors integrate 
specialist components into a whole product, a construction project, and deliver it to clients 
and end users such as building occupants. The latter is the customer of the overall project. 
In this thesis, subcontractors refer to firms that provide specialist goods and services for 
main contractors. The delivery of construction projects is a process where main 
contractors as intermediate customers of subcontracted projects usually participate in the 
delivery, interact with subcontractors as suppliers and provide service. The shadows of 
the past and future as well as rules and resources at multiple levels of the service 
ecosystems influence perceptions, normative practices and power relations in current 
interactions and hence knowledge transfer and capability building in project businesses 
and networks (Brady and Davies, 2004; Manning and Sydow, 2011). G-DL and P-FL fall 
short in addressing the active role of main contractors as intermediate customer in the 
service process, influence of past and future, and contexts where relationships are 
embedded and have value beyond present projects. 
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S-DL is proposed as a complementary logic to G-DL and P-FL. S-DL shifts the focus 
away from projects, goods and services towards service and relationships in service 
ecosystems (Vargo and Lusch, 2008, 2016). This inherently-relational feature links S-DL 
with construction project and supply chain management, and this research. S-DL regards 
relationship and trust as an operant resource that acts upon goods, services and other 
operant resources and can improve resource integration and value co-creation (Vargo and 
Lusch, 2008). In this vein, the value of relationship and trust goes beyond bringing 
repeated transactions. Under S-DL, main contractors and subcontractors can only create 
value propositions, namely construction projects and components. By participating in 
service interactions, actors have more opportunities for mutual learning, knowledge 
sharing and relationship building, hence gaining resources and service rights as financial 
and social capital that lever value for future service exchanges, which is part of value co-
creation. Trust informs and is part of the service interactions in that it may encourage 
communication and learning between main contractors and subcontractors, help create 
and adapt shared meanings in uncertainties and dynamics, ensure reciprocity and equity 
in the service process and outcomes, and nurture relational norms between actors and 
organisations. Value co-creation is founded upon trust-based interactions at different 
levels of service ecosystems that align actors’ value expectations as reciprocal promises 
“to and from suppliers and customers seeking an equitable exchange” (Ballantyne and 
Varey, 2006, p. 344).  
Although S-DL is inherently relational, relationship-related concepts, such as trust, have 
gained little attention in the S-DL literature. The relational, zooming-in, interactive and 
multilevel aspects of service interactions and value co-creation that include both 
customer’s and producer’s service experiences and value need investigation – pointing to 
the necessity for embodying a relational approach in the S-DL community that focuses 
on relationships. The theoretical points of departure identified in the literature review are 
summarised below: 
1) The dynamic process of trust development in construction supply chain relationships; 
2) The unfolding value of trust in terms of service provision and outcomes; 
3) The relational, zooming-in, interactive and multilevel nature of service interactions; 
4) The influences of time and structures of the service ecosystem on trust and value.  
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Theoretical, philosophical and methodological foundations 
Building blocks of the research: the conceptual framework 
Based on problems and gaps identified in the literature review, five building blocks were 
identified and consisted of the conceptual framework of this research. They also served 
as theoretical expectations of this thesis that linked the phenomenon of trust with 
interaction process, structures and value. 
1) Trust phenomenon. The phenomenon of trust links attitudinal trust and behavioural 
trust and shows how actors’ attitudes towards the others party’s competence and 
intentions are manifested in behaviour, therefore revealing the practical significance 
of trust. Attitudinal trust includes the perception of trustworthiness and orientation of 
trust. Based on extant research and in the light of S-DL, we use a working definition 
of trust as an actor’s current intention to rely on the actions of or to be vulnerable to 
another actor, based on the expectation that the other actor can reduce risks and co-
create value in a relationship (Mayer, Davis and Schoorman, 1995; Rousseau et al., 
1998; Sydow, 1998; Smyth, Gustafsson and Ganskau, 2010).  
2) Interaction. This process-based research explores trust in on-going processes of 
service interactions between main contractors and second-tier subcontractors. Despite 
the significance of structures, trust develops or erodes in interactions between actors 
and organisations (Barney and Hansen, 1994). Trust is dynamic over time, influenced 
by the shadow of the past as well as expectations of the future (Poppo, Zhou and Ryu, 
2008; Buvik and Rolfsen, 2015; Ligthart, Oerlemans and Noorderhaven, 2016; Ahola, 
Vuori and Viitamo, 2017).   
3) Structures of the service ecosystem. Trust and relationship in projects are affected by 
structures of the service ecosystem, including projects, organisations, inter-
organisational networks and organisation fields (Grabher, 2002; Manning, 2008; 
Edvardsson, Tronvoll and Gruber, 2011; Akaka, Vargo and Schau, 2015). Those 
structures provide actors, rules and resources that constrain and enable the 
constitution of trust and the enactment of trust value at the project level (Edvardsson, 
Tronvoll and Gruber, 2011). Also, structures can help generate a sense of ontological 
security, by creating a healthy level of accountability and furnishing common 
knowledge that sustains day-to-day practices, for instance, which form the base of 
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trust (Giddens, 1990; Meyerson, Weick and Kramer, 1996; Bachmann and Inkpen, 
2011).  
4) Time dimensions of past and future, which constrain and enable trust development 
(Poppo, Zhou and Ryu, 2008; Buvik and Rolfsen, 2015). 
5) Value. Value creation is the driving force behind project businesses. Instead of 
focusing only on reducing risks, this research considers the effects of trust on value-
in-use. The concept of value-in-use goes beyond value-in-exchange and includes all 
kinds of perceived benefits that can better lever or realise value under current and/or 
future states of actors and/or organisations (Vargo and Lusch, 2004). 
The conceptual framework guided the research design and empirical research. 
Process-based perspective 
Chapter 4 discusses the philosophy and methodology of this research. For the reality, we 
take the worldview that the movement, change and thereby processes are the basic forms 
of the universe, and seemingly stable and concrete entities and substances such as 
organisations are the momentary outcomes or effects of historical processes (Bergson, 
1946; Rescher, 1996). We recognise the existence of substances and treat them as 
manifolds of process. On the basis of ‘becoming’ ontology, this thesis takes the 
perspective of critical realism and regards the reality as consisting of three domains – the 
real, the actual and the empirical (Bhaskar, 1975). The task of the thesis is to explore trust 
and its unfolding value between “what we experience, what actually happens, and the 
underlying mechanisms that produce the events in the world” (Danermark, Ekstrom and 
Jakobsen, 2001, p. 21). The emphasis is on the generative mechanisms and emergence 
that entails the presence of phenomena (Sayer, 2000). This thesis studied the process of 
trust development and the unfolding value by investigating the generative mechanisms, 
emergence as well as the phenomenon of trust entailed.  
Methodologically, this research is qualitatively-based and uses a multiple case study 
method. Case study facilitates a zooming-in view and the exploration of the phenomenon 
in the local context (Yin, 2009), which fits the research aim and objectives of exploring 
the value of trust in the process of developing trust. This research is in line with process-
based studies (Weick, 1979; Langley, 1999; Chia, 2002; Tsoukas and Chia, 2002; Van de 
Ven and Poole, 2005; Langley and Tsoukas, 2010) and focuses on the dynamics of trust, 
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interactions and unfolding value. The unit of analysis is the relationship between main 
contractor and subcontractor. 
In order to take time into account, empirical research was inspired by the longitudinal 
study method (Pettigrew, 1990). Data were collected through three-wave interviews at 
the procurement and preconstruction, execution and completion stages of project 
delivery. In doing so, this research contributes to the understanding of trust and value in 
the domain of construction project and supply chain management that is unavailable from 
variance-based research. The latter tends to either ignore time or treat it as a variable (e.g., 
comparing effects of long-term and short-term relationships) (Mohr, 1982; Langley and 
Tsoukas, 2010). This thesis takes an interpretative approach to investigate the 
phenomenon (cf. Isabella, 1990; Pratt, Rockmann and Kaufmann, 2006; Monin et al., 
2013). Specifically, this thesis focuses on individuals’ perceptions of events and 
processes and strives to understand the informants’ views of the topics under research, 
such as their perceptions of certain events and experiences, and their attitudes towards the 
other party. The interpretative process helps produce conceptual products at different 
stages of analysis, which were used as the basis of further analysis.  
Theory is constructed in an abductive way, meaning that generative mechanisms for 
patterns of events and activities were identified by interactions between local findings 
and theories. Throughout, the thesis focuses on what Merton (1968, p. 39) called “theories 
of the middle range”, theories that lie between working hypotheses in day-to-day 
practices and the all-inclusive systematic grand theories. The key to building middle-
range theories is to explain local findings by using social, organisational or psychological 
mechanisms drawn from grand theories; in doing so, explanations are distinguished from 
can otherwise be spurious associations (Hedström and Swedberg, 1998). 
The theoretical lens of analysis: structuration theory 
Chapter 5 introduces structuration theory, which was emergent at the early stage of data 
analysis. It was found in the initial interpretation that patterns of data accorded with 
structuration theory, which offers theoretical mechanisms for analysing and interpreting 
empirical data from case studies. Structuration theory (Giddens, 1984) is one of the 
theories able to reconcile the interplay of structures and agency and accommodate more 
open, dynamic and reflexive management approaches and process-based organisation 
studies (Sydow, 2017). The concept of duality of structure provides a dynamic lens for 
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viewing the recurrent interactions between structures and interaction processes. 
According to Giddens (1984), structure consists of rules and resources; rules of 
signification and legitimation constitute the interpretative and normative aspects of 
structure, and resources are constituted from authoritative and allocative resources from 
social systems. Furthermore, rules and resources in the institutional, social and 
organisational environment then constrain and enable practices in interactions. 
Knowledgeable actors, on the other side, reflexively choose among multiple rules and 
resources in interactions with others, hence reproducing or transforming rules and 
resources. Sydow (1998) explained the constitution of trust from the perspective of 
structuration theory (Giddens, 1984), and this is also our view: that generating trust needs 
interactions between actors and collective actors that raise the perception of 
trustworthiness (interpretative rule), use trust relations as resources to allocate resources 
(facility of resources), and legitimate relational norms that constrain opportunism and 
encourage trusting and trustworthy behaviour (normative rule). The phenomenon of trust, 
in return, influences communication, power relations and sanctioned behaviour in 
interactions, hence service process and project performance. 
Notably, the search for a middle-range theory of trust uses the theoretical lens, 
mechanisms and concepts as a general guideline that is subjective to revision; meanings 
of concepts can be revised and refined according to empirical findings (Blumer, 1954; 
Merton, 1968; Dubois and Gadde, 2002a).  
Contribution to the body of knowledge 
This study contributes to knowledge in that it theoretically and empirically demonstrates 
the value of trust and relationship, and responds directly to a call for empirical 
examination in the construction project and supply chain management domains (Smyth 
et al., 2016). It advances the relational approach and supply chain integration (Pryke and 
Smyth, 2006; Smyth and Pryke, 2008; Kumaraswamy, Anvuur and Smyth, 2010) in 
construction project and supply chain management disciplines by highlighting the role of 
relational norms in developing trust and co-creating value. Construction project 
management research has addressed relational governance and collaborative mechanisms 
such as partnering and relational contracting in client-contractor relationships at the front 
end (e.g., Eriksson and Laan, 2007; Ling et al., 2015), but supply chain relationships in 
the project execution have attracted little interest. On the other hand, structural integration 
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of supply chains such as lean construction has gained a great deal of interest (e.g., 
Bygballe and Jahre, 2009; Bankvall et al., 2010), whereas the dialogue of relational 
integration is emerging (e.g., Kumaraswamy, Anvuur and Smyth, 2010). This thesis 
extends the latter line of thought by pointing out the dynamics of supply chain 
relationships and perceived value over time. The research highlights the role of relational 
norms such as equity, bounded solidarity and reciprocity in forming and sustaining the 
phenomenon of trust and value co-creation in construction supply chain relationships, 
indicating a move beyond transaction cost theory towards the social capital side of the 
relationship management approach. 
In the domain of S-DL, this thesis strengthens the eighth foundational premise (FP8), “a 
service-centred view is inherently beneficiary oriented and relational” (Vargo and Lusch, 
2016). It integrates trust as a relational concept into the S-DL theorisation. Explicating 
how service manifests itself within and among relationships in the service provision and 
generates value for both main contractors and subcontractors extends the understanding 
of service experiences, value co-creation and value-in-use. Extant S-DL research has 
mainly focused on service beneficiary’s use experiences and perceived value-in-use (e.g., 
Sandström et al., 2008; Edvardsson, Enquist and Johnston, 2010). Centring on service 
interactions over time enables the research to identify what activities are conducted when 
and how value is created or co-created for either or both parties. Zooming out of the 
dyadic relationship between main contractors and subcontractors, this research also 
explores the structural influences of service ecosystems on service interactions. 
Overall, drawing upon construction project and supply chain management, S-DL and the 
structuration theory as a lens of analysis, this thesis builds a holistic and dynamic theory 
of trust that combines trust development, phenomenon and value in one single study and 
emphasises the interactive and iterative relationship of trust and value. This holistic and 
dynamic view of trust is, to the author’s knowledge, one of the first among trust theories 
in various disciplines. 
Layout of the thesis 
The thesis is arranged in chronological order; the layout is illustrated in Figure 1. 
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Chapter 1 Collaboration in construction supply 
chains 
Collaboration rose up the agenda of construction in many countries for reasons of culture, 
government and client demands, and performance drivers (Egan, 1998; Phua and 
Rowlinson, 2003; Wolstenholme et al., 2009; Chalker and Loosemore, 2016). 
Collaboration is fundamental to delivering value in construction projects (Poirier, 
Forgues and Staub-French, 2016). Despite its significance, it is commonly recognised that 
collaboration in construction projects is hard to initiate between actors or collective actors 
representing their own organisations. Various forms of collaboration and management 
interventions have been promoted in the construction industry, but the outcomes of 
collaboration vary (Mason, 2007). There are qualified empirical successes such as 
Heathrow Terminal 5 and the London Olympics 2012 (Pryke, 2009; Brady and Davies, 
2014). Other research, however, identified no difference between partnering and non-
partnering projects in terms of flexibility, time delays, the number of disputes, financial 
outcome and trust (Mason, 2007; Nyström, 2008; Lau and Rowlinson, 2009; Venselaar, 
Gruis and Verhoeven, 2015).  
Why has it been so difficult to induce and sustain collaboration, especially among the 
supply chain? This chapter strives to answer this question by investigating the context of 
construction supply chains. There are multiple reasons. Finance and short-term 
organisational self-interest are factors (Kadefors, 2004). Time pressures and temporality 
are factors (Jones and Lichtenstein, 2008; Swärd, 2016). These factors reflect a goods-
dominant and project-focused logic that has been institutionalised in the construction 
industry, largely by the recursive use of transactional approaches to managing projects. 
Complexity is certainly another important factor in terms of both management and 
content (Cicmil and Marshall, 2005). A review of the difficulties of collaboration points 
to the fundamental role of inter-organisational relationship and trust, an under-researched 
area in construction project and supply chain management disciplines. Based on the 
research context, the overarching aim of the thesis is broken down into detailed 
objectives, and primary research questions are formulated by the end of this chapter.    
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1.1 Why does collaboration matter in construction? 
Construction projects are usually mentioned as being complex systems not least because 
of the perceived difficulties in coordinating and integrating different yet interdependent 
parts into a coherent entity (Baccarini, 1996; Gidado, 1996). Recent research also points 
out the effects of uncertainties and dynamics of both environment and systems on project 
complexity (Geraldi, Maylor and Williams, 2011; Brady and Davies, 2014; Davies and 
Mackenzie, 2014). The term dynamics refers to changes that might occur in the process 
of project delivery. Uncertainty implies the inability to provide an accurate prediction and 
the lack of knowledge of alternative courses of action, including ‘the unknown unknown’ 
(Sydow, 2017). Uncertainty is different from risk. The latter is calculable or at least 
implies certain knowledge and thus accessibility and controllability; risk is ‘the known 
unknown’ (Knight, 1921). By collaboration, actors and organisations form a system to 
manage complexity in terms of environmental and systemic uncertainties and dynamics, 
differentiation and interdependence (Poirier, Forgues and Staub-French, 2016).  
Environmental uncertainties and dynamics are normally from local and market 
conditions, macro economies and stakeholder perspectives (Bosch-Rekveldt et al., 2011). 
Construction projects usually involve a high level of uncertainty from both demand and 
supply markets. Demand for construction projects fluctuates and is unpredictable. In their 
analysis of the UK construction industry, Morton and Ross (2008) pointed out two 
reasons for the fluctuation and unpredictability. The first is that the number and types of 
projects depend on public and private needs and available finance, goods and services 
related to other industries. Another reason is that, compared with producers in many other 
industries, construction firms have few opportunities for stimulating and managing 
demand for their products through proactive marketing, for example. The slumps and 
booms of the macro-economy and unstable political environments also induce 
uncertainties in supply chain relationships (Manu et al., 2012).  
The development of technology, globalisation, and economic, political and social 
conditions have resulted in more stakeholders who might have different or even 
conflicting demands on construction projects (Walker, 2015). These divergent demands 
are dynamic, co-evolving in the project lifecycle. Moreover, as per authors such as 
Latham (1994) and Egan (1998), industrial reports have led to the recognition that it is 
necessary to transform industrial vision towards value for society as the end-user of 
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construction projects, hence increasing the level of demand for the value delivered 
through construction projects (Saxon, 2005). 
Under these increasing and also divergent demands, in order to survive, clients who are 
often not sophisticated in construction prefer integrated solutions with higher standards 
from contractors (Brady, Davies and Gann, 2005b). Construction clients have higher 
requirements and have perceived that service improvements are important and possible 
in project delivery (Fewings, 2013). With the help of fast-developing technologies such 
as information and communications technology (ICT) and building information model 
(BIM), clients have become more informed and proactive than frequently recognised and 
are no longer satisfied with the basic package of tangible products and services (Smyth, 
2015a). Some construction firms appear content to merely survive by meeting the 
minimum requirements by providing products and services in a self-sufficient way. But 
it is increasingly difficult to adapt to and adopt new means to meet the demands (Skitmore 
and Smyth, 2007, 2009; Smyth, 2015a). The increasing dynamics and uncertainties of the 
construction environment cause difficulties in project planning and execution to reconcile 
unfolding uncertainties and maintain or lever value in service exchange (Winch, 2015). 
It is less likely, if not impossible, for a single firm to have sufficient resources to meet all 
contingent requirements and manage the full scope of project delivery.  
The prevailing trend has been for value propositions to be put forward by a range of 
specialist providers who can meet the complex minimum requirements and enhance 
potential value through their specialisation, supporting capabilities (Holti, Nicolini and 
Smalley, 2000), and decentralised task and risk management, including the ability to 
manage labour flexibly and respond to rapidly changing demands – the subcontracting 
system. Specialisation and subcontracting enable project businesses at each level to 
concentrate on their own core businesses and share risks and liabilities with other actors, 
so they become more flexible and capable of meeting changing demands and providing 
an effective service (Lai, 2000; Manu et al., 2013).  
The content of a project is divided into specialised packages and delivered through 
multiple-tier supply chains. A supply chain is “a network of organisations that are 
involved, through upstream and downstream linkages, in the different processes and 
activities that produce value in the form of products and services in the hands of the 
ultimate consumer” (Christopher, 2005, p. 17). In the UK construction industry, a supply 
chain has multiple tiers, including the first-tier main contractors who are responsible for 
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the delivery of project as an integrated system, the second- and lower-tier subcontractors 
who deliver specialised subsystems such as foundation and piling, suppliers who provide 
goods and services to support the integrated system or subsystems and professional firms 
who offer solutions and advice for clients (Pryke, 2009). Different from supply chains in 
the manufacturing industry where exchanges are continuous and activities are sequential, 
supply chains in the construction industry are complex due to the discontinuity of project 
demand, uniqueness of each project, uncertainty of requirements, specialisation and 
interdependencies between main contractors, specialised contractors, suppliers and their 
activities (Vrijhoef and Koskela, 2000; Dubois and Gadde, 2002b; Eriksson, 2015; 
Walker, 2015). In construction supply chains, the relationship between main contractors 
and second-tier subcontractors are key to the creation and delivery of value; yet they are 
believed to be weak due to the reliance on competitive tendering in order to pursue lowest 
possible cost (Eriksson, Dickinson and Khalfan, 2007; Broft, Badi and Pryke, 2016).  
Healthy interdependence is needed to achieve effective resource planning, allocation and 
integration (Eriksson, 2010) but also develop dynamic capabilities to keep strategic 
advantages so that businesses and market can survive (Brady, Davies and Gann, 2005b). 
If collaboration is facilitated and enhanced, then theory says it can be effective in helping 
integrate the system and manage the other complex project factors (Jones and 
Lichtenstein, 2008; Manning and Sydow, 2011; Ligthart, Oerlemans and Noorderhaven, 
2016). It is notable that both environmental and systemic uncertainties, if project actors 
reflexively learn in context and are proactive towards the environment rather than reactive 
to it, can also become opportunities for levering value in service experience (Perminova, 
Gustafsson and Wikström, 2008), which requires dynamic capabilities within and across 
projects (Brady and Davies, 2004). 
Moreover, the increasingly higher demands for the value delivered through construction 
projects mean that project businesses need to go beyond satisfying minimum 
requirements by delivering goods and services per se, if businesses are to survive and 
lever value (Saxon, 2005). Value creation is the driving force behind project businesses, 
and, in construction, value is inevitably co-created or co-destructed between multiple 
project actors and organisations. Collaboration is a raw material for effective interactions 
and a source of co-creating value. Clients, designers, contractors, suppliers and other 
stakeholders need to work together so that projects can be delivered, value can be created, 
and the market is sustained (Anvuur and Kumaraswamy, 2008; Poirier, Forgues and 
Staub-French, 2016). 
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1.2 Why is collaboration difficult to induce and sustain? 
Though the subcontracting system helps deal with uncertainties and dynamics in the 
environment, the system is also a source of uncertainty and has its own dynamics (Sydow, 
2017) – that is, organisational and relational complexity. Successful supply chain 
collaboration requires effective management intervention to address organisational and 
relational complexity. This thesis draws upon the perspectives of construction project 
management, construction supply chain management and institutional logic to examine 
the question: Why is collaboration difficult to induce and sustain?  
1.2.1 Construction project management perspective 
Pryke and Smyth (2006) classified four approaches to managing projects, including 
construction. Traditional project management applies tools and techniques to deal with 
two principle problems: 1) how to structure and plan project activities in order to meet 
goals and objectives, and 2) how to ensure activities conform to the plan (Engwall, 2003). 
Problems and tasks are usually resolved through formal control and procedures such as 
scheduling tools, earned value analysis, critical chain, quality management and 
performance management (Smyth and Morris, 2007). In this line of thought, project 
success relies on the skills of the project manager and on formal procedures as a basic 
and necessary condition for gaining legitimacy and authorised control within the 
organisation (Engwall, 2003). The classic project management literature predominantly 
focuses on calculable risks and instruments of execution rather than emergency and 
uncertainty aspects of managing projects (Perminova, Gustafsson and Wikström, 2008). 
In this vein, the planning-and-conformance-oriented approach falls short in terms of 
managing uncertainties and dynamics of collaboration; the adaption of a plan is as 
important as the conformity to it (Sydow, 2017). 
The second project management approach in Pryke and Smyth (2006), the information 
processing approach, mostly focuses on the critical success factors and best practices 
such as communication systems, trust, contract forms and specific conditions of projects 
(Black, Akintoye and Fitzgerald, 2000; Akintoye and Main, 2007; Hughes, Williams and 
Ren, 2012; Schöttle Haghsheno and Gehbauer, 2014). The primary quest is project 
efficiency and success. Similarly, the functional management approach, which takes a 
strategic and ‘front-end’ perspective, emphasises the role of structures such as the 
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governance of projects at the organisation level in improving project performance. For 
information processing and functional approaches, collaboration is either viewed as an 
input to project efficiency or an output representing project success; the process of how 
collaboration is formed and sustained and how collaboration improves project 
performance remains unanswered (Poirier, Forgues and Staub-French, 2016).  
Relational approach emphasises the role of relationships and the management of 
relationships in project success (Pryke and Smyth, 2006; Smyth and Pryke, 2008; Meng, 
2012). Although it provides conceptual and practical scope for a proactive approach such 
as relationship marketing and management, most studies taking a relational approach are 
interested in relational contracting, which ties to collaborative procurement, partnering 
agreements, incentive-based payment and building integrated teams (Kumaraswamy, 
Anvuur and Mahesh, 2008; Ling et al., 2013; Bygballe, Dewulf and Levitt, 2015; Austin, 
Pishdad-Bozorgi and De La Garza, 2016). Similar to information processing and 
functional approaches, extant research lacks detailed knowledge about how relational 
practices and collaborative behaviour are enacted, which has partly caused the challenges 
of realising partnering arrangements into real behaviour and consistent performance 
across projects (Bresnen and Marshall, 2000; Bresnen, 2007). It has been argued that 
relational contracts and agreements are not sufficient to establish and maintain 
collaboration; they need to be accompanied by relationship management at multiple 
levels of project organisations to form an environment of trust in execution (Kadefors and 
Badenfelt, 2009; Smyth, 2015b).  
Furthermore, most relational research focuses on client and main contractor relationships 
and relationships with supply chains have largely been under-researched (Dainty, Millett 
and Briscoe, 2001; Bygballe, Jahre and Swärd, 2010; Hartmann and Caerteling, 2010). 
Despite relational contracting and various collaborative mechanisms between client and 
tier-one contractors, lower-tier subcontractors are still expected to compete based on price 
(Broft, Badi and Pryke, 2016), resulting in the perception that partnering projects “are 
only paying lip-service to the principles of partnering” (Brown et al., 2001, p. 195). 
However, main contractor and second-tier subcontractor relationships were identified to 
be worse than client and main contractor relationships (Alderman and Ivory, 2007). It has 
been argued that second-tier subcontractors and suppliers have less understanding of 
partnering or collaboration, what it is, how to operate it and – most importantly – what 
benefits they can get through collaborating with main contractors (Mason, 2007). There 
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is a need for broadening the scope of the relational approach to include lower tiers of the 
supply chain (Meng, 2012; Broft, Badi and Pryke, 2016), not least because subcontracting 
occupies a large portion of the total value of projects. Supply chains are embedded with 
specialist knowledge and skills that can be used to improve value propositions (Pryke, 
2009; Khalfan and Maqsood, 2012; Ahola, Vuori and Viitamo, 2017).  
1.2.2 Construction supply chain management perspective 
In the domain of construction supply chain management, supply chain collaboration is 
closely related to the concept of supply chain integration (SCI) (Crespin-Mazet and 
Portier, 2010; Hartmann and Caerteling, 2010; Eriksson, 2015). Both involve co-
ordinating structures and collective processes among supply chain partners to support and 
manage the flow of resources and service (Vijayasarathy, 2010). In the face of fragmented 
supply chains, SCI has been proposed to achieve optimal balance among the strength, 
scope, duration and depth of integration in order to increase project effectiveness and 
efficiency (Egan, 1998; Bygballe and Jahre, 2009; Pryke, 2009; Bankvall et al., 2010; 
Davies and Mackenzie, 2014; Eriksson, 2015). While inspired by supply chain 
management in manufacturing industries (e.g., Vijayasarathy, 2010; Cao and Zhang, 
2011), SCI in project-based contexts, which include construction, is distinct and 
challenging due to the unpredictable demands, the uniqueness and complexity of projects, 
divergent interests and inconsistent supply chain relationships across projects (Briscoe 
and Dainty, 2005; Broft, Badi and Pryke, 2016). The latter is a result of transactional 
management approaches that rely on competitive tendering to minimise costs and manage 
projects in a project-by-project way (Kadefors, 2004; Briscoe and Dainty, 2005). 
A considerable body of research has stressed methods for structural integration to 
eliminate redundancy and increase operational efficiency (Vrijhoef and Koskela, 2000; 
Bygballe and Jahre, 2009; Bankvall et al., 2010; Flynn, Huo and Zhao, 2010). Structural 
integration involves coordination of resources, supporting systems and operational 
processes (Leuschner, Rogers and Charvet, 2013). At the organisation level, integration 
can take place within organisation boundaries between different functions and 
departments, enabling them to work together and support activities across boundaries. It 
can also take place between organisations, for instance, integrating ‘design’ and ‘build’ 
in construction projects (Flynn, Huo and Zhao, 2010). At the inter-organisational 
networks level, SCI investigates a number of suppliers and the interdependencies among 
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them. Integration is achieved through coordinating different types of interdependencies 
and associated economic logics to mitigate technical difficulties and workflow disruption 
because of site conditions, achieve concurrency, and reduce buffers and lead times 
(Vrijhoef and Koskela, 2000; Dubois and Gadde, 2002b; Bygballe and Jahre, 2009; 
Bankvall et al., 2010; Pala et al., 2014). Structural integration at the networks level is 
inclusive of techniques such as lean construction, modularisation and prefabrication.  
Although functions and systems in theory can be integrated, getting coherent teams is not 
self-evident (Kumaraswamy, Anvuur and Smyth, 2010). Relational integration therefore 
has been proposed as a complementary approach to integration of supply chains to form 
an atmosphere of mutual trust and generate value among the actors and organisations 
involved (Pryke and Smyth, 2006; Kumaraswamy, Anvuur and Smyth, 2010; 
Vijayasarathy, 2010). Many integrative activities have been identified in research such as 
early supplier involvement (Eriksson, 2015; Ahola, Vuori and Viitamo, 2017), joint 
developing of routines and processes (Söderlund, Vaagaasar and Andersen, 2008; Ruuska 
et al., 2011), investing in long-term framework agreements and supplier training (Errasti 
et al., 2007; Gosling et al., 2015), co-location and ad hoc meetings dedicated for 
integration (Davies and Mackenzie, 2014; Gosling et al., 2015). Apart from activity-
based integration, Kumaraswamy, Anvuur and Smyth (2010) proposed a value-based 
approach to supply chain integration that identifies and aligns divergent goals of multiple 
organisations in projects, including those in supply chains, in order to form an integrated 
value network.  
Despite the rich insights from extant research, studies have highlighted the 
implementation difficulties and the lack of detailed knowledge about how contractors and 
supply chains achieve integration, establish and sustain a common goal, and develop 
collaborative relationships in the dynamic project lifecycle and under which 
circumstances (Alderman and Ivory, 2007; Eriksson, 2015; Ahola, Vuori and Viitamo, 
2017). Also, the contribution of integrative activities to value creation and project 
performance remains ambiguous. Furthermore, the role of suppliers has been portrayed 
as passive. Relational contracting is mostly promoted by markets or clients to benefit 
clients (Akintoye and Main, 2007), thus is largely reactive from the perspective of supply 
chains (Smyth, 2015b). Furthermore, supply chains’ motivations of preserving and 
expanding resources to support a certain client’s value have received little interest, as 
Dainty, Millett and Briscoe (2001, p. 170) remarked: “This assumption relies upon the 
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notion that those involved in the construction process have an inherent preference to be 
integrated”. 
1.2.3 The institutional logic: G-DL and P-FL 
Apart from management approaches, the difficulty of establishing and maintaining 
collaboration has resulted from the current institutional logic in the construction industry 
– that is, goods-dominant logic (G-DL) and project-focused logic (P-FL). G-DL is a 
concept originally from the marketing domain and stresses the way that value is created. 
Under G-DL, value is added in goods and services by producers before selling and is 
determined at the point of transaction or series of transactions, which is value-in-exchange 
(Vargo and Lusch, 2004). Value-in-exchange is the negotiated figures that customer and 
supplier agree to pay and receive, and is furnished by accounting systems that capture this 
limited form of value (Vargo and Lusch, 2006). P-FL is a concept specifically in project 
management, including construction project management, and drives the management of 
projects in a project-by-project way to maximise value-in-exchange (Kadefors, 2004). G-
DL and P-FL led to the interpretation that supply chains are a vehicle to increase project 
efficiency and relationships terminate with the project; projects have no memory and 
collaboration is mostly built from scratch (Dubois and Gadde, 2002b). Within short time-
frame goals and interests, G-DL and P-FL drive project actors and organisations to focus 
more on the immediate benefits and tasks and manage projects in a project-by-project 
way, instead of seeing the collective value across projects. However, as it will be argued 
in the next section, the G-DL and P-FL view is a narrow one in the context of construction. 
Projects are temporary, yet typically have more stable and permanent organisations as 
sponsors or in support as part of the broader network or ecosystem (Winch, 2014). Few 
projects emerge from a vacuum and some relational contact is typically present, directly 
or indirectly (Engwall, 2003).  
G-DL and P-FL enable the recursive use of fragmented approaches to managing projects, 
which, in turn, strengthen and eventually institutionalise G-DL and P-FL. Fragmented 
approaches are inclusive of practices such as isolating design and build phases, 
competitive procurement processes that focus on lowest cost and individual 
organisations’ capability rather than their collective capability to integrate and work 
together effectively, human resource allocation to minimise transaction costs, 
management and assessment in a project-by-project way, and performance criteria 
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focusing on the efficiency of individual projects (Kadefors, 2004; Smyth, 2015a). These 
approaches have been repeatedly employed in the construction industry as they are 
perceived, especially by clients, to help reduce their own risks and bring about project 
efficiency, which have caused divergent perceptions of value between different 
organisations, inefficient production and communication, arms-length relationships, 
blame cultures and opportunistic behaviour within projects (Egan, 1998; Dubois and 
Gadde, 2002b; Bresnen et al., 2003; Cicmil and Marshall, 2005; Fulford and Standing, 
2014). Relational contracting and partnering have been promoted as a solution. However, 
without addressing the transactionally-rooted logic behind practices, relational 
contracting and partnering are insufficient for maintaining effective and healthy 
relationships, especially among supply chains (Bresnen, 2007; Kadefors and Badenfelt, 
2009). In some cases, relational contracting and partnering were found to be used as a 
veneer for the underlying traditional power relationships, a guise used by main 
contractors to reap the profits from supply chains (Dainty, Briscoe and Millett, 2001; 
Packham, Thomas and Miller, 2003; Alderman and Ivory, 2007; Bresnen, 2007), resulting 
in reluctance of supply chains to enter partnering (Crespin-Mazet and Portier, 2010).  
From the perspective of main contractors, under G-DL and P-FL, collaboration initiatives 
have tended to be project-specific and dissolve after project completion, which causes 
loss of knowledge after project teams are dissolved and members are assigned to different 
projects, and hence failure to transfer lessons from successful partnering projects to 
support continuous improvement (Davies and Brady, 2000; Smyth, 2010). From the 
perspective of supply chains, practices under G-DL and P-FL make it difficult to jointly 
create value with stakeholders, clients and main contractors. Supply chains are burdened 
with the demands from main contractors, clients and stakeholders, which, as 
demonstrated before, are divergent, dynamic and therefore hard to satisfy. Moreover, the 
emergence of a large number of specialist companies as part of the subsystems providing 
similar goods and services for a relatively small number of large main contractors means 
that, to maintain and lever value through delivering construction projects, supply chains 
require more specialised knowledge, technical expertise and equipment and thus more 
investments in both tangible and intangible resources (Pryke, 2009; Walker, 2015). The 
industry generally lacks a sufficient understanding of value in the broader sense (Brady, 
Davies and Gann, 2005a) and the engagement in terms of financial links has been 
identified as weak between main contractors and supply chains (Pala et al., 2014). The 
burden of risks, lack of investments and constraint of resources collectively hinder 
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continuous collaboration and improvement across projects on the side of supply chains 
(Smyth, 2010). Figure 2 summarised factors that make collaboration among construction 
supply chains difficult. 
 
Figure 2 Why is supply chain collaboration challenging? 
1.3 Collaboration among supply chains: a relational approach 
Combining the perspectives of construction project management, construction supply 
chain management and the institutional logic, Figure 2 points to the need for conceptual 
and empirical research that: 
1) Puts supply chain relationships at the centre of analysing and theorising; 
2) Offers a complementary logic to G-DL and P-FL that goes beyond value-in-exchange; 
3) Addresses detailed knowledge about the process and context of inducing and 
sustaining supply chain collaboration and value for all parties involved. 
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1.3.1 Supply chain relationships at the centre of analysis 
Collaboration between supply chain members and value creation is less likely to succeed 
without the support from inter-organisational relationships (IORs) that are featured as 
mutual adaptions and orientation, interdependency and a collaborative atmosphere 
(Gadde and Dubois, 2010). However, IORs are usually mentioned in the context of 
projects, which downplays their distinctive role and importance (Sydow and Braun, 
2017).  
At the project level, inter-organisational relationships are an important factor in joint 
problem solving, flexible resource allocation, and coping with uncertainties and dynamics 
(Jones and Lichtenstein, 2008; Manning and Sydow, 2011; Ligthart, Oerlemans and 
Noorderhaven, 2016). IORs bridge distinct projects in time and space and can create 
continuity (Engwall, 2003; DeFillippi and Sydow, 2016). Actors and organisations 
delivering projects have earlier experience and future orientations; most projects have 
processors and successors as well as simultaneous peers (Jones and Lichtenstein, 2008; 
Manning, 2008). Despite the ‘institutionalised termination’ (Lundin and Söderholm, 
1995), relationships between main contractors and subcontractors typically tend to remain 
at least as ‘sleeping relationships’ until they are reactivated for future projects (Smyth, 
2015b; Sydow and Braun, 2017). At the organisation level, IORs help transfer knowledge, 
reduce cognitive distance, manage structural and dynamic complexity, and offer 
economies of repetition and recombination across projects (Brady and Davies, 2004; 
Bresnen, Goussevskaia and Swan, 2004; Grabher, 2004; Manning and Sydow, 2011). 
Further, relationships between organisations in project networks stabilise and strengthen 
practices in projects (Manning and Sydow, 2011). 
On the other hand, it has been argued that prior successful collaboration and relationships 
may lead to path-dependent development that reduces flexibility and value in 
collaboration over time because of both structural and relational inertia (Sydow, 
Schreyögg and Koch, 2009; Sydow, 2017). Path dependence, in general, refers to self-
reinforcing processes triggered by contingent events, subsequently intensified such that 
the options for action are constrained, and eventually leading to lock-in situations 
(Manning and Sydow, 2011). In path-dependent development, relational and structural 
persistence hinder effective management and, in extreme cases such as lock-in situations, 
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might lead to following the development path that has already been determined by certain 
events.  
The managerial paradox between the positive and negative effects points to the 
importance of understanding IORs, and only then reaping the benefit from past experience 
and preventing path-dependent development. In this line of thought, this thesis agrees 
with Sydow and Braun (2017, p. 3), “…the interorganizational dimension deserves to be 
perceived as being in the centre rather than in the context when theorizing temporary 
organizations.” 
The call for more focus on IORs, which include supply chain relationships, accords to the 
relational approach in construction project management (cf. Smyth and Pryke, 2008; 
Pryke and Smyth, 2012).  
1.3.2 A complementary logic to G-DL and P-FL 
Apart from value-in-exchange, actors and organisations can gain non-financial benefits 
from collaboration with other parties; the latter has been argued as key to successful 
collaboration (Akintoye and Main, 2007). Knowledge and relationship have been widely 
recognised in both practice and research as strategic advantages for firms and are as, if 
not more, important as goods and services (Smyth, 2015b). In construction projects, value 
is jointly and dynamically created in relationships between actors, between actors and 
organisations, and between organisations (Pryke and Smyth, 2006). Knowledge learnt in 
service interactions with other parties enriches actors’ experience, improves value 
propositions and levers service value. Furthermore, knowledge and relationships might 
develop future dynamic capabilities at both project and firm levels and benefit future 
business through the economies of repetition and recombination (Brady and Davies, 
2004). To lever value derived from knowledge and relationships, therefore, requires at 
least a complementary logic to G-DL and P-FL that goes beyond value-in-exchange and 
transactional performance criteria such as cost, time and quality. 
1.3.3 A process-based perspective 
Taking a process-based perspective of studying collaboration among supply chains helps 
demonstrate the process of collaboration and the value created or destroyed in the process. 
Relational contracting and partnering have been used to encourage continuous 
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collaboration and relationships in a series of projects. Nevertheless, as mentioned before, 
only relying on collaborative arrangements initiated at the front end and contractual level 
by no means ensures collaborative practices and effective relationships at the operational 
level (Cicmil and Marshall, 2005; Lau and Rowlinson, 2009; Suprapto et al., 2016). The 
challenge of partnering as it appears in contracts and agreements is partly due to the 
assumption of static equilibrium conditions that ignores temporal dynamics and 
emergence (Langley and Tsoukas, 2010). A process-based perspective provides another 
approach to studying collaboration and relationships as situated sequences of events and 
complexes of processes unfolding in time. On the other hand, environmental and systemic 
uncertainties and dynamics render difficulties in specifying future conditions ex ante, 
pointing to the need for process research that considers ongoing interactions between 
actors and organisations, experiential and reflexive learning, and emergency (Langley, 
1999; Sydow and Braun, 2017).  
Apart from interactions, a process-based approach also focuses on how things that unfold 
and change over time and tend to associate with social and relational contexts (Langley 
et al., 2013). IORs, in particular supply chain relationships, are embedded multilevel 
service ecosystem including projects, organisations, inter-organisational networks and 
organisational fields (Manning, 2008; Sydow, 2017). Structures of the service system 
enable and constrain interactions between actors and organisations (Bresnen, 
Goussevskaia and Swan, 2004). The term ‘organisations’ here refers to client 
organisations and construction firms as well as those in supply chains that are relatively 
stable and more ‘indeterminate’ than projects (Winch, 2014). Projects are part of a project 
series or even an entire programme (Brady and Davies, 2004; Brady and Davies, 2014). 
Unique project tasks can consist of several non-unique technical components and highly 
standardised procedures (Engwall, 2003). Furthermore, organisations equip project actors 
with organisational goals, rules of conduct, norms and values that can influence actors’ 
interpretations and decisions when they engage in project activities. Inter-organisational 
networks induce network goals, power relations, resources, roles and responsibilities 
between multiple actors representing different organisations (Manning, 2008). The 
organisational field comprises institutional life in which clients, construction firms, 
designers, regulatory agencies and other stakeholders are engaged with each other in the 
face of institutional environment (Bachmann and Inkpen, 2011).  
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1.4 Research aim and objectives  
This chapter introduced the research context of the construction industry and construction 
supply chains. It particularly explored the question, ‘Why is collaboration difficult to 
induce and sustain, especially among supply chains?’ The review of collaboration from 
the perspectives of construction project management, construction supply chain 
management and institutional logic points to the importance of supply chain relationships, 
a complementary logic to G-DL and P-FL, and a relational and process-based approach 
to managing supply chain collaboration.  
Trust is fundamental to supply chain relationships and collaboration. The ability to 
develop and maintain trust is believed to be valuable for collaboration in construction 
projects because it can enhance communication, enable flexible operations, sustain 
partnering and increase project performance (Kadefors, 2004; Ligthart, Oerlemans and 
Noorderhaven, 2016; Swärd, 2016). To promote and improve supply chain collaboration 
in construction projects, this research aims to investigate the value of trust in construction 
supply chains. Detailed objectives under the overarching aim are: 
(1) Identifying the process of trust development in construction supply chains; 
(2) Providing an institutional logic at least complementary to G-DL and P-FL as a lens 
of analysing value and value-creating activities beyond points of transactions towards 
value-in-use (Vargo and Lusch, 2004; Saxon, 2005) in construction project lifecycles; 
(3) Shedding light on the unfolding value of trust over time for those involved, including 
main contractors and subcontractors.  
To achieve the aim and objectives, primary research questions are formulated as follows: 
(1) Whether and if so how does trust from main contractor to second-tier subcontractor 
develop during service interactions between the two? 
(2) Whether and if so how does trust from main contractor to second-tier subcontractor 
dynamically help increase service value during service interactions between the two? 
Taking a critical realist approach, as will be demonstrated in the Chapter 4, this thesis 
studies the dynamic process of trust development and the unfolding value by 
investigating the generative mechanisms and associated phenomenon. In other words, 
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the mechanisms affecting trust development and thus value, and the dynamic 
phenomenon of trust in the process are the foci of the investigation.  
The above questions lead to our literature review on theories of trust and service-dominant 
logic (S-DL) as a complementary lens to G-DL and P-FL.  
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Chapter 2 Trust in construction projects and 
supply chains 
Trust is fundamental to relationships (Smyth, Gustafsson and Ganskau, 2010). Putting 
supply chain relationships at the centre of analysis and theorising means a close 
examination of trust in supply chains. In construction, trust had not gained much interest 
until the prevalence of partnering following the Egan Report (1998). In the traditional 
project management approach where transaction efficiency and cost minimisation are the 
priority, relationships and trust have been treated, if at all, as a frictional drag. Egan (1998) 
explicitly pointed out the potential relationship value in construction supply chains by 
‘partnering supply chains’ and hence stimulated interest in the role of trust relationships 
and the mechanism of trust building (Zaghloul and Hartman, 2003; Kadefors, 2004; 
Wong et al., 2008; Pishdad-Bozorgi and Beliveau, 2016).  
This chapter introduces trust theories into the research context. Our review first 
investigates the concept of trust from different perspectives and then narrows down to the 
specific context of construction projects and supply chain relationships. The literature 
review identifies three dimensions of trust: trust perceptions, trust orientations and 
trusting behaviour. On the basis of these dimensions, the following sections then explore 
how trust develops in general social contexts and in construction projects and supply 
chain relationships specifically.  
2.1 Trust: what is it? 
“Trust, in the broadest sense, is a basic fact of social life.” 
(Luhmann, 1979, p. 1) 
Despite the broad relevance of trust in various areas (e.g., Deutsch, 1962 and Rotter, 1967 
in psychology; Luhmann, 1982 and Lewis and Weigert, 1985 in sociology; Williamson, 
1993 in economics; Mayer, Davis and Schoorman, 1995, Sydow, 1998 and Rousseau et 
al., 1998 in organisational studies; Kadefors, 2004 and Smyth, Gustafsson and Ganskau, 
2010 in project management), no definition is commonly accepted among these areas. 
Trust is at the centre of webs of concepts (Table 1).  
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Table 1 Trust and its relatives 
Concept  Literatures Definition 
Behaviour Deutsch (1962, 
quoted in Zand, 
1972, p. 230) 
Trusting behaviour is defined here as consisting of actions that 
(a) increase one's vulnerability, (b) to another whose behaviour 
is not under one's control, (c) in a situation in which the penalty 
(disutility) one suffers if the other abuses that vulnerability is 
greater than the benefit (utility) one gains if the other does not 
abuse that vulnerability. 
Zand (1972, p. 
230) 
…the conscious regulation of one's dependence on another that 
will vary with the task, the situation, and the other person. 
Schlenker, 
Helm and 
Tedeschi (1973, 
p. 419) 
…reliance upon information received from another person 
about uncertain environmental states and their accompanying 
outcomes in a risky environment. 
General 
expectation 
Rotter (1967, p 
.653) 
…generalized expectancy that the oral or written statements of 
other people can be relied upon… 
Perception of, 
confidence in or 
expectation on 
the other’s 
trustworthiness 
Bradach and 
Eccles (1989, p. 
104) 
…a type of expectation that alleviates the fear that one’s 
exchange partner will act opportunistically. 
Sako 1992, p. 
32) 
Trust is a state of mind, an expectation held by one trading 
partner about another, that the other behaves or responds in a 
predictable and mutually expected manner. 
Cummings and 
Bromily (1996, 
p. 303) 
Trust will be defined as an individual’s belief or a common 
belief among a group of individuals that another individual or 
group (a) makes good-faith efforts to behave in accordance 
with any commitments both explicit or implicit, (b) is honest in 
whatever negotiations preceded such commitments, and (c) 
does not take excessive advantage of another even when the 
opportunity is available. 
Doney and 
Cannon (1997, 
p. 36)  
…trust as the perceived credibility and benevolence of a target 
of trust. 
Young-Ybarra 
and Wiersema 
(1999, p. 443) 
…trust as a construct based on three components-
dependability, predictability, and faith. 
Dyer and Chu 
(2000, p. 260) 
…trust as one party’s confidence that the other party in the 
exchange relationship will not exploit its vulnerabilities. 
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Subjective 
probability 
Gambetta 
(1988, p. 217) 
…trust (or, symmetrically, distrust) is a particular level of the 
subjective probability with which an agent assesses that 
another agent or group of agents will perform a particular 
action...When we say we trust someone or that someone is 
trustworthy, we implicitly mean that the probability that he will 
perform an action that is beneficial or at least not detrimental 
to us is high enough for us to consider engaging in some form 
of cooperation with him. 
Coleman and 
Coleman (1994, 
p. 91) 
…a subclass of those involving risk. They are situations in 
which the risk one takes depends on the performance of another 
actor. 
Intention to rely 
on 
Anderson and 
Narus (1986, p. 
320) 
…the firm's belief that another company will perform actions 
that will result in positive outcomes for the firm, as well as not 
take unexpected actions that would result in negative outcomes 
for the firm. The strength of this belief may lead the firm to 
make a trusting response or action, whereby the firm commits 
itself to a possible loss, depending upon the subsequent actions 
of the other company… 
Mayer, Davis 
and Schoorman 
(1995, p. 712) 
…the willingness of a party to be vulnerable to the actions of 
another party based on the expectation that the other will 
perform a particular action important to the trustor, 
irrespective of the ability to monitor or control that other party. 
Zaheer, 
McEvily and 
Perrone (1998, 
p. 143) 
trust as the expectation that an actor (1) can be relied on to 
fulfil obligations, (2) will behave in a predictable manner, and 
(3) will act and negotiate fairly when the possibility for 
opportunism is present. 
Rousseau et al. 
(1998, p. 395) 
Trust is a psychological state comprising the intention to accept 
vulnerability based upon positive expectations of the intentions 
or behaviour of another. 
To answer the question ‘What is trust?’, it is useful to draw a boundary between ‘what 
trust is’ and ‘what trust is not’ in the context of this research. Trust is originated between 
people. Actors are able to develop trust in other actors, collective actors such as 
organisations and institutions (Doney and Cannon, 1997; Fulmer and Gelfand, 2012). The 
conceptualisation of trust starts with an individual’s trust. Trust can also be inter-
organisational based upon the sum of the key interactions and individuals (Zaheer, 
McEvily and Perrone, 1998). Conceptualising trust at the individual level can shed light 
on inter-organisational trust. 
Trust is not entirely about actions. Trust has often been associated with the choice of 
social alignment, cooperation, dependence and reliance (e.g., Deutsch, 1962; Zand, 
1972). Cooperative behaviour and reliance can be driven by factors other than trust, such 
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as power or ignorance. Reliance is a broader concept than trust (Nooteboom, 2002). 
Actors and collective actors might rely on the other party because trustors are protected 
by legal orders such as laws or private orders such as close monitoring (cf. Jiang, 
Henneberg and Naudé, 2009). Trusting behaviour needs to be studied in relation to trust 
attitudes (Nooteboom, 2002). Behaviourally, to trust is to undertake a risky course of 
action based on the positive expectation that is gained and adapted in a social context over 
time (Mayer, Davis and Schoorman, 1995). Behavioural enactment of trust is an 
important facet of trust, especially trust between organisations, and demonstrates the 
practical significance of trust (Lewis and Weigert, 1985). 
Trust is not entirely about the perception of, confidence in or expectation of 
trustworthiness. Trustworthiness is a characteristic of the trustee and consists of a series 
of qualities differentiating one trustee from another such as competence, integrity and 
benevolence (Mayer, Davis and Schoorman, 1995). Trustworthiness can be 
conceptualised as the opposite of opportunism, and an exchange partner worthy of trust 
is one that is perceived not to behave opportunistically (Lyons and Mehta, 1997). 
Instances of opportunistic behaviour include providing inaccurate informational 
resources or goods and services of lower quality than agreed and holding up resources 
such as payment. In the business-to-business context, value creation potential is one of 
the determinants of perceived trustworthiness and the right degree of trust to maintain and 
promote positive outcomes (Fawcett, Jones and Fawcett, 2012; Manu et al., 2015). 
Perceived trustworthiness does not necessarily lead to trust (cf. Doney and Cannon, 
1997). Based on the belief in the other party’s trustworthiness, trust involves an 
underlying disposition or intention towards relying on the other party and undertaking a 
risky course of action (Mayer, Davis and Schoorman, 1995; Rousseau et al., 1998; Smyth, 
Gustafsson and Ganskau, 2010). 
The difference between expectation and trust is that trust requires a certain level of 
dependence or interdependence between two parties, whereas expectation does not. 
Expectation is normative as one cannot live without expectation on contingent events and 
trust is only available in selected objects in certain contexts. Trust differs from power in 
that the latter usually involves unilateral dependence. Furthermore, according to 
Luhmann (1988), trust differs from confidence in that the latter depends on contingency 
and danger whereas the former depends on a situation of risk. Risk is different from 
danger in that it emerges only as a consequence of decisions and actions. Risk does not 
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exist by itself: if one refrains from decision or action, one has no risk. Both trust and 
confidence might entail disappointment. The disappointment associated with confidence 
is likely to be attributed to external contingencies and that with trust is to one’s own 
trusting attitudes and behaviour. In other words, if one prefers one actor to another, 
despite the possibility of disappointment by the actions of the actor selected, one is in a 
situation of trust.  
Trust is not a subjective probability or predictability. Defining trust as a subjective 
probability “with which an agent assesses that another agent or group of agents will 
perform a particular action” that “is beneficial or at least not detrimental to us” 
(Gambetta, 1988, p. 2017) means to reduce trust to a form of rational calculation. In this 
vein, trust is the highest when the probability of another party performing beneficial or at 
least not detrimental actions is unity, so that no risks are perceived. However, trust is 
generated and develops where things are uncertain and cannot be seen (Luhmann, 1988; 
Mayer, Davis and Schoorman, 1995; Smyth, 2008). Trust involves an acceptance of risk 
in uncertainties; if there is no risk, we can no longer speak of trust (Gulati, 1995; Smyth, 
2008). Further, the notion of subjective probability leads to the concept of prediction.  
Nor is trust a prediction, the correctness of which could be measured when the 
predicted event occurs and after some experience reduced to a probability value. 
These types of techniques which are significant within the framework of decision-
making models have, as does trust, the function of reducing complexity. They are 
functional equivalents for trust but not acts of trust in the true sense. 
Luhmann (1979, p. 88) 
The calculation of probability presupposes the predication of the party’s behaviour. 
Predication builds upon an accumulating of information while trust enables an 
overdrawing of information available in context. “Trust begins where prediction ends” 
(Lewis and Weigert, 1985, p. 976).  
Trust is not familiarity. Familiarity provides a sense of assurance by drawing a distinction 
between familiar and unfamiliar fields and enabling actors to live with the familiar while 
acknowledging the unfamiliar as opaque. Familiarity might breed trust through repeated 
interactions (Gulati, 1995). Nevertheless, building trust mainly relying on familiarity 
requires time, which might not always be possible in temporary organisations such as 
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construction projects. In the context of inter-organisational projects, institutional 
arrangements and role assignment are used as complementary to familiarity to build trust 
in a short time period (Meyerson, Weick and Kramer, 1996; DeFillippi and Sydow, 2016; 
Swärd, 2016). 
The literature review on trust in social science demonstrates that trust is generated and 
develops where things are uncertain (Mayer, Davis and Schoorman, 1995; Smyth, 2008). 
In construction, uncertainties might reside in the environment but also in the other party’s 
action and intention (Dubois and Gadde, 2002b). These uncertainties might cause 
environmental and relational risks (Das and Teng, 2001) as well as opportunities. In the 
situation of trust, the presence of risks is known and can be avoided, yet at the expense of 
waiving the associated opportunities (Luhmann, 1988). To trust is to reduce perceived 
environmental risks by engaging in relationships with others, and to accept the risk of 
loss if the trusted one falls short of the trust bestowed. The other party’s freedom of action 
to be trustworthy or opportunistic is acknowledged, which makes reflexive learning and 
contextual adapting in projects meaningful. 
Based on extant research (Mayer, Davis and Schoorman, 1995; Rousseau, Sitkin, Burt 
and Camerer, 1998; Smyth, Gustafsson and Ganskau, 2010; Sydow, 1998), this study 
uses a working definition of trust as:  
An actor’s current intention to rely on the actions of or to be vulnerable to another 
party, based on the expectation that the other party can reduce risks and co-create 
value in a relationship. 
This thesis focuses on inter-organisational trust from main contractor to second-tier 
subcontractor. A relationship can be interpersonal. It can also be inter-organisational 
based upon the sum of the key interactions and individuals. Interpersonal trust 
accumulated in business interactions can be transformed to trust in the organisation 
represented by trusted actors (Doney and Cannon, 1997). The behaviour and attitudes of 
a project manager, for example, might be assumed to reflect the values and attitudes of 
his or her organisation in general. With respect to inter-organisational trust, this thesis 
follows Zaheer, McEvily and Perrone (1998), who conceptualise inter-organisational 
trust to reflect the collectively-held trust intention by members in one organisation 
towards another organisation, in this case, trust intention by actors in main contractor 
organisations towards subcontractor organisations.   
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2.2 How does trust develop? 
2.2.1 The bases of trust development 
Trust between people and organisations at least partly arises from the ontological security 
provided by institutions and institutional arrangements – that is, systems trust or 
institutional-based trust (Zucker, 1986; Giddens, 1990; Bachmann and Inkpen, 2011). 
Relationships are embedded in a multilevel service ecosystem that enables and constrains 
interactions and trust between collectives of project actors (Grabher, 2002; Bresnen, 
Goussevskaia and Swan, 2004; Manning, 2008). The organisational fields supply 
institutional arrangements that include formal and informal structural arrangements such 
as laws, legal regulations, cultures and norms (Zucker, 1986; Bachmann and Inkpen, 
2011). Inter-organisational networks and organisations offer obligations, norms and 
routines inherited in industries, project networks and organisations (Meyerson, Weick 
and Kramer, 1996; Manning and Sydow, 2011). At the project level, formal contracts, 
project routines, resources, programmes and relational norms formed in day-to-day 
interactions influence trust development (Kadefors, 2004; Maurer, 2010).  
Authority and sanction derived from structures of the service ecosystem induce 
accountability and drive the fulfilment of contractual obligations and commitment 
(Williamson, 1985; Woolthuis, Hillebrand and Nooteboom, 2005). On the other hand, 
accountability beyond a healthy level, building excessive safeguards in the form of close 
monitoring, for instance, may negatively influence a relationship and the level of trust 
(Woolthuis, Hillebrand and Nooteboom, 2005). Formal and informal rules furnish 
common knowledge and roles are appropriate for the systems in which they are involved. 
This applies to programme management, where the programme system is found on the 
supply or demand side or both. Role assignment is based upon training, industry or 
professional certifications of competency, and the record of performance in previous 
project engagement (DeFillippi and Sydow, 2016). These roles define institutionalised 
behaviour that is stable and enduring and connect individuals to the large organisational 
system. Hence, rules and resources facilitate interactions between actors and 
organisations of different knowledge domains but also enable the suspension of 
judgement on the trustworthiness of the other party at early stages of a relationship and 
allow a ‘leap of faith’ under uncertainties (Meyerson, Weick and Kramer, 1996; Bechky, 
2006). 
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In construction, as discussed in Chapter 1, rules and resources from stakeholders in the 
ecosystem are divergent, including organisational policy, communication system, 
contracts, agreements and joint decision-making structures (Ngowi and Pienaar, 2005; 
Wong et al., 2008; Lahdenperä, 2012). Formal procedures and arrangements can 
strengthen communication channels between partners, facilitate organisational functions 
and improve organisational relationships (Wong et al., 2008). On the other hand, the cost-
saving initiative driven by the organisation level or transactional norms of the industry, 
can impede trust development (Kadefors, 2004). Bases of power also disperse. Project 
organisations are decentralised and authorise project actors power at use, but whether and 
how to use power depends on interests of organisations but also power relationships and 
resources in the projects (Bresnen, Goussevskaia and Swan, 2004).  
Projects are connected by past experiences and future expectations of actors and 
collective actors in the ecosystem (Grabher, 2002; Jones and Lichtenstein, 2008; 
Manning, 2008; Elfenbein and Zenger, 2014). Past experiences form initial conditions 
that can foster cognitive learning of how cooperation should take place and behavioural 
learning of how to make the cooperation work (Doz, 1996; Poppo, Zhou and Ryu, 2008). 
When two parties have no prior experiences, third-party recommendation and the 
integrity of the third party are important to the formation of trust at an early stage of the 
relationship (Mayer, Davis and Schoorman, 1995). In construction projects, the effects of 
past experiences depend on organising practices, staffing practices and role assignment, 
for instance (Maurer, 2010; Ligthart, Oerlemans and Noorderhaven, 2016). Future 
relationships and business opportunities affect the motivation to collaborate and invest in 
trust-based relationships (Kadefors, 2004; Nordqvist, Hovmark and Zika-Viktorsson, 
2004; Poppo, Zhou and Ryu, 2008; Swärd, 2016).  
2.2.2 Trust in interactions 
Despite the importance of institutional-based trust, trust built upon indirect interactions 
and third-party sources is ‘thin’ and needs interactions between individuals and 
organisations to maintain and develop (Barney and Hansen, 1994). For instance, 
individuals might not fully fulfil their assigned roles (Goffman, 1961) and thus trust 
initiated based on role assignment needs adaption in day-to-day interactions. Institutional-
based trust focuses on the fulfilment of formal obligations and accountabilities. Apart 
from formal relationships specified in the contract, informal relationships established in 
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day-to-day interactions also can also be attributed to trust between actors and 
organisations. Trust exists and develops in relationships among people and organisations 
rather than within isolated individuals; the latter would have no occasion or need to trust 
apart from engaging in relationships (Lewis and Weigert, 1985). In a business context, 
interaction is a mutual or reciprocal process in which two or more parties are involved in 
each other’s practices or in contact with each other (Grönroos and Ravald, 2011). This 
subsection focuses on trust in direct interactions, in which interacting parties are co-
present in a context and can simultaneously influence the process (Echeverri and Skålén, 
2011; Grönroos and Voima, 2013). 
The development of trust needs cognition (McAllister, 1995), based on which a cognitive 
decision can be made about “whom we will trust in which respects and under which 
circumstances” (Lewis and Weigert, 1985, p. 970). In construction, communication, 
transparency, past performance, and financial status are key factors for activating 
cognition-based trust in another organisation (Wong and Cheung, 2005; Wong et al., 
2008; Lahdenperä, 2012; Pishdad-Bozorgi and Beliveau, 2016). The cognition process is 
not static. Lewicki and Bunker (1996) demonstrate the evolution of the cognitive process 
in which trust develops. At an early stage of the relationship, trust might be calculus-
based or deterrent-based. The former is based on the belief that the other party will behave 
as promised because of the fear of the sanctions or loss from not behaving well (Lewicki 
and Bunker, 1996), whereas the latter considers both the loss from not being trustworthy 
and the possible gains from granting trust (Shapiro, Sheppard and Cheraskin, 1992). As 
interactions continue, actors gather information and knowledge and the development of 
trust at this stage relies on the predictability of the other party and offering reasons for 
increasing or withdrawing trust (Sheppard and Sherman, 1998). This stage of trust is 
called knowledge-based trust (Lewicki and Bunker, 1996) or relational trust (Rousseau et 
al., 1998). 
However, this does not mean that trust development or erosion is a result of cognitive 
calculation (cf. Williamson, 1993). According to Williamson (1993), calculativeness 
means that actors engage in a transaction with each other based on probabilities of 
possible outcomes and associated net gain, and actions are driven by cost-effectiveness 
and profit maximum. Calculative trust in this vein is a subset of calculated risk resulting 
from dependencies and can be enacted only when risk is minimised. Research 
(McAllister, 1995; Nooteboom, 2002) has pointed out that trust development involves 
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intentional, experiential and reflexive learning. Intentional learning means that actors and 
organisations assess the other party’s trustworthiness in a purposive way (Giddens, 1984). 
Experiential learning means learning in shared experiences whereas reflexive learning 
monitors actions and perceptions afterwards in a reflexive way. Experiential and reflexive 
learning enable actors to gain tacit and practical knowledge that is largely intuitive (Smyth 
et al., 2010). Tacit knowledge refers to the part of knowledge that is hard to formalise and 
communicate and explicit knowledge is the part that can be codified and transmitted in 
formal and systematic ways (Polanyi, 1962; Nonaka, 1994). Increased knowledge helps 
adapt actions and practices for better resource integration. “Learning, in all, involves 
acquiring identities that reflect both how a learner sees the world and how the world sees 
the learner” (Brown and Duguid, 2001, p. 200), and therefore actors learn about but also 
learn to be. Actors learn about the changing demands and requirements in context, 
process, technical skills and capabilities required for service delivery, and learn to be a 
partner by seeking their partners’ preferences, values, routines and competence. Also, 
they can learn about the appropriateness of their goals in context, the sustainability of the 
process and sufficiency of the resources.  
Experiential and reflexive learning involve a cumulative process that helps form a 
common basis conducive to knowledge generation, internalisation and use (Cohen and 
Levinthal, 1990; Nonaka, 1994; Inkpen, 1998). Through repeated interactions, patterns 
of trusting and trustworthy behaviour, under structural conditions, can eventually be 
routinised (Sydow, Schreyögg and Koch, 2009). Relational norms might emerge and help 
tie actors and organisations together by contributing to positive expectations and forming 
the desire to uphold the relationship with each other (Macneil, 1980; Pervan, Bove and 
Johnson, 2009). This facilitates actors and organisations to build relational bonds by 
expressing and receiving care and respect (McAllister, 1995), hence creating identities. 
This stage of trust accords to identification trust in Rousseau et al. (1998). Psychological 
contracts are initiated, under which actors voluntarily stay trustworthy as they understand 
the importance of maintaining relationships (Sheppard and Sherman, 1998). Trust is 
sustained not least because of institutional arrangements but also who the actors are 
(Sydow, Schreyögg and Koch, 2009). In other words, identification-based trust forms and 
increases the value of such relationships (Coleman, 1988; Lewicki and Bunker, 1996; 
Smyth, Gustafsson and Ganskau, 2010). This view contradicts the assumption of 
transaction cost economics that “opportunistic agents will not self-enforce open-ended 
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promises to behave responsibly” (Williamson, 1993: 469) and risk can only be reduced 
by contractual safeguards.  
Although the emotional component is strongest in close interpersonal trust, mutual 
identification can present in inter-organisational relationships through ties and bonds 
between actors. For instance, care and help between project team members can initiate 
and strengthen identities between organisations, if they are translated to the organisation 
level through systems of relationship management, behaviour programme and codes 
(Smyth, 2015b). In construction, to generate identification trust and induce long-term 
relationships and relational investment needs mutual understanding, care, consideration 
of mutual benefits and consistency (Kadefors, 2004; Wong et al., 2008; Pishdad-Bozorgi 
and Beliveau, 2016). 
Interactions enable actors and organisations to know more about the other party’s ability, 
benevolence and integrity (Mayer, Davis and Schoorman, 1995), which can lead to 
trusting behaviour to demonstrate the practical significance of trust (Lewicki and Bunker, 
1996). Behaviourally, to trust is to undertake a risky course of action based on the positive 
expectation placed on the other party (Mayer, Davis and Schoorman, 1995). Apart from 
reflecting attitudinal trust, trusting behaviour also creates interaction opportunities for 
gathering more information, reinforcing or eroding relational ties and adapting the extent 
of trust, pointing to the dynamic nature of trust development (Lewis and Weigert, 1985; 
Huang and Wilkinson, 2013; Jarratt and Ceric, 2015).   
2.3 What is the phenomenon of trust? 
Trust dynamically develops in multiple dimensions, forming the phenomenon of trust in 
interactions. This section demonstrates trust from three perspectives: perception, 
orientation and behaviour. 
2.3.1 The perception of trustworthiness 
The perception of trustworthiness in terms of the other party’s competence and intention 
has been recognised as one dimension (Sako, 1992; Mayer, Davis and Schoorman, 1995). 
In construction, competence trust relates to technical and organisational capability such 
as supply chain reliability, financial stability, insurance, past project performance and 
health and safety (H&S) records, whereas intention trust relates to honesty, integrity and 
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benevolence, such as refraining from opportunism when an opportunity arises, 
performing to the best of their ability in dealing with challenging tasks and working as a 
team (Hartman, 2000; Zaghloul and Hartman, 2003).  
2.3.2 The orientation of trust 
With the same interpretation of the other party’s trustworthiness, trust and trust-based 
relationships might be driven by different orientations. The second dimension of trust is 
the trustor’s motivation for engaging in trust relations, which might be self-interested or 
socially-oriented. Self-interested trust is essentially forward-looking, actors only looking 
at the transaction-end payoffs against their own narrow short-term interests (Lyons and 
Mehta, 1997). Trust relations are initiated within the boundaries of transactions that are 
treated as isolated even when they are serial. The fundamental question is ‘What can the 
other party do for me?’ (Smyth and Edkins, 2007). Socially-oriented trust is built upon 
recognising social relations and systems beyond the boundaries of the transactions. It 
considers the process of pursuing the end (Lyons and Mehta, 1997). In other words, social 
orientations can be seen as a suspension of self-interest for the benefit of both parties as 
a whole (Nooteboom, 2002). The fundamental question is ‘What can I do for us?’ (Smyth 
and Edkins, 2007). In this vein, socially-oriented trust raises the asset value of social 
capital between organisations (Coleman, 1988; Smyth et al., 2010). 
2.3.3 Trusting behaviour 
To fully understand the phenomenon of trust, “behavioural trust should be 
conceptualised as situationally activated cognitive and/or emotional trust” (Lewis and 
Weigert, 1985,  p. 977). Moreover, trust needs behavioural manifestation to underwrite 
the practical value in context (Lewis and Weigert, 1985). Repeated patterns of trusting 
behaviour can result in relational norms that can be perceived through interactions and 
inform the subsequent behaviour of actors and collective actors such as organisations 
(Macneil, 1980; Rousseau et al., 1998). Exchange relations, therefore, depart from “pure 
economic motives” and “become overlaid with social content that carries strong 
expectations of trust and abstention from opportunism” (Granovetter, 1985,  p. 490).  
In this vein, trust can be viewed as an organising principle or governance mechanism that 
enables and constrains the allocation of resources, coordination of activities and 
integration of service (Bradach and Eccles, 1989). McEvily, Perrone and Zaheer (2003) 
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demonstrated two causal pathways by which trust can influence organising. On the one 
hand, trust can affect the relative positions and links among actors and organisations, 
hence structures between organisations. For instance, trust entails serial equity and 
reciprocity (Dyer and Chu, 2003; Swärd, 2016), which builds more stable and durable 
relationships. Trust can also motivate actors and organisations to invest, integrate and 
coordinate resources towards collective endeavours (McEvily, Perrone and Zaheer, 
2003). For instance, trust encourages knowledge sharing, builds identities, strengthens 
commitment, and grants flexibility and adaptability to the organising process (Lewicki 
and Bunker, 1996; Teece, Pisano and Shuen, 1997; Nahapiet and Ghoshal, 1998; Dirks 
and Ferrin, 2001; Ligthart, Oerlemans and Noorderhaven, 2016). With increased 
technical and relational knowledge, actors can better internalise, mobilise, transform, 
adapt and integrate resources with other actors in shared systems to deal with uncertainties 
and dynamics. 
Regarding trust as a governance mechanism leads to an issue concerning the relation 
between trust and control. Some studies view trust as an alternative to control that reduces 
the level of control (Inkpen and Currall, 2004; Gulati and Nickerson, 2008). Others point 
out that, the higher the degree of trust in a relationship, the easier it is to implement control 
such as enacting detailed contracts. This is because the actors are more likely to cooperate. 
Trust and control complement each other (Poppo and Zenger, 2002; Olsen et al., 2005; 
Benítez-Ávila et al., 2018). Also, it has been argued that the relation between trust and 
control is not static or linear; instead, it is dynamic and changes through time (Woolthuis, 
Hillebrand and Nooteboom, 2005). 
Construction projects are organised under a hybrid mode of governance, or ‘quasifirm’, 
according to Eccles (1981), which consists of multiple mechanisms including price, 
authority and trust (Bradach and Eccles, 1989; Winch, 2001). Project governance has 
been conceptualised as a structure corresponding to types of contract (Reve and Levitt, 
1984), a process of decision making (Abednego and Ogunlana, 2006), but also as the 
management of relationships between various actors and organisations engaged in the 
project (Cherns and Bryant, 1984; Winch, 2006). Formal mechanisms, such as 
collaborative procurement and relational contracting, have been used to promote trust as 
the predominant mechanism that works with other mechanisms to lever project value 
(Eriksson and Laan, 2007; Rahman and Kumaraswamy, 2008; Bygballe, Dewulf and 
Levitt, 2015). The form of governance is chosen not least for cost minimisation; the use 
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of hybrid governance facilitates the pursuit of greater joint value (Zajac and Olsen, 1993). 
The choice of governance structure influences and, at the same time, is influenced by 
behaviour, interactions and value created at the behavioural level (Winch, 2006). It has 
been commonly agreed that trust generates an environment where project actors are more 
willing to communicate with each other, share risks, solve problems in a collaborative 
manner, and commit resources to ensure service delivery and maintain relationships 
(Zaghloul and Hartman, 2003; Kadefors, 2004; Smyth, 2005; Smyth and Thompson, 
2005; Doloi, 2009; Pinto, Slevin and English, 2009). Project outputs such as cost, time 
and quality, and value propositions may also be improved. The better experience and 
value creation in turn generate higher expectations and reinforce trust as a norm (Shiu, 
Jiang and Zaefarian, 2014). Trust in this vein works in a self-sufficient way (Wong and 
Cheung, 2005; Laan et al., 2011). 
2.4 Research gaps and theoretical points of departure 
The literature review on trust theories in various domains and disciplines has offered rich 
insights on understanding trust in construction project and supply chain management. 
This section demonstrates the research gaps and theoretical points of departure of this 
research, pointing to a process-based study as the way forward. 
1. From static to dynamics 
A considerable body of trust research in construction project and supply chain 
management has taken a variance-based view and sought to investigate the causes and 
effects of trust or trustworthiness (e.g., Doloi, 2009; Lau and Rowlinson, 2009; Chalker 
and Loosemore, 2016). For instance, many studies on trust development have built upon 
sociological or organisational models to identify antecedents to trust (e.g., Hartman, 
2000; Kadefors, 2004; Wong et al., 2008). Also, current studies on trust in project 
governance mainly focus on the role of formal mechanisms in building trust, such as 
procurement, relational contracting and other collaborative arrangements (Rahman and 
Kumaraswamy, 2005; Eriksson and Laan, 2007; Ling et al., 2015; Benítez-Ávila et al., 
2018). The epistemological view implied in this body of research is that trust is an 
important element in relationships that can be changed by cause variables (e.g., 
communication and commitment) or act on a unit of analysis (e.g., organisations and 
projects) to produce outcome variables (e.g., organisation and project effectiveness) 
(Smyth, Gustafsson and Ganskau, 2010).  
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While variance research provides explanations for phenomena in terms of relationships 
among dependent and independent variables, it ignores the time ordering and patterns 
among events and activities (Mohr, 1982; Van de Ven and Poole, 2005). For instance, 
studies on mechanisms of building trustworthiness as an antecedent to trust shed little 
light on how perceived trustworthiness leads to trust and its behavioural manifestation 
over time. Moreover, the findings of variance-based research are static and illustrated 
snapshots of trust at the moment of survey. The dynamic aspects of trust development 
and the unfolding value of trust over time have been ignored in variance-based research. 
Yet the dynamics of supply chain relationships and trust remain a significant topic in the 
construction project and supply chain management domain. Focusing on the dynamic 
process of trust development in supply chain relationships offers an opportunity for 
investigating the execution of formal but also informal and emergent collaborative 
practices in projects and their effects on trust, which can shed light on solutions to the 
difficulty of transferring trust at the governance level to the behavioural level (Bresnen, 
2007, 2009; Smyth, 2015a). Moreover, from the service-dominant logic (S-DL) point of 
view, as Chapter 3 will discuss, value is constituted by a series of co-created value 
propositions with implications for later execution and realisation post completion (Smyth, 
Lecoeuvre and Vaesken, 2017), which is also a dynamic process.  
2. From risk to value 
Many studies have viewed trust as a mechanism for reducing perceived risks and 
transaction costs (Winch, 2001; Doloi, 2009). Reducing risks is important for project 
organising, but value creation is the fundamental driving force behind business activities. 
Creating value differentiates trust from calculation of risks and power. Whereas power 
can reduce risks and transaction costs through imposing contractual mechanisms and 
close monitoring (Williamson, 1993; Nooteboom, Berger and Noorderhaven, 1997), trust 
enables collaborative relationships, spontaneous knowledge sharing, flexible resource 
allocation and commitment (Zaghloul and Hartman, 2003; Smyth and Thompson, 2005; 
Shiu, Jiang and Zaefarian, 2014). These activities can reduce perceived risks but also 
lever value, which can hardly be achieved by using power and formal control. Trust 
enables actors to progress in larger systems with more resources and proactively 
participate in value-creating activities with others. As Luhmann (1988, p. 99) mentions: 
“Mobilizing trust means mobilizing engagements and activities, extending the range and 
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degree of participation”. Therefore, to investigate the value of trust, it is necessary to link 
trust with value-creating activities between construction supply chain partners. 
3. From projects to ecosystem 
Trust research in construction project and supply chain management has mostly focused 
on projects and had few implications for the ecosystem (e.g., Kadefors, 2004; Laan, 
Noorderhaven, et al., 2011). Social contexts that enable and constrain trust development 
are largely neglected. The project-focused approach leads to the difficulty of transferring 
trust between the project level and organisation level and across projects. This problem 
is more severe when the project involves different teams responsible for procurement and 
execution respectively, which is not uncommon in construction project businesses. 
Taking a broader view to emphasise project activities but also multilevel systems 
complements the zooming-in perspective of observation, offering a more comprehensive 
view on the dynamics of trust. 
Research gaps point to a process-based approach as the way forward to exploring the 
dynamics of trust and value over time. A process-based approach deals with events and 
mechanisms rather than variables and focuses on ongoing interactions between actors, 
organisations, and between actors and organisations and multiple-level contexts rather 
than static states and structures (Langley and Tsoukas, 2010; Langley et al., 2013). Unlike 
the variance-based perspective, the process-based perspective builds explanation in terms 
of meaning, diachronic patterns and generative mechanisms rather than the synchronic 
presence of higher or lower levels of specific attributes (Mohr, 1982; Van de Ven and 
Poole, 2005). In other words, a process-based approach enables the exploration of the 
unfolding value of trust in construction supply chain relationships situated in ongoing 
interactions and multiple-level contexts. In doing so, it contributes to theories of trust in 
construction project and supply chain management by demonstrating the dynamic aspects 
of trust and value in the project lifecycle.  
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Chapter 3 Moving towards a service-dominant logic 
view 
The changing place of service and higher demands on the value that construction projects 
deliver distance the delivery of projects from G-DL and P-FL. This chapter introduces 
service-dominant logic (S-DL) as a complementary logic to the current institutional logic 
in construction, the goods-dominant logic (G-DL) and project-focused logic (P-FL). S-
DL emphasises service as the unit of exchange and the significance of relationships in 
creating value that improves the wellbeing of service beneficiaries. However, the 
literature review identified that relational concepts such as trust and power have not been 
the central focus of the S-DL community. The second half of this chapter introduces trust 
in S-DL. On the basis of research gaps in trust theories and S-DL, a conceptual framework 
for researching the value of trust in construction supply chains is proposed. 
3.1 Managing construction projects and supply chains from 
G-DL and P-FL perspectives 
The traditional view that construction is mainly about coordination of site-specific tasks 
and activities (Cox and Thompson, 1997), and value is embedded in products, material, 
components and project inputs and assessed in terms of price in the transaction, has 
formed a G-DL and P-FL in approaches to managing construction projects. As discussed 
in Chapter 1 (see 1.2.3), G-DL and P-FL enable the recursive use of transactional project 
management approaches, which, in turn, reinforce and eventually institutionalise the 
logic.  
Under G-DL, value is added in goods and services by suppliers before selling and 
determined at the point of transactions or series of transactions – that is, value-in-
exchange. They are static promises delivered by producers projecting benefits that can be 
delivered through products and/or services along with the associated approximate price 
that customers are willing to pay (Lanning and Michaels, 1988). G-DL views value 
propositions as ‘quantifiable evidence’ of value (Skålén et al., 2015). Value propositions 
that resonate more with customer need form the competitive advantage for firms since 
they enable firms to be differentiated from their competitors and hence help them gain 
more value-in-exchange in markets (Anderson, Narus and Van Rossum, 2006). The 
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emphasis is on how a firm can display the attractiveness of its offerings in the market 
(Skålén et al., 2015). Furthermore, value propositions are active from the supplier’s side 
as the supplier chooses, provides and communicates the value through its internal ‘value 
delivery system’ that in some cases is directed to be customer-oriented to fulfil the 
supplier’s generic strategies (Lanning, 1998). On the customer’s side, value propositions 
are largely reactive, involving limited interaction and direct participation; they passively 
or reactively accept the offering or not. G-DL does not implicitly address the role of 
customers in creating value propositions, hence interactions and relationships between 
customers and suppliers in the production, because of the focus on the exchange of 
manufactured goods and services (Skålén et al., 2015). Therefore, G-DL and derived 
practices are transactional.  
Nevertheless, for projects in general little can be accurately quantified as nothing has yet 
been produced prior to execution. Selling and bidding, hence the formation of the value 
proposition, occur prior to production or delivery. The process of value co-creation may 
be initially formed by the putting together of value propositions through interactions at 
the front end of the construction project. Value propositions can be shaped through 
interactions and early involvement of main contractors and supply chains (Cova and 
Salle, 2008). Conceptually, this involves business development managers, procurement, 
bid managers and project managers, although time and functional or silo constraints may 
result in weak internal and external interactions (Smyth, 2015a). Value propositions 
harbour the scope for future value actualisation in use, although the scope is not 
automatically as actualised value in the future. The latter depends on actors’ resources 
and capabilities of co-creating value in using the service. One feature of service delivery 
in construction projects is that there is a gap between selling stage and use stage where 
the project’s value is realised. This is a function of working to contract, by selling first 
and then producing (Smyth, 2015a). Main contractors as the intermediate customer of 
specialised projects, more often than not, participate in the service provision. Interactions 
between main contractors and subcontractors continue beyond the formation of value 
propositions at the front end and might even become intensified in project execution. In 
order to manage changes and uncertainties, both main contractors and subcontractors may 
take the role of service provider during delivery to collaboratively coordinate interactions, 
solve problems and reduce risks (Dubois and Gadde, 2002b). Taking a broader view, the 
nexus of clients as the intermediate customer of overall projects and external stakeholders 
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may also engage throughout project lifecycles to various degrees (Ballantyne et al., 2011; 
Morris, 2013; Frow et al., 2014). 
P-FL emphasises the temporary nature and uniqueness of projects. Projects are usually 
conceptualised as temporary systems with ex ante built-in time of termination (Lundin 
and Söderholm, 1995). By involvement in projects, project teams representing their own 
organisations might have short-term transitions to fit in the phenomenon of project 
working until the institutionalised termination. As project results are recoupled to 
organisations after completion, projects are also viewed as a temporary agency for 
organisations to manage change, utilise resources, create value, and deal with risk and 
uncertainty (Turner and Müller, 2003; Brady and Davies, 2004). Since projects are 
contingent upon their contents and related activities, they are perceived as unique in time 
(Shenhar and Dvir, 1996; Shenhar, 2001).  
Relationships and any associated trust are regarded as temporary and dissolve with project 
delivery (Dubois and Gadde, 2002b). Trust relations are viewed as a vehicle to increase 
project efficiency and terminate with the project; projects have no memory and trust is 
mostly built from scratch (Dubois and Gadde, 2002b). Yet, as argued in Chapter 1 (see 
1.3.1), this is far from the case in supply chain networks and where repeat business exists. 
The shadow of the past and future and actors, rules and resources at multilevel service 
ecosystems influence perceptions, actions, practices and power relations in current 
interactions and hence their performance in knowledge transfer and capability building 
(Brady and Davies, 2004; Bresnen, Goussevskaia and Swan, 2004; Manning and Sydow, 
2011; Ligthart, Oerlemans and Noorderhaven, 2016). To reap the benefit from the broader 
service ecosystems, a ‘relationship-orientation’ is adopted in construction in the form of 
relational contracting, partnering projects and alliances across supply networks. Trust in 
this vein is imported to the extent that it resides in the supply chain and its network. 
However, these practices simply move the singular transactions to multiple transactions 
over time and use supply chains as vehicles to increase project efficiency (Lusch and 
Vargo, 2014; Smyth, 2015b), hence still reflecting the limitations and shortfalls of G-DL 
and P-FL (cf. Wood and Ellis, 2005; Alderman and Ivory, 2007). They are market driven 
and are reactive from the perspective of the supply side. 
Table 2 illustrates the management of construction projects from the perspective of G-DL 
and P-FL. The distance between G-DL and P-FL and the delivery of construction projects 
points to the necessity of moving towards a complementary logic offering a different lens 
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of value and focusing on supply chain relationships. Relationships are the basis for supply 
chain management, supported through effective transactions, contracts and project 
support mechanisms. They are part of programmes and the portfolio of the project-based 
construction firm. In terms of the specific research focus, relationships between main 
contractors and second-tier subcontractors should not be seen as project specific. They 
are nested in the broader operations of both the project-based organisations and networks 
in the broader service ecosystem. Value is evaluated against the benefits gained from 
using the service and normally goes beyond the transactional value of individual projects. 
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Table 2 G-DL, P-FL and S-DL in delivering construction projects 
 The delivery of 
construction projects 
G-DL/P-FL perspective S-DL perspective 
Creation of the 
value proposition 
Before delivery After production 
 
A balancing mechanism 
that links actors at 
different times and 
positions in the service 
ecosystem 
Little can be 
accurately quantified 
Quantifiable evidence of 
transactional value, such 
as cost, programme and 
quality 
Continuously shaped 
before and during the 
delivery 
Static promises from the 
producer to customer 
Role of customer Main contractor as the 
intermediate customer 
of specialist projects 
participating in the 
delivery and providing 
service 
Reactive recipient of 
goods and services 
Customers co-create value 
by integrating their own 
resources with others’ 
Some clients as the 
intermediate customer 
of overall projects 
participating in the 
delivery 
An operand resource to be 
profited from 
An operant resource to co-
create value with 
Firm-customer 
interaction 
Intensive interactions 
between the main 
contractor and 
subcontractors in 
delivering the project 
Active producer and 
reactive customer in 
making value propositions 
and production 
Interchangeable role of 
service provider between 
the customer and producer 
Service secured in the 
delivery process can 
be recombined and 
reused in future 
Producer may provide 
facilitating services as 
added value 
Service beneficiary co-
creates value in use 
experience through direct 
or indirect interactions 
with the service provider 
as well as other actors in 
the service ecosystem 
Firm-customer 
relationship and 
trust 
An integral part of 
project success 
Not addressed in G-DL Inherently relational 
Related to repeat 
business and 
economics of 
repetition and 
recombination 
Temporary and an 
operand resource for 
project efficiency in P-FL 
An operant resource 
determining the meaning 
of goods and services 
Source: original 
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3.2 Managing construction projects and supply chains from 
the S-DL perspective 
Businesses have been more service driven than before (Grönroos, 2007), focusing more 
on overall functionality than the delivery of stand-alone goods or services (Wikström et 
al., 2009). This is evident in construction project businesses where main contractors as 
system integrators provide the service of management for clients whilst they do not 
conduct any ‘real construction’ tasks (Smyth, 2015a). The management of projects has 
become a major service in construction projects and subcontracting systems enable 
previous in-house production to become a type of service in construction project delivery. 
The changing place of service has gained increasing interest in both production and 
project businesses (Brady, Davies and Gann, 2005b; Edvardsson, Gustafsson and Roos, 
2005) – pointing towards the necessity of at least a complementary logic of business.  
This section demonstrates the key concepts and premises of S-DL in relation to practices 
in construction projects and supply chains. Table 2 summarised the delivery of 
construction projects from the perspective of S-DL. 
3.2.1  Service 
Service-dominant logic (S-DL) represents a shift in marketing theorisation away from a 
goods-dominant logic (G-DL) (Vargo and Lusch, 2004, 2008, 2016). It has been widely 
discussed, developed, refined and used for analysis and in implementation in a wide range 
of areas, such as tourism (Grissemann and Stokburger-Sauer, 2012), logistics (Randall, 
Pohlen and Hanna, 2010), service science (Vargo and Akaka, 2009), and recently in 
project management (Wells and Smyth, 2011; Smyth, 2015a; Smyth, Lecoeuvre and 
Vaesken, 2017). S-DL shifts the focus away from goods and services towards service and 
relationships in service ecosystems (Vargo and Lusch, 2008, 2016). This inherently 
relational feature links S-DL with the construction industry. As mentioned repeatedly, 
collaboration between main contractors and supply chains is necessary for project 
delivery and value is jointly created in networks of relationships (Pryke, 2009).  
Particularly in construction project management, S-DL is viewed as an institutional logic 
counterpart to G-DL and P-FL (Smyth, 2015a). The central argument of S-DL is that in 
an actor-to-actor (A2A) context the basis of exchange is service, “service is exchanged 
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for service” (Bastiat and de, 1964, as quoted in Vargo and Lusch, 2004: pp. 6-7), and 
goods and projects are only mechanisms for service exchange. Service is more than what 
was traditionally meant in G-DL as an activity or a set of input activities resulting in a 
singular output aimed at assisting the customer’s practice. Under S-DL, service is the 
“application of specialised competencies (skills and knowledge) through deeds, 
processes, and performances for the benefit of another party or the entity itself” (Vargo 
and Lusch, 2004, p. 2). The application of knowledge and skills to achieve the benefit for 
another party or oneself means that service (singular) is a process, which is different from 
services (plural) as units of output (Vargo and Lusch, 2008). In the construction industry, 
the division of labour and subcontracting systems enable previous in-house production to 
become a type of service and main contractors as system integrators to provide the service 
of management for clients (Winch, 2014). Construction projects then become less about 
production, even for subcontractors as system sellers that produce and deliver integrated 
solutions (Davies, Brady and Hobday, 2007); projects are a delivery channel of service 
exchange for the wellbeing of clients, main contractors, supply chains, other stakeholders, 
and ultimately end users and society (Saxon, 2005).  
The changing place of service and the increasingly higher demands for the value delivered 
through construction projects have led to the preference for integrated solutions, pointing 
to the importance of collaboration, hence relationships between main contractors as 
system integrators and subcontractors and suppliers and knowledge sharing among supply 
chains (Brady, Davies and Gann, 2005b; Edvardsson, Gustafsson and Roos, 2005). To 
deliver a subcontracting project, the main contractor as the intermediate customer for the 
subcontractor – the main dyadic relation in this ecosystem of provision, usually 
participate in the process of project delivery. Hence, the role of service provider might 
change in the construction project delivery and the main contractor and subcontractors 
facilitate the co-creation process across different and serial interactions. This means that 
the ultimate service delivered consists of a series of mutual service bundles provided by 
the supply chain and integrated by the main contractor. In this sense, service is more than 
what was traditionally meant as an activity or a set of input activities resulting in a 
singular output aimed at assisting the customer’s practices. 
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3.2.2 Resources 
Resources can be physical, human, organisational, informational and relational (Hunt and 
Derozier, 2004). Actors and organisations draw on resources to create value. Under S-
DL, goods and services are operand resources. Operand resources are one type of 
resources, on which an operation or act is performed to produce an effect. The meaning 
of operand resources depends on the service those resources provide since customers do 
not buy goods or services per se, but rather service rendered that creates value (Vargo 
and Lusch, 2004). Operant resources are employed to act on operand resources as well 
as other operant resources (Vargo and Lusch, 2004). Human knowledge and skills, 
organisational routines and capabilities, information about markets and relationships in 
ecosystems are operant resources that “are the fundamental source of strategic benefit” 
(Vargo and Lusch, 2016,  p. 7). The same resource might generate different value for 
actors and organisations in service ecosystems, depending on action and appraisal that 
transform potential resources into realised value. As Zimmermann (1951) pointed out, 
resources are not; they become. Relationships and hence trust are one type of operant 
resources that determine the resourcefulness and accessibility of a certain resource. 
Therefore, S-DL regards relationship value beyond bringing repeated transactions. 
3.2.3 Value propositions, value and value co-creation 
Value is the core organising principle, or order parameter, of service ecosystems that 
integrates actors into a coherent system (Edvardsson, Tronvoll and Gruber, 2011; 
Meynhardt, Chandler and Strathoff, 2016). S-DL emphasises value-in-use and regards 
this as a higher-order concept that results in value-in-exchange (Kowalkowski, 2011). 
Value-in-exchange is the negotiated figures that customer and supplier agree to pay and 
receive, which is furnished by accounting systems that capture this limited form of value 
(Vargo and Lusch, 2006). In the long term, value-in-exchange only exists if value-in-use 
is generated, because customers who perceive no or low value-in-use are less likely to 
return, and value-in-exchange is confined to the discrete transaction for the supplier and 
thus there is no projected customer lifetime value to the supplier. Hence, value-in-use as 
a concept is not only important for customers but also for suppliers (Grönroos, 2008). 
Value-in-use is not embedded in operand resources as goods and services as inputs, but 
rather co-created between multiple actors and organisations. In S-DL, value can only be 
determined by the service beneficiary when the service is used, and the value potential is 
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actualised and becomes value-in-use. In this sense, value (-in-use) can be conceptualised 
as phenomenologically perceived benefits for current and/or future use (Vargo and Lusch, 
2004). What is valuable is not the goods or projects per se, but the benefits perceived out 
of them through actors’ experience (Payne, Storbacka and Frow, 2008), which can be 
functional, social, relational or emotional (Sweeney and Soutar, 2001; Baxter, 2008).  
S-DL views value propositions as a balancing mechanism that links actors at different 
positions in service ecosystems (Vargo and Lusch, 2010) and aligns the offers with 
expectations through interactions. As such, the ecosystem is dynamically maintained 
through value propositions and it changes over time (Frow et al., 2014). Value 
propositions are not simply unidirectional from suppliers to customers or other 
stakeholders (cf. Lanning, 1998; Frow and Payne, 2011). Nor are they crafted to satisfy 
the supplier’s own generic strategies, which might include customer intimacy, so they are 
directed to be customer-oriented (cf. Day, 2006). Customers can either passively accept 
the propositions, thus the service provision, and then integrate resources to use and assess 
the value (e.g., Kowalkowski et al., 2012; Payne and Frow, 2014), or they can participate 
in the communicative interactions with suppliers to create reciprocal value propositions 
until service is delivered and value can be evaluated in service use (e.g., Ballantyne et al., 
2011; Truong, Simmons and Palmer, 2012). The role of supply chains is to integrate the 
resources into value propositions and support the value-creating processes enabled by 
service exchange (Grönroos, 2008; Lusch, Vargo and Tanniru, 2010), since firms “cannot 
deliver value but can participate in the creation and offering of value propositions” 
(Vargo and Lusch, 2016, p. 4). This is not to say supply chains cannot gain value; instead, 
value might be co-created and/or emerge in service experiences. Given the reciprocal 
nature of service exchange, supply chain members as service providers also have the role 
of “beneficiary” (Vargo and Lusch, 2016, p. 4). In the construction industry, by involving 
in project organisations, second-tier subcontractors can build relationships and gain 
knowledge from main contractors, clients and other contractors, which are fundamental 
sources of strategic benefits and beneficial to future businesses. All organisational actors 
are co-creators, combining resources for mutual advantage, ultimately adding to the 
potential value co-created with customers.  
Value co-creation consists of two dimensions, co-production and value-in-use (Ranjan 
and Read, 2016). Co-production occurs in direct firm-customer interactions – that is, 
customers participating in the design and/or delivery of the core offerings and value 
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propositions (Vargo and Lusch, 2006; Grönroos, 2008; Grönroos and Gummerus, 2014). 
This includes subcontractors, whose customer is the main contractor. Main contractors 
and subcontractors co-produce construction projects as core offerings for clients; the 
latter deliver service through projects to the ultimate customers of projects, such as road 
users and building occupants. Value-in-use stresses the service use process and depends 
on the core offering and value propositions (potentially) delivered and service 
beneficiaries’ capability of integrating resources in market, public and private sources in 
the use context (Ranjan and Read, 2016; Vargo and Lusch, 2016). From the perspective 
of customers of construction projects, value-in-use is realised when projects are 
completed and used. This is different from main contractors and supply chains, whose 
value-in-use depends on the service experience of co-producing projects and post-
completion (Smyth, 2015a). The former refers to the experience of mutual service in 
delivering projects, in which main contractors and subcontractors can secure knowledge 
and develop relationships. Service experience determines the extent to which an aligned 
and integrated service outcome is evident and thereby value realised in service use post-
completion. In summary, the context of value co-creation between main contractors and 
subcontractors provides the thesis focus, which consists of: 
(1) service experience of co-producing; 
(2) service outcomes beneficial for future use.  
3.2.4 Service ecosystems and service interactions 
Value is co-created between multiple actors in shared systems of exchange or service 
ecosystems (Edvardsson, Tronvoll and Gruber, 2011; Akaka, Vargo and Schau, 2015; 
Vargo and Lusch, 2016). A service ecosystem is “a relatively self-contained, self-
adjusting system of resource-integrating actors connected by shared institutional 
arrangements and mutual value creation through service exchange” (Vargo and Lusch, 
2016, p. 10). Shared systems tie actors together through institutional arrangements and 
denote a wider perspective than firm and customer. Vargo and Lusch (2016, p. 19) 
emphasise this understanding in their newest foundational premise: “Value co-creation is 
coordinated through actor-generated institutions and institutional arrangements”. This 
perspective is related to, yet different from, the concept of project ecology in the project 
management field that consists of projects, organisations, inter-organisational networks 
and organisational fields (Manning, 2008). Both recognise the constraining and enabling 
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effects of the layered structures of wider stakeholder ecosystems. The difference is that 
the former emphasises interactions between actors, organisations, resources and rules at 
micro-, meso- and macro-levels of systems in terms of value co-creation (Akaka, Vargo 
and Lusch, 2013). Particularly in project management, the meso-level includes project 
and firm levels. The concept of project ecology lends weight to the influence of structures 
of projects, organisations, inter-organisational networks and the organisational fields on 
the project organisation. 
The sustaining and self-adjusting properties of service ecosystems relies on the 
reproduction and transformation of structures of systems (Chandler and Lusch, 2015; 
Edvardsson, Skålén and Tronvoll, 2015), which relies on service interactions at different 
levels and across systems. In turn, these interactions are enabled and constrained by 
structures of systems (Berger and Luckmann, 1966; Giddens, 1984; Edvardsson, Tronvoll 
and Gruber, 2011). To deliver construction projects, actors and organisations mobilise 
resources from markets, whether private and/or public sources, which is influenced by 
and influences structures of projects, organisations, inter-organisational networks and 
organisational fields. Actors need to use authoritative, economic and relational 
mechanisms at different levels of the service ecosystem to allocate resources 
(Edvardsson, Skålén and Tronvoll, 2015). These mechanisms can be driven by structures 
but are also emergent in situations (Bhaskar, 1975; Sayer, 2000), which, under certain 
conditions, can induce different practices, processes and outcomes of value co-creation 
(Biggemann and Buttle, 2009; Akaka et al., 2014; Akaka, Vargo and Schau, 2015).  
The dynamics of service ecosystems depend on interactions within and between different 
levels, which incur “a sea of change, making all the systems inherently dynamic” (Lusch 
and Vargo, 2014, p. 170) over time and space. At the micro-level, by participating in 
service interactions, actors have more opportunities for mutual learning, knowledge 
sharing and relationship building. The accumulation of resources at the micro-level has 
implications for projects, such as more resource access and better resource mobilisation 
(Laud et al., 2015). Furthermore, through continuous interactions, actors might establish 
routines, recognise relative roles, and form shared intentions and meanings that enable 
the emergence of norms at the project level (Penaloza and Mish, 2011; Taillard et al., 
2016). From projects, organisations can gain resources and service rights that improve 
current value-creating activities, help realise more value-in-use and contribute to generic 
service experiences (Brady and Davies, 2004; Payne, Storbacka and Frow, 2008; 
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Söderlund, Vaagaasar and Andersen, 2008; Truong, Simmons and Palmer, 2012), 
although in construction projects operant resources are not always transferred to parent 
organisations due to the weak systems between the two levels (Smyth, 2015a). 
Actualisation at this point, from the subcontractor’s viewpoint, occurs post-completion 
of their work, but not of the total project undertaken by the main contractor. At the inter-
organisational networks level, operant resources such as knowledge and inter-
organisational relationships can form practices between organisations, and the 
effectiveness of such practices can promote repetition, which eventually leads to 
routinisation and normative practices at the organisational field level (Manning, 2008). 
In other words, the sustaining and self-adjusting service ecosystem is the outcome of a 
duality of structures (Giddens, 1984) that involves the mutual effects of interactions and 
structures at different levels of the system.  
Table 3 summarised key concepts in S-DL. 
Table 3 A summary for S-DL concepts 
Concepts S-DL conceptualisation 
Service Application of specialised competencies (skills and knowledge) through deeds, 
processes, and performances for the benefit of another party and the entity itself 
(Vargo and Lusch, 2004). 
Operand resource A resource on which an operation or act is performed to produce an effect 
(Vargo and Lusch, 2004). 
Operant resource A resource that is employed to act on operand resources as well as other operant 
resources (Vargo and Lusch, 2004). 
Value-in-use Phenomenologically perceived benefits for current and/or future use (Vargo 
and Lusch, 2004) 
Value-in-exchange The negotiated figures that customer and supplier agree to pay and receive, 
which is furnished by accounting systems that capture this limited form of value 
(Vargo and Lusch, 2006). 
Value propositions A balancing mechanism that links actors at different positions in the service 
ecosystem (Vargo and Lusch, 2010) and aligns the offers with expectations 
through interactions. 
Service ecosystem A relatively self-contained, self-adjusting system of resource-integrating actors 
connected by shared institutional arrangements and mutual value creation 
through service exchange (Vargo and Lusch, 2016). 
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3.3 Research gaps: introducing the concept of trust in S-DL 
Although S-DL is inherently relational (Chandler and Wieland, 2010; Vargo and Lusch, 
2011), relationship-related concepts such as trust, equity and power have gained sparse 
attention in S-DL theorisation (Fyrberg and Jüriado, 2009). Reciprocity and equity are 
necessary for sustaining value-co-creating activities as well as inter-organisational 
relationships and hence trust (Ballantyne and Varey, 2006; Aarikka-Stenroos and 
Jaakkola, 2012; Swärd, 2016). Current research mostly focuses on customer perceived 
value-in-use (cf. Ulaga, 2003; Heinonen, Strandvik and Voima, 2013). The value for 
supply chains is largely neglected (Walter, Ritter and Gemünden, 2001; Smyth et al., 
2016). Research on the value simultaneously perceived by both customer and supplier is 
scant. This imbalance of research interests is consistent with the client-centred project 
management studies. However, overemphasising customer value limits the meaning of 
value co-creation processes. Value-in-use needs to focus on the value perceived by 
service providers, especially when the customer contributes to service processes and 
facilitates the provider’s delivery. 
The experience and perceived value in using the service have gained broad interest (e.g., 
Sandström et al., 2008; Edvardsson, Enquist and Johnston, 2010), but how service 
dynamically manifests itself within and among relationships over time and generates 
value for those involved remain unknown and need further investigation (Chandler and 
Vargo, 2011; Leroy, Cova and Salle, 2013; Makkonen and Olkkonen, 2017). Most 
research embraces a zooming-out perspective, pointing to the need for a closer 
examination of the process of value co-creation in the S-DL community to avoid the “risk 
of black-boxization of the value co-creation concept” (Leroy, Cova and Salle, 2013, p. 2). 
Research has recognised different dimensions of interactions for value co-creation 
between customers and suppliers (Grönroos, 2008, 2011; Payne, Storbacka and Frow, 
2008; Ballantyne et al., 2011; Echeverri and Skålén, 2011; Grönroos and Ravald, 2011; 
Aarikka-Stenroos and Jaakkola, 2012). The social construction school of S-DL research 
has taken a practice-based approach to examining interactions and value co-creation – 
that is, the structured aspect of interactions (e.g., Edvardsson, Tronvoll and Gruber, 2011; 
Edvardsson, Skålén and Tronvoll, 2015; Marcos-Cuevas et al., 2016). Practices in these 
studies were treated as routinised ways of doing that are structured by rules, actors and 
resources at higher levels. Yet, the emergent and interactive aspect of service interactions 
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for value co-creation has been under-researched and needs examination (Echeverri and 
Skålén, 2011; Makkonen and Olkkonen, 2017). 
Zooming out, a service ecosystems’ view points out the multiple-layer feature of value 
co-creation (Akaka, Vargo and Lusch, 2013; Frow et al., 2014; Akaka, Vargo and Schau, 
2015). Value is co-created in interactions across different levels of service ecosystems, 
especially in contexts where resources, actors and rules are widely dispersed (Cova and 
Salle, 2008; Aarikka-Stenroos and Jaakkola, 2012; Russo-Spena and Mele, 2012; 
Marcos-Cuevas et al., 2016), such as the construction industry. Value cannot be 
understood by focusing only on a single level of service ecosystems (Corsaro, 2014; 
Akaka, Vargo and Schau, 2015), such as inputs at the operational level. For project 
businesses, apart from organisations and inter-organisational networks, the meso-level 
consists of projects or programmes as the main contexts of micro-level activities. The 
interplay between the organisation and project levels is vital to value co-creation in 
project businesses and requires attention.  
However, most research, while it acknowledges the multilevel system, ignores the 
interactions between different levels (e.g., Payne, Storbacka and Frow, 2008; Chandler 
and Vargo, 2011; Akaka, Vargo and Lusch, 2013) – although exceptions can be found in 
recent studies (e.g., Frow et al., 2014; Edvardsson, Skålén and Tronvoll, 2015; Laamanen 
and Skålén, 2015; Makkonen and Olkkonen, 2017). Value co-creation involves multiple 
levels of service ecosystems that are interdependent and synergetic with each other. Value 
formed at the micro-level creates order for the meso-level in the form of habitualisation 
and routinisation. Meso-level value further influences macro-level in the form of the 
institution. Macro-level in return enables and constrains meso- and micro- levels to abide 
by the rules of the game (Berger and Luckmann, 1966; Haken, 1984; Meynhardt, 
Chandler and Strathoff, 2016). 
In summary, the relational, zooming-in, interactive and multilevel aspects of service 
interactions and value co-creation that include both customer’s and producer’s service 
experiences and value need investigation – pointing to the necessity of embodying a 
relational and process-based approach in the S-DL community. To fill in this gap, this 
section seeks to conceptually link trust, an important relational concept, with S-DL and 
value co-creation.  
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3.3.1 Trust in service experiences 
The process of service provision is where the service is configured, produced and 
delivered after the sale is secured. It is particularly important to specific assets where 
service is exchanged business-to-business (B2B) before and after the sale, such as 
construction projects (Smyth, 2015a). In construction, exchange is a process, broken 
down into stage payments. How this is managed is an important part of the relationship 
and trust is a key part of the service experience across these serial transactions within a 
project. Between selling and project completion, the components of value propositions 
and perceptions of value may alter. To capture the dynamics of perceived value and value 
propositions during delivery requires the formation and adaption of shared intentions and 
meanings formed in shared experience and systems (Maglio and Spohrer, 2013; Akaka et 
al., 2014; Taillard et al., 2016). These shared intentions and meanings, in turn, help 
sustain the continuity of interactions and trust between actors and organisations 
(Ballantyne and Varey, 2006; Edvardsson, Skålén and Tronvoll, 2015). In some cases, 
meanings are gained through communicative intent that expresses meanings, either 
intentional or non-intentional (Aarikka-Stenroos and Jaakkola, 2012). Trust is key to this 
process. It can generate an environment of integrity and openness where actors are willing 
to share information and knowledge, sustain communication, form common goals and 
work jointly (Nooteboom, 2000; Kadefors, 2004; Smyth and Thompson, 2005; Berggren, 
Sydow and Tell, 2017). At other times, meanings are comprehended from structural 
orderings of sign systems that exist between but also beyond the current relationship 
(Giddens, 1984; Akaka et al., 2014). In the construction project delivery, shared meanings 
might be from the standard form of contract and norms of conduct in the industry as well 
as day-to-day formal and informal interactions between actors and organisations.  
Apart from the perception of value and value propositions, power relations between main 
contractors and subcontractors are dynamic in delivering construction projects, depending 
on which business has most leverage at any one time, particularly over costs and payments 
(Cox, Ireland and Townsend, 2006). Imbalanced power may result in value realisation 
enhanced for some yet reduced for other organisational actors. This points to the 
importance of complementary objectives, mutual understanding on the basis of shared 
meanings, resource commitment and access to mobilising other actors’ resources and 
reflexive learning in experience (Lusch, Vargo and Tanniru, 2010; Kowalkowski et al., 
2012). All these are founded upon trust-based interactions at different levels of service 
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ecosystems that align actors’ value expectations as reciprocal promises “to and from 
suppliers and customers seeking an equitable exchange” (Ballantyne and Varey, 2006, 
p. 344). On the one hand, equitable exchange means that main contractors and 
subcontractors apply and integrate resources, hence taking the role of service provider, to 
facilitate each other’s work and ultimately to lever the potential value that can be fulfilled 
later on (Grönroos, 2012). On the other hand, equity also refers to the reciprocity of value 
propositions. The phenomenon of trust sustains mutual service as it nurtures relational 
norms such as reciprocity and equity that stabilise relationships (Macneil, 1980).  
3.3.2 Trust in service outcomes 
Service provision inevitably results in service outcomes that are subjective in evaluation. 
Actors in the phenomenon of trust may perceive better service experiences that enable 
higher performance, not least project outputs regarding costs, time and quality. Trust 
helps maintain the reciprocity of value propositions and levers value beyond present 
projects as trust-based interactions enable main contractors and subcontractors to gain 
more resources such as knowledge and relationships that can be used in and benefit future 
service. Reciprocal value propositions emphasise value-in-use for both main contractors 
and subcontractors. Value-in-exchange is also an integral part of value creation, indeed 
intense co-creation. Hence, it is important to deliver a balanced emphasis on value-in-use 
and value-in-exchange in value propositions (Michel, Brown and Gallan, 2008).  
From the perspective of main contractors and supply chains, the value-in-use post-
completion comes in monetary form to benefit the businesses, their owners and staff, in 
the form of reputation in the market and specifically repeat business opportunities. In 
some cases, maintenance and operational contracts may also flow and this brings in other 
operational factors for the business. Apart from profits and work volumes, main 
contractors and subcontractors might also benefit from insurance against crises or 
difficulties, technological and organisational knowledge, market insight, resource access 
and referral business (Walter, Ritter and Gemünden, 2001; Bettencourt et al., 2002). 
Operant resources gained in service interactions can help address uncertainties and risks 
in subsequent phases of delivery and/or businesses beyond the current service, should 
they be translated to the organisational level for future use (Teece, Pisano and Shuen, 
1997; Staber and Sydow, 2002; Brady and Davies, 2014; Berggren, Sydow and Tell, 
2017), 
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3.4 Summary: the conceptual framework 
Chapter 2 reviewed trust theories in various domains and disciplines and conceptualised 
the meaning of trust in construction supply chains. Trust first and foremost is about 
freedom of choice: actors have the choice to trust as well as to be trustworthy or not. Trust 
presupposes uncertainties. Freedom of choice involves risks but also opportunities for 
levering value through collaborations between trusting and trustworthy actors and 
organisations. To trust is to submit one’s own vulnerability to another party and 
potentially vice versa for it to build in a relationship. This research uses a working 
definition of an actor’s current intention to rely on the actions of or to be vulnerable to 
another party, based on the expectation that the other party can reduce risks and co-create 
value in a relationship. Trust arises in individual members, but it can be inter-
organisational depending on key interactions. The overall focus is inter-organisational 
trust from main contractor to second-tier subcontractor. Interactions between individuals 
provide evidence that builds to represent the inter-organisational trust. Inter-
organisational trust therefore reflects the collectively-held trust intention by members in 
one organisation towards another organisation (Zaheer, McEvily and Perrone, 1998). 
Trust develops in interactions between actors and organisations in an institutional 
environment (Zucker, 1986; Mayer, Davis and Schoorman, 1995; Bachmann and Inkpen, 
2011). Trust is dynamic; the perception of trustworthiness, the orientation of engaging in 
trust-based relationships and trusting behaviour may change during interactions. On the 
other hand, the process of trust development in projects is subjective to structures of 
multilevel service ecosystems (Grabher, 2002; Manning, 2008).  
The value of trust unfolds while trust develops. Nevertheless, the value of trust has not 
been well recognised in construction project and supply chain management. Most 
research and practices in this field are based on the goods-dominant (G-DL) and project-
focused logic (P-FL). Under G-DL and P-FL, trust is viewed as intangible, heterogeneous, 
inseparable and perishable, and not an output contributing to the value-creating activity 
in construction; or as an input necessary for achieving relationship-orientation and 
efficiency of a project or series of projects (Smyth, 2015a). The view is a narrow one. 
Chapter 3 offered S-DL as a complementary logic to G-DL and P-FL that goes beyond 
value-in-exchange. Combining S-DL with trust permits trust to be seen as a contributor 
to value creation and specifically co-created value. Co-creating value with construction 
supply chains, from the perspective of S-DL, needs a series of reciprocal value 
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propositions and mutual service between main contractors and subcontractors. It also 
needs actors, resources and rules from different levels of service ecosystems. Between 
selling and project completion, the components of value propositions, perceptions of 
value and power relations may alter. S-DL is inherently relational (Vargo and Lusch, 
2004, 2008, 2016). However, relational concepts such as trust have gained little interest 
in the S-DL literature at any detailed level. The relational, zooming-in, interactive and 
multilevel aspects of service interactions and value perceived by main contractors and 
subcontractors in service ecosystems are under-researched.  
Despite the rich insights from literature, research shortcomings and gaps were identified 
as theoretical points of departure (see 2.4 and 3.3). In combination, the limited 
understanding includes: 
(1) The dynamic process of trust development in construction supply chain relationships; 
(2) The unfolding value of trust in terms of service experiences and outcomes; 
(3) The relational, zooming-in, interactive and multilevel nature of service interactions; 
(4) The influences of time and multiple-level service ecosystems on trust and value.  
The limited understanding is further related to problems in practices, such as the 
reactiveness of supply chains in engaging in partnering, the difficulty of transferring trust 
at the governance level to the behavioural level and vice versa, and inconsistent service 
within and across projects (Brown et al., 2001; Bresnen, 2007; Mason, 2007; Crespin-
Mazet and Portier, 2010; Smyth, 2015a).  
Trust informs and is part of service interactions. It can encourage communication and 
learning between main contractors and subcontractors, create and adapt shared meanings 
in uncertainties and dynamics, ensure reciprocity and equity in the service process and 
outcomes, and nurture relational norms between actors and organisations (Nooteboom, 
2000; Kadefors, 2004; Smyth and Thompson, 2005; Berggren, Sydow and Tell, 2017). 
Under S-DL, trust can be viewed as an operant resource that acts upon goods and services 
in order to improve resource bases, mobilisation and transformation (Laud et al., 2015). 
By participating in service interactions, actors and organisations have more opportunities 
for mutual learning, knowledge sharing and relationship building, hence gaining 
resources and service rights that lever value for future service exchanges. Better service 
experiences are both evidence of and lead to higher performance.  
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In short, trust does ‘add’ value to projects and their organisations through the actors in 
two ways: 
(1) Trust improves the service experience for those involved during delivery based upon 
any past experience and the quality of the current project experience, which is 
execution based; 
(2) The better service enables actors to reach higher performance levels as service 
outcomes (cf. Smyth, Gustafsson and Ganskau, 2010), which has its origins in 
executions and is realised post-completion. 
The research gaps and problems point to a relational and process-based study as the way 
forward. Therefore, to advance trust theories, apply S-DL in construction project and 
supply chain management disciplines, and improve collaborative practices in construction 
supply chain relationships, the conceptual framework of this research is built upon five 
elements: 
(1) Trust as a phenomenon consists of the perception of trustworthiness, orientation of 
trust and trusting behaviour; 
(2) Interaction, a process in which trust develops or is eroded and hence the value of trust 
unfolds over time in iterative ebbs and flows to potentially build overall, although 
critical interactions can rapidly erode trust and confidence; 
(3) Structures of service ecosystems consist of rules and resources at micro-, meso- and 
macro-levels, which mutually influence the process of trust development or erosion. 
For project businesses, the meso-level constitutes projects and their organisations; 
(4) Time dimensions of past and future, which constrain and enable trust development; 
(5) Value as perceived by both main contractors and subcontractors in service experiences 
and outcomes. 
The conceptual framework helps organise the empirical work of this research. The next 
chapter will discuss the philosophical and methodological foundation of the research. The 
framework will be further specified in Chapter 4 as it was refined by findings of the pilot 
project.  
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Chapter 4 Research philosophy and methodology 
The theoretical foundations have been set down for this research. Research gaps have 
been identified in both trust theories and service-dominant logic (S-DL), which are taken 
as theoretical points of departure for building a theory of trust in construction supply 
chains. Equally, if not more important, is the consistency between the theory and 
underlying ontological understanding of trust. All theories are based upon a philosophy 
of science, the assumptions concerning the very essence of the phenomena under 
investigation and the grounds of knowledge (Burrell and Morgan, 1979). The above sets 
of assumptions have direct influences on the way of questioning, investigating and 
obtaining knowledge about the social world. This chapter will address our philosophical 
assumptions and the associated methodology underlying our research. On the basis of the 
philosophical and methodological standing, the rest of the chapter will further outline and 
justify the research design and methods. 
4.1 Research philosophy, methodology and methods 
4.1.1 Process research: a critical realist view 
It has been argued that this research takes a process-based perspective to explore 1) the 
dynamic process of trust development in construction supply chains, 2) the unfolding 
value of trust in the process of trust development (see 1.3.3 and 2.4). This perspective 
recognises the interplay between interaction process and structures of service ecosystems 
over time in terms of constituting trust and creating value (see 3.4). The value of trust is 
investigated as an on-going process.  
Thus, it can be said that, in essence, this research is in line with process theorists who 
view the movement, change and thereby process as reality itself (Bergson, 1946; Rescher, 
1996). Process is fundamental, “there are changes, but there are underneath the change 
no things which change: change has no need of a support. There are movements, but 
there is no inert or invariable object which moves” (Bergson, 1946, p.173). Seemingly 
stabilised and concrete entities such as organisations are momentary outcomes or effects 
of historical processes, “stability waves in a sea of process” (Rescher, 1996, p.53). That 
reality is always becoming implies chaos, dynamics, uncertainties and ambiguity as 
fundamental, and organisation as the exception to stabilise, regularise and order what 
would otherwise be a wild world in which living would be extremely difficult if not 
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impossible (Chia, 2002). In this vein, organisation, including project organisation, is a 
‘world-making’ process rather than a unit (Tsoukas and Chia, 2002). Notably, this thesis 
does not deny the existence of substances but treats them as processual activities and 
stabilities, or, in short, manifolds of process. Even for physical objects, they are marked 
not by their material components but by a processual unity – the service delivered through 
them and the value-in-use.  
On the basis of a ‘becoming’ ontology, this thesis takes the perspective of critical realism 
and regards the reality as consisting of three domains – the real, the actual and the 
empirical (Bhaskar, 1975). The process, be it natural or social, occupies the domain of 
the real that is independent of human perception, regardless of whether it is empirically 
experienced by individuals and whether individuals are capable of understanding its 
nature (Sayer, 2000). The real has mechanisms that might be productive of different 
events under conditions – that is, causal powers – or, alternatively, susceptible to certain 
kinds of changes – that is, passive powers. The analysis of underlying mechanisms behind 
the process is the creation of theories that are not just a complex of data. Science, thereby, 
is a product of the social, “but the mechanisms that it identifies operate prior to and 
independently of their discovery” (Bhaskar, 1998, p. xii). The domain of the actual 
constitutes those events that take place when mechanisms are activated under certain 
conditions and transpires independently of the observer who might record it. The domain 
of the empirical is defined by what individuals observe and experience, which is a 
manifestation of the other two domains (Sayer, 2000).  
Something is real if it can have a causal effect and makes a difference. For critical realists, 
causal relations are not universal and measurable cause and effect as assumed by 
positivists; rather, they generate tendencies rather than certainties (Danermark, Ekstrom 
and Jakobsen, 2001). Whether these powers are actualised depends on other conditions. 
Causation is in essence contextual, emergent and varied. Events are therefore not pre-
determined before they happen (Sayer, 2000).  
The above philosophical position has implications for this thesis. First, the thesis views 
trust as foundational to establishing and maintaining relationships. Viewing trust as a 
relationship foundation does not mean that trust is an absolute; it means that any value of 
trust enacts through relationships in given contexts (Smyth, Gustafsson and Ganskau, 
2010). The task of the thesis is to explore trust and its unfolding value between “what we 
experience, what actually happens, and the underlying mechanisms that produce the 
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events in the world” (Danermark, Ekstrom and Jakobsen, 2001, p. 21). The emphasis is 
on the generative mechanisms and emergence that entail the presence of phenomena 
(Sayer, 2000). Second, both the process orientation and critical realism are sensitive to 
the central role of embedded agency in the constitution of the world that is experienced 
as an independent structure (Sayer, 2000; Langley and Tsoukas, 2017). The experience 
of action, which include interactions and the consequences they produce, changes agents 
and the phenomena they help co-create (Langley and Tsoukas, 2017). Therefore, 
experience is critical to actors as well as the service systems and ecosystems in which 
they are embedded, pointing to the importance of capturing and understanding 
experiences of those involved in supply chain relationships in terms of trust and value. 
The process-based view notes what is necessary for segmenting experience into discrete 
and temporally-structured events to fit pragmatic needs and projects (Moore, 1996). Yet 
it is the continuity of experience that is fundamental to process thinkers, as Rescher (1996, 
p.29) argues, “the idea of discrete ‘events’ dissolves into a manifold of processes which 
themselves dissolve into further processes”. Therefore, events of trust are investigated 
not as isolated entities but in relation to their predecessors; in this sense, the past is also 
part of the present (Langley and Tsoukas, 2010).  
Moreover, just as the Heraclitan individual cannot step into the same river twice, 
experience is heterogeneous (Guerlac, 2006). This accords to the S-DL argument that the 
creation of value is not through the repeat production of ‘value-adding’ goods and 
services but through the integration of resources with actors in service ecosystems 
(Akaka, Vargo and Lusch, 2013; Vargo and Lusch, 2016), which involves endless 
reflexivity of previous service experiences and reproduction or transformation of these 
into the present (Edvardsson, Tronvoll and Gruber, 2011). Value is not an objective 
attribute but is constituted and reconstituted over time through representative, integrative 
and normative practices (Lusch and Vargo, 2014). The heterogeneity of experience points 
to what is necessary for investigating the conditions for trust and value, such as the 
constraining and enabling effects of structures and time.  
In terms of human nature, this thesis combine the views of Giddens (1984) and Van de 
Ven and Lifschitz (2013) and claim that actors are knowledgeable and prudentially 
reasonable sense makers, who select appropriate choices in the light of collective norms 
of reasonable behaviour. At this point, this thesis tends to distance itself from 
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methodological individualism. For the thesis recognise the constraining and enabling 
effects of structures, unacknowledged conditions and unintended consequences. 
To explore the value of trust requires looking into the dynamic process of trust 
development or erosion over time in which the value unfolds. Theorising trust in this way 
leads to a rethinking of the methodology of trust research, which will be discussed in the 
next section.  
4.1.2 Qualitative approach 
This thesis seeks an in-depth understanding of generative mechanisms for patterns in a 
social context, focuses on processes and concerns emergent issues. The philosophical 
position guides the research to a qualitative and process-based nature. Qualitative 
methodology offers a zooming-in opportunity for looking for mechanisms in a local 
situation, sorting out complexity and temporality dimensions of events and processes and 
showing loose sequences either through direct observation or retrospection (Miles and 
Huberman, 1994). Process theories, as mentioned (see 1.3.3 and 2.4), provide 
explanations in terms of temporal patterns, generative mechanisms and meanings of 
experiences and concerns interactions, multiple-level contexts, reflexivity and emergency 
instead of static states and structure (Weick, 1979; Mohr, 1982; Langley, 1999; Tsoukas 
and Chia, 2002; Van de Ven and Poole, 2005; Langley and Tsoukas, 2010), although it is 
recognised that empirical approaches to process vary (cf. Isabella, 1990; Pratt, Rockmann 
and Kaufmann, 2006; Bresman, 2013; Bruns, 2013; Swärd, 2016 and see Langley and 
Tsoukas, 2017).  
In this vein, the thesis focuses on the dynamics of trust, interactions and unfolding value 
over time. As mentioned (see 2.4), in the context of construction, extant research on trust 
has mostly addressed the snapshots of trust either by using quantitatively-based surveys 
or cross-sectional case studies (exceptions can be found in Laan et al., 2011 and Swärd, 
2016). It is not uncommon that trust is treated as a taken-for-granted input of operations 
or an output of certain events or behaviour (e.g., Doloi, 2009; Chalker and Loosemore, 
2016; Benítez-Ávila et al., 2018). Although these studies contribute to rich insights into 
trust at any given moment, the dynamics of trust are deluded (Van de Ven and Ring, 
2006). As Langley and Tsoukas (2017, p. 6) note,  
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However, because we segment the world and chronologically arrange our 
discrete experiences to fit whatever pragmatic needs we happen to have, it does 
not mean that what we apparently perceive is all there is. 
Think of Zeno’s arrow, as illustrated in Box 4.1. This thesis focuses on the process as 
generative mechanisms and conditions that bring about different degrees of trust and 
value. For, by doing so, the essence of trust can be unfolded.  
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Box 4.1 Zeno’s Arrow Paradox 
As described by Aristotle (Physics VI: 9, 239b5), Zeno’s arrow paradox states that if a moving 
arrow, during any indivisible moment or instant of time, is at rest when it occupies an equal 
space and if it is always occupying such a space at any given instant, the moving arrow is 
motionless. Although contemporary physics theory well resolved the paradox, it is Aristotle’s 
objection that is interesting here: “Time is not composed of indivisible nows any more than 
any other magnitude is composed of indivisibles” (Physics, VI: 9, 239b5). That a thing is static 
in a given moment does not mean it is static in any other moment.  
Zeno’s arrow paradox can be viewed as an analogy to snapshots-focused methods employed 
in extant trust research. We cannot obtain knowledge about a moving arrow, its speed, 
direction and height, given that we look only at an instantaneous photo of them. Similarly, we 
cannot obtain the essence of trust – that is, dynamics in the course of time – by snapshots-
focused methods. An alternative way is to investigate the process, bringing about series of 
snapshots of the arrow as events. By doing so, the full picture of the moving arrow can be more 
or less captured (see Figure 3). 
 
Figure 3 Zeno's arrow paradox and process-based research 
Source: original 
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This thesis focuses on building a middle-range theory that “involves abstractions… but 
they are close enough to observed data to be incorporated in propositions that permit 
empirical testing” (Merton, 1968, p. 39). In this vein, a theory of trust in construction 
supply chains is built upon first answering queries grounded in specific contexts and then 
consolidating special answers into more general sets of concepts and mutually consistent 
propositions. Middle-range theories are not derived from a single all-embracing grand 
theory, although it is possible that once they are developed they are more consistent with 
one than another (Merton, 1968). The search for a middle-range theory has implications 
for the abductive logic across the research process and strategies of analysing the data. 
Abductive logic builds a technical account, the researchers’ categories, upon participants’ 
own language and meanings (Blaikie, 2007). 
Specifically, the research started with existing theories and research, which led to the 
development of a conceptual framework that helped plan the study and design fieldwork. 
In the fieldwork and early stage of analysis, the thesis focused on the informants’ 
perceptions and experiences in service interactions. Description and explanation were 
grounded in and supported by informants’ own accounts. This stage of analysis sought to 
identify temporal patterns among activities and events (Langley, 1999; Langley and 
Tsoukas, 2010), answering questions such as ‘Who did this and when?’, ‘What was the 
participant’s perception of this experience or attitudes towards the other party?’ and ‘How 
were events ordered and related?’. While constructing the chronology of each case story, 
the author gave room to narratives of both main contractor and subcontractor 
organisations and interpreted the meanings of events and activities from both parties’ 
perspectives (cf. Buchanan and Dawson, 2007).  
Meanwhile, initial empirical findings were found to be in accordance with structuration 
theory (Giddens, 1984). A theoretical framework based on structuration theory then 
emerged and was employed to build explanations for patterns of findings. At the later 
stage of analysis, the author related findings back to theories and existing knowledge in 
order to identify generative mechanisms to distinguish the thesis from spurious 
associations (Hedström and Swedberg, 1998; Langley and Tsoukas, 2010). It is notable 
that theoretical mechanisms and concepts, either used at the start or end of the study, were 
used as a general guideline that is subjective to revise (cf. Blumer, 1954; Langley, 1999). 
As suggested by Dubois and Gadde (2002a), the author remained open to the meanings 
of concepts that can give rise to and refined concepts according to empirical findings. 
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A “temporary bracketing” strategy was used throughout the analysis (Langley, 1999, p. 
703) to decompose the time scale of cases into three successive stages. At the early stage 
of analysis, decomposition helped structure the description of events; at the latter stage, 
it enabled exploring and replicating theoretical ideas in successive time periods, analysing 
how changes from previous periods impact interactions and perceptions in current 
periods, and identifying theoretical mechanisms recurring over time (cf. Doz, 1996; 
Monin et al., 2013; Stevens, MacDuffie and Helper, 2015; Swärd, 2016). 
This research aims to achieve empathic neutrality, meaning that the author tried to avoid 
obvious and conscious bias in the research process while recognising that all research will 
be influenced by the researcher (Ritchie et al., 2013). Based on this recognition, the author 
strived to be reflexive about the role and influence of one’s own beliefs and knowledge 
on the research and transparent about the potential sources of bias alongside procedural 
details of the study’s conduct.  
4.1.3 Case study 
“A case study is an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon in 
depth and within its real-life context, especially when the boundaries between 
phenomenon and context are not clearly evident.” 
(Yin, 2009,  p. 18) 
A case study approach is the primary method employed in this research. It provides 
opportunities for understanding the dynamics present within single settings (Eisenhardt, 
1989). Case study is desirable for this study in that the study aims to explore trust 
dynamics and trust value in the on-going service interactions between main contractors 
and subcontractors in construction supply chains. Whether and how interactions between 
collectives of actors help trust development strongly depends on the context in which 
these relationships are embedded (Stevens, MacDuffie and Helper, 2015). Multiple case 
studies were used to compare and detect patterns across contexts, develop richer 
description and evidence, and hence advance knowledge by developing stronger 
theoretical constructions (Eisenhardt, 1989; Yin, 2009; Langley et al., 2013). For case 
studies to serve to make analytical generation – that is, to compare previously developed 
theory with empirical results of the case study (Yin, 2009) – cases were purposively 
chosen because they represented particular features that allow for refinement of existing 
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theories (Dubois and Gadde, 2002a; Ritchie et al., 2013). Case selection and data 
collection process are discussed in detail in the next section. This thesis mainly followed 
Yin (2009) to initiate a logical model of proof in the methods design to guide data 
collection and analysis, building explanations, and drawing inferences and conclusions. 
Specifically, a database was established that consists of a case study protocol, a topic 
guide, interview questions, data collected from fieldwork (interview records and 
transcripts, site notes, photos, project documents), frameworks and charts for case 
analysis, indexed transcripts and case reports.  
4.2 Research process 
This section will detail the research process, which consists of 1) the pilot case study, 2) 
the development of the case study protocol, topic guide and interview questions, 3) case 
selection, 4) data collection and 5) data analysis. 
4.2.1 The pilot case study 
Before selecting cases and collecting data, a pilot case study was conducted to refine the 
conceptual framework and help develop the case study protocol, the topic guide and 
interview questions. Another reason for carrying out the pilot case study was the easy 
access by a personal contact of the main contractor organisation. The case involved a five-
year collaborative relationship between a main contractor, referred to herein as Road Ltd., 
and one of its supply chain partners, referred to herein as Communication Ltd. Road Ltd. 
and Communication Ltd. jointly delivered three consecutive highway projects from 2011 
to 2016 and were about to complete the last project by the time of the study. The 
relationship improved over the five years and has been mentioned as an exemplar of 
collaborative relationships between Road Ltd. and their supply chain partners.  
The case fitted the purpose of our study because the long-term, consistent and 
collaborative relationship enabled the author to identify the key features of the trust 
phenomenon as well as influential factors contributing to trust. Moreover, the near-
completion project offered a full picture of the value of trust throughout the project 
lifecycle. The primary data collection method was semi-structured interview. 
Interviewees were project managers, quantity surveyors and operatives from both Road 
Ltd. and Communication Ltd. The author also obtained the contract between Road Ltd. 
and Communication Ltd. and archived project information published on the government 
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website by the client, herein referred as HA, which is a UK government agency. 
Additional data sources helped triangulate data for interviews. It is notable that the pilot 
case study is to help develop relevant lines of questions, rather than a rehearsal for the 
final data collection plan (Yin, 2009) or for developing pre-structured hypotheses to be 
tested (Dubois and Gadde, 2002a). The scope of the inquiry was therefore broader, and 
the findings were used to narrow the relevant interview topics and questions. Based on 
the conceptual framework, the pilot project was to identify: 
1) Interactions attributing to trust; 
2) Conditions for trust development; 
3) The phenomenon of trust; 
4) The value of trust for both main contractor and subcontractor  
The context of the pilot case 
The pilot case study, P1, involves an inter-organisational relationship in three highways 
construction projects in the northern region of England from 2011 to 2016 (see Table 4). 
The main contractor, Road Ltd., was a construction firm in the UK; the subcontractor, 
Communication Ltd., specialised in providing communication systems, traffic signs, 
signals, street lighting and associated civil engineering to construction projects. 
Specifically, for projects in P1, Communication Ltd. delivered communication systems, 
ducting and chambers, street lighting and footpath steps and guardrails. 
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Table 4 Case P1 overview 
Project name P1a P1b P1c 
Start date October 2011 January 2014 November 2013 
End date September 2013 March 2015 July 2016 
Type Highway major scheme Highway pinch points 
improvement scheme1 
Highway major scheme 
Cost £136 million £20 million £120 million 
Overall project 
contents 
1) Transforming the hard 
shoulder between five 
junctions into a 
temporary fourth lane 
for use during 
congestion periods; 
2) Installing smart 
motorways 
technology 
3) Creating emergency 
refuge areas 
Installing: 
1) Closed circuit 
television cameras 
(CCTV) 
2) MIDAS automatic 
signalling traffic 
monitoring equipment 
3) Variable message signs 
4) Communication 
ducting 
1) Transforming the 
hard shoulder into a 
permanent fourth 
lane for traffic; 
2) Installing smart 
motorways 
technology 
Specialist 
project 
contents 
1) Communication systems; 
2) Ducting and chambers; 
3) Street lighting; 
4) Footpath steps and guardrails. 
Case findings and topics 
1. The phenomenon of trust 
Road Ltd. perceived Communication Ltd. as capable of managing risks, and having 
openness, integrity and honesty. A predominant feature of the relationship between Road 
Ltd. and Communication Ltd. was the high degree of shared understanding of risks, 
mutual benefits, project requirements and each other’s requirements. In return, trust 
increased the willingness to communicate, leading to more mutual understanding. 
Moreover, the case study found both parties behaved collaboratively to sustain the 
solidarity, reciprocity and equity of the relationship. Road Ltd. focused on the relational 
impacts of using contractual mechanisms, so contracts were rarely used to impose control. 
In this vein, trust was socially-oriented. 
Under socially-oriented trust, Road Ltd. was more willing to share risks and benefits, “We 
don’t want to see our subcontractors lose. We don’t want to lose either. Provided we were 
working together… then everybody has got the share” (Quantity Surveyor, Road Ltd.). 
This was evident in the way Road Ltd. managed delays suffered by Communication Ltd. 
                                                 
1 The pinch point programme is designed to deliver smaller scale improvements to the strategic road net-
work that will help to stimulate growth in the local economy and relieve congestion and/or improve safety. 
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In delivering P1c, frequent changes of the overall project delayed Communication Ltd.’s 
operations. Under the New Engineering Contract 3 (NEC3) re-measured contract, 
changes needed the re-measurement of the quantities, formal procedures of 
communication and approval, which further delayed the process. To reduce 
Communication Ltd.’s burden of contract management and reduce the risk of delay, Road 
Ltd. changed the re-measured contract to cost reimbursable, which meant Road Ltd. 
reimbursed all costs occurred in Communication Ltd.’s works and relied on 
Communication Ltd.’s honesty and integrity to deliver on time while ensuring that the 
project stayed on budget. In other words, socially-oriented trust led to a sense of 
responsibility and tolerance of uncertainties in interactions. Findings related to the 
phenomenon of trust accorded to the conceptual framework that views trust from three 
dimensions, the perception of trustworthiness, the orientation of trust and trusting 
behaviour.  
2. Interactions attributing to trust 
The phenomenon of trust is found to be more emergent than purposely created. The 
perception of trustworthiness and social orientations emerged through learning during or 
after joint activities. The implication is that, instead of directly asking how trust is formed, 
investigating informants’ perceptions and attitudes in joint activities can shed light on the 
phenomenon of trust. As for joint activities key to trust development, in P1, managing 
changes and risks immediately came to the fore. In risk workshops as well as during 
operations, Communication Ltd. tried to mitigate risks not only in its own contract but 
also in the overall project. Short-term programmes and resource plans were regularly 
planned and re-planned to adjust changes. These plans were agreed by both parties. For 
Road Ltd., implementing mutually-agreed programmes improved the effectiveness of the 
execution; for Communication Ltd., jointly developing programmes ensured fair payment 
and increased Road Ltd.’s understanding of their works. In other words, the value 
proposition was reciprocal to both parties even though the project contents frequently 
changed. When emergent changes occurred, Communication Ltd. was willing to increase 
resources for Road Ltd. The perception of competence and benevolence emerged in joint 
risk and change management, although it was not necessarily an intended consequence of 
such activities. Therefore, risk management and change management were recognised as 
two main subtopics under the topic of interaction process.  
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Apart from joint risk and change management, another joint activity was found 
unexpectedly. Road Ltd. offered various training opportunities for Communication Ltd. 
Whilst delivering Pla, Road Ltd.’s engineers introduced Communication Ltd.’s operatives 
to smart motorways technology and its installation. The knowledge gave Communication 
Ltd. an advantage over its competitors when tendering for projects P1b and P1c. From 
the perspective of Road Ltd., training Communication Ltd. and maintaining continuous 
collaboration made projects P1b and P1c more efficient. Road Ltd. also offered health 
and safety (H&S) courses that increased Communication Ltd.’s awareness of safety issues 
on site as well as the understanding of Road Ltd.’s requirements. Through these joint 
activities, Road Ltd. had more trust in Communication Ltd.’s capability of completing 
projects to the requirements. The provision of service was based on future business 
opportunities, which were secured by the collaborative agreement between the two parties. 
This pointed to two subtopics that required future investigation, the shadow of the future 
and supply chain management systems within main contractor organisations.  
As stated in the first point, Road Ltd. and Communication Ltd. had good shared 
understanding of risks, mutual benefits, requirements and each other’s priorities. Shared 
understanding can be attributed to the proactive communication of both parties. Apart 
from formal communication through project meetings, Road Ltd. valued supply chain 
partners’ feedback on operations and management. An instance was in P1a when Road 
Ltd. assigned link managers to manage all subcontractors’ works between two junctions. 
Subcontractors fed back that this practice led to inconsistent operations since they had to 
deal with different managers who might have different requirements and methods after 
completing a junction. The relationships built between subcontractors and link managers 
were also disrupted. Road Ltd. took the advice and assigned each subcontractor a package 
manager in project P1c as the boundary person between the two parties, which improved 
relationships and efficiency. Continuous communication reduced perceived risks, helped 
the emergence of common knowledge and strengthened ties between the two parties. Thus, 
communication, knowledge management and relationship management were identified 
as subtopics.  
3. Conditions for trust development 
The shadow of the past was found to form the first condition for trust development. The 
phenomenon of trust in P1c was mostly inherited from shared experiences in P1a and 
P1b. The shadow of the past furnished familiarity between actors as they repeatedly 
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interacted with each other and security in operations as service processes became routines. 
Routines reproduced and hence consolidated the collaborative way of managing projects. 
Collaborative procurement increased the involvement of the client, which positively 
influenced the relationship and trust. The client initiated a common system and an open 
project account to mitigate issues such as main contractor holding-up payment and 
facilitate information flow within projects. These practices increased Communication 
Ltd.’s sense of security and willingness to cooperate. Further, the involvement of the 
client helped balance the power relations between Road Ltd. and Communication Ltd., 
which offered the perception of fairness between the two parties. In short, findings 
pointed to the significance of the shadow of the past and procurement route. 
4. The value of trust for both main contractor and subcontractor 
In the process of service provision, trust first encouraged service communication between 
Road Ltd. and Communication Ltd. Contractual mechanisms were rarely used; both 
parties relied on their relationships at the individual level and organisational level to 
manage emergent changes. Both parties were able to react to changes quickly and 
spontaneously and deal with changes in a collaborative way. By working in the 
phenomenon of trust, actors perceived a sense of pride when they achieved the common 
goal. In terms of service outcomes, the project was delivered on time and within budget, 
despite the contract change. Both parties gained reputation and market status through the 
five-year collaboration and expected continuous business through their collaborative 
arrangements.  
Implications for the research 
Concepts derived from the pilot case study were employed to create a reference point and 
were treated as a guideline for the remaining data collection (Dubois and Gadde, 2002a). 
The pilot case study shed light on the primary topics and subtopics below: 
(1) Interaction process: risk management, change management, communication, routines 
and other joint activities; 
(2) Structures: procurement, organisation systems (e.g., knowledge management, 
relationship management, supply chain management), the shadow of the past and the 
shadow of the future; 
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(3) The phenomenon of trust: the perception of trustworthiness, the orientation of trust 
and trusting behaviour (e.g., taking responsibility, risk sharing); 
(4) The value of trust: service experience (e.g., pride), service provision (e.g., 
communication, adaptability of service) and service outcomes.  
Despite the rich findings, the one-shot case study lacked the power to explore the process 
of trust development and the unfolding value in service interactions. This points to the 
significance of multiple-wave data collection in the lifecycle of projects.  
4.2.2 The development of the case study protocol, topic guide and 
interview questions 
This research used a case study protocol and topic guide to keep coherence of data 
collection and analysis among the different cases (Yin, 2009; Ritchie et al., 2013). After 
the pilot case study, the case study protocol was developed (Appendix I), which consists 
of six parts, research introduction, data collection procedures, outline of case study report, 
interview topic guide, interview questions and participant information sheet. The topic 
guide listed the key themes to be explored in interviews.  
4.2.3 Case selection 
A case study method serves to make analytical generation – that is, to compare previously 
developed theory with empirical results of the case study (Yin, 2009). Cases need to be 
purposively chosen to represent particular features that allow for refinement of existing 
theories (Dubois and Gadde, 2002a; Ritchie et al., 2013). Process-based studies have 
investigated trust development in projects by focusing on the interplay of trust and various 
relational factors (e.g., prior ties in Buvik and Rolfsen, 2015; reciprocity in Swärd, 2016), 
but how collectives of actors interact and develop trust in multilevel service ecosystems 
(Grabher, 2002; Manning, 2008) remains under-researched. Therefore, cases varied by 
structure of service ecosystems. The UK construction industry serves as the empirical 
field; therefore, cases were under the same conditions at the level of organisational fields. 
At the inter-organisational networks and organisation levels, the pilot case study pointed 
to the significance of procurement routes and organisational systems. To conduct a 
process-based study and compare trust development over time, projects of the chosen 
cases should be at the stage of procurement and have similar durations. The unit of 
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analysis is the inter-organisation relationship between main contractors and second-tier 
subcontractors. Primary case selection criteria were: 
(1) The chosen cases differ in terms of the procurement route of the overall project; 
(2) The chosen cases differ in terms of organisation systems; 
(3) The subcontracted projects in the chosen cases are at the stage of procurement; 
(4) The subcontracted projects in the chosen cases have similar durations. 
After the first-round screening and initial contact with construction firms, the author 
found that it was rather difficult to obtain access to projects at the procurement stage. This 
was because it was uncertain which subcontractor could secure the project. A further 
consideration was the time constraint of this research programme. Therefore, the last two 
criteria were revised: 
(3) The subcontracted projects in the chosen cases are about to start or have just started 
the execution; 
(4) The subcontracted projects in the chosen cases have a similar execution duration, 
ideally four to six months. 
Three cases were eventually selected (see Table 5). 
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Table 5 Case overview 
 Alpha Beta Gamma 
Context Surfacing for a highway 
improvement project 
Piling for an office 
building project 
Piling for a multiple-
use building project 
Main contractor Road Ltd. Office Plc. Build Gamma 
Subcontractor Surface Ltd. Found Gamma Found Gamma 
Procurement route Collaborative framework 
procurement: long-term 
collaboration  
Competitive 
procurement 
Two-stage 
procurement: one-
time collaboration 
Organisation systems Independent systems Independent systems Shared systems: 
belonging to the same 
parent organisation 
Subcontract procurement Limited bid invitation Limited bid invitation Limited bid invitation 
Execution duration 5 months 7 months 6 months 
Main contract NEC3 Target cost JCT2 2011 lump sum JCT 2011 Pre-
Construction 
Agreement (PCA) 
Subcontract NEC3 Re-measured JCT 2011 lump sum 
(changed to remeasured 
during execution) 
JCT 2011 lump sum 
4.2.4 Data collection 
To investigate the sequence and flow of events and understand processes in the course of 
time, data collection involved three waves of semi-structured interviews at the 
procurement/preconstruction, execution and completion stages of the subcontracted 
project, in order to capture both historic and contemporary processes and track changes 
in small steps (Pettigrew, 1990). By doing so, the author gathered data about past 
experiences that dated back to five years ago as well as on-going experiences in present 
projects. Conducting repeated, multiple-wave interviews also mitigates the possibility of 
bias due to incomplete, misinterpreted and mistakenly reported memories (Saldaña, 
2003). To capture a more detailed and balanced picture of the phenomenon, during each 
visit, the author interviewed informants from different functional units and hierarchical 
levels of both main contractors and subcontractors. To examine changes, the author tried 
to interview the same informants in multiple visits, but, due to the handover of the project 
from the procurement or bid teams to project teams and redistribution of staff, some 
informants were substituted by others with similar roles. For instance, due to the handover 
of the project from the procurement or bid team to the project team, the bid manager and 
                                                 
2 Joint Contracts Tribunal 
95 
supply chain manager were substituted by project directors. Table 6 lists roles of 
interviewees. Figure 4 illustrates the chronology of case studies.  
The unit of analysis was inter-organisational relationships between main contractors and 
subcontractors. Interview questions were therefore designed to ask informants’ views on 
own organisation and the other organisation, such as practices of own organisation, 
interactions between the two organisations, and attitudes towards the other organisation. 
Individual views and attitudes were aggregated to form collective views and attitudes 
representing their organisations. 
 
Figure 4 The chronology of the case studies 
In total, 71 semi-structured interviews were conducted, comprising six interviews for the 
pilot case study, 56 for the three case studies and nine for general organisation information 
such as organisation systems and management approaches. The average interview time 
was 45 minutes. While the length and focus of the interviews varied, they were all guided 
by a research protocol with interview topics and questions. The author was flexible in 
relation to detailed interview questions to allow for identifying and exploring emergent 
findings.  
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Table 6 Interview information 
Interviewee roles Alpha Beta Gamma 
Managing project programmes, incl. bid 
manager, project director, supply chain 
manager, operations director 
5 6 7 
Project operatives, incl. project manager, 
project engineer, site agent, supervisor, 
project planner 
7 7 10 
Commercial, incl. commercial manager, 
quantity surveyors 
6 4 4 
Interview numbers 18 17 21 
Apart from interviews, the author gathered archival material published online by clients 
to help build a sequence of events. The author also attempted to obtain contracts between 
main contractors and subcontractors, which did not receive responses. Interview data 
were supplemented by non-participant observation during site visits. In case Alpha, the 
site agent of Road Ltd. invited the author to participate in their first pre-start meeting with 
Surface Ltd. The author also asked subcontracts in all three cases but did not receive a 
positive response. In summary, our methods design follows the four tests illustrated in 
Yin (2009, p. 41) to ensure the validity and reliability of the case study (Table 7). 
Table 7 Case study validity and reliability 
Validity and Reliability Case study tactic in this research 
Construct validity Multiple-wave data collection 
Dyadic interview with both main contractors and subcontractors 
Interviewees with diverse roles and at different hierarchical levels 
Chain of evidence 
Internal validity Pattern matching between theoretical mechanisms and empirical 
findings 
Explanation building 
External validity Conceptual and theoretical frameworks 
Reliability Case study protocol 
Interview topic guide 
Case study database 
Source: adapted from Yin (2009, p. 41) 
4.2.5 Data analysis 
All interviews were recorded and transcribed by the author. Transcription was stored and 
managed through MAXQDA 12. Data analysis was conducted in four steps. The first step 
was constructing chronological histories of the cases, based on themes and events 
expressed in interviews as well as the online archival material of projects (Langley, 1999; 
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Van de Ven and Poole, 2005). The focus was on what two organisations did in 
interactions, and informants’ interpretations of events, progress and performance.  
 
Figure 5 Development of a thematic framework (adapted from Ritchie and Spencer, 2002, 
p. 181) 
A framework analysis approach (Ritchie and Spencer, 2002; Ritchie et al., 2013) was 
then used to uncover processes of interactions that influenced trust development at 
different stages of project. The development of the framework was illustrated in Figure 
5. A framework was developed for each case. The first framework version drew upon the 
interview topic guide but also on the first round of analysis (e.g. ‘Internal communication’ 
in Figure 5). The framework was then applied to the interview data in its textual form, 
during which new themes emerged and enriched the framework. All interview transcripts 
were indexed with numbers that linked back to themes. The framework consisted of 
themes within which the material can be sifted and sorted. 
After indexing individual transcripts, data were lifted from the original context and 
rearranged in charts (Figure 6). The author then began to pull together the data and 
interpret the data set as a whole. Indexing and sorting data were facilitated by MAXQDA 
12.  
98 
 
Figure 6 An extract from the charts 
The author tried to identify and trace three types of interaction, from the lens of 
structuration theory (Giddens, 1984), which will be introduced in Chapter 5. The first was 
interaction processes that stimulated the perception of trustworthiness. The second type 
was processes that drove the use of trust relations to allocate and integrate resources in 
organising projects. The last type of interactions helped form the normative practices that 
collectives of actors behaved trustworthily and were willing to maintain the relationship 
with each other. We studied the phenomenon of trust from three dimensions, main 
contractors’ perception of subcontractors’ trustworthiness (competence and intention 
trust), orientations of collaborating with subcontractors (self-interested and socially-
oriented trust) and the behavioral manifestation of trust. The value of trust was examined 
through benefits from service provision and outcomes, as perceived by both main 
contractors and subcontractors. Up to this point, various interaction processes that 
developed or eroded trust, phenomenon of trust and the value of trust at different stages 
of respective cases were identified as first-order concepts (Gioia, Corley and Hamilton, 
2013). 
Lastly, the thesis used the chronological stories to conduct cross-case analysis and found 
recurrent situations and perceptions as well as differences between two cases. The process 
of systematically combining patterns with the literature was iterative where empirical 
findings directed attention to theories and vice versa (Dubois and Gadde, 2002a). Through 
this process, the author identified patterns among the concepts that lead to second-order 
themes that represented theoretical concepts at a more abstract level (Gioia, Corley and 
Hamilton, 2013; Ritchie et al., 2013). Further analysis of the interplay between these 
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second-order themes over time revealed a model for understanding trust development and 
value in construction supply chain relationships under different structural conditions. 
The research process was itself dynamic as the theoretical framework emerged at the early 
stage of data analysis. Before starting the case study analysis, Chapter 5 will introduce 
the framework and its underpinning theory, structuration theory (Giddens, 1984). The 
framework provided the analytical tool of interpreting data and building theoretical 
explanations.   
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Chapter 5 Structuration theory and the theoretical 
framework 
The focus of dynamics of trust, the interplay of interaction and structures, and unfolding 
value requires more open and reflexive management and organisation theories. Whereas 
Luhmann (1995)’s systems theory has shaped our conceptualisation of trust, particularly 
the function of trust in the face of complexity, the theory’s predominant focus on the level 
of systems, or macro-level offers few explanations for the process at meso- and micro-
levels. On the other hand, social network theorists construct the social reality at the level 
of structures, leaving the process of actors constituting their networks obscure (cf. White, 
1992). It is Gidden (1984)’s structuration theory that offered useful explanations for 
initial data patterns.  
Structuration theory concerns knowledgeable actors in the more or less autonomous 
dynamics of a social system that influences actors’ choices in more than just a very 
selective fashion (Staber and Sydow, 2002; Manning, 2008; Sydow and Braun, 2017). 
Based on structuration theory, a theoretical framework emerged and offered theoretical 
mechanisms for analysing, interpreting and explaining empirical data. As mentioned, the 
theoretical framework was also subjective to revise. The interplay of data and theories 
has led to the refined framework, which will be discussed in Chapter 10. 
This chapter first introduces structuration theory (Giddens, 1984), particularly in context 
of construction projects and supply chains and service ecosystems. The discussion 
provides a synthetic picture and forms the theoretical framework of this thesis.  
5.1 Theoretical framing 
Giddens’ structuration theory is part of a group of theories that stresses the interrelation 
of structure and agency (e.g., Bourdieu, 1977; Archer, 1996; Sayer, 2000). The concept 
of ‘structuration’, in Giddens’ sense, involves “the structuring of social relations across 
time and space, in virtue of the duality of structure” (Giddens, 1984, p. 376). The main 
argument of his structuration perspective is that knowledgeable actors are capable of 
producing and reproducing social structures and continue to do so through the flow of 
interactions that are enabled and constrained by social structures (Sydow and Staber, 
2002). Berends, Boersma and Weggeman (2003, p. 1041) state that structuration is “the 
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construction and reconstruction of structure by the interaction of knowledgeable actors.” 
Structuration highlights that knowledge is distributive in nature and exists within a larger 
social context, in that organisational members share only a portion of available 
knowledge (Berends, Boersma and Weggeman, 2003). This points to the significance of 
relationships in the service exchange and can shed light on a relational approach in 
construction project and supply chain management.  
A lot of literature on project management, including construction project management, 
emphasises technical-efficiency and takes a static and contingency perspective assuming 
that there is one best organisational form in response to particular conditions. Such 
particular conditions are viewed as given and the management of projects is implemented 
rationally and intentionally. More recent approaches (e.g., information processing and 
relational approaches) have focused on systemic character and relational aspects of 
project organisations, taking into account project ecologies, organising processes, 
learning, sensemaking, culture, norms, knowledge and dynamic capabilities (Manning, 
2008; Smyth, Gustafsson and Ganskau, 2010; Kusuma, 2014; Bygballe, Swärd and 
Vaagaasar, 2016; Davies, Dodgson and Gann, 2016; Swärd, 2016; Sydow and Braun, 
2017). These studies come closer to capturing relations and conflicts within and beyond 
projects and associating project organisations with a timeline and multiple contexts 
including business context but also social systems. Despite the rich insights into the 
management of projects, few address the simultaneous and mutual influences of structure 
and action, in particular the context of construction projects and supply chains. 
In this section, the interplay of structure and agency will be examined by reviewing key 
concepts of the thesis from the lens of structuration theory. 
5.1.1 Structures and service ecosystems 
In structuration theory, social phenomena are constituted by the interaction between 
structure and agency. Social structures and individual actors are inseparable.  
Structure is not ‘external’ to individuals: as memory traces, and as instantiated 
in social practices, it is in a certain sense more ‘internal’ than exterior to their 
activities. 
 (Giddens, 1984, p. 25) 
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For Giddens, structures are empirically unobservable rules and resources and exist in 
memory traces and social practices. While structures can enable and constrain actions, 
they are sustained, reinforced and, in some cases, changed by actors’ interactions. 
Knowledgeable actors draw on rules and resources embedded in structures to build 
relationships, organise projects, exchange service and co-create value and possess the 
capability of ignoring, replacing or recreating rules and resources in ways that differ from 
the original (Manning, 2008). Structure is endogenous to individual actors, “is what gives 
form and shape to social life, but it is not itself that form and shape” (Pozzebon, 2004, p. 
253).  
Above conception of structure is the duality of structure, a central message of Giddens’ 
theory of structuration, as illustrated in Figure 7.  
 
    
The theorem of the duality of structure consists of two dimensions, the dimension of 
structure and the dimension of action. Structures of signification are rules that enable and 
constrain actors’ sensemaking of the context they are placed and communicating of 
meanings created and emerged in the context (Staber and Sydow, 2002). In construction 
project businesses, rules of signification are embedded in formal contracts, agreements, 
organisation policies and project requirements that lend meaning to actors. Structures of 
legitimation are rules that legitimise behaviour and actions, namely what and how actors 
should do in a particular context (Staber and Sydow, 2002). For instance, organisational 
cultural programmes guide how actors should act in organisations.  
Structures of domination are means of production that actors use to actualise their 
purposes, which take two forms (Giddens, 1984). First, structures of domination involve 
Figure 7 The duality of structure (reproduced from Giddens, 1984, p. 29)
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the distribution of allocative or material resources, the free market being one example 
(Edvardsson, Skålén and Tronvoll, 2015). Second, structures of domination involve the 
use of authoritative resources, which are embedded in hierarchical relationships but also 
trust-based relationships. Structures of domination furnish actors with power that can be 
mobilised to realise their own interests. However, the actual mobilisation of power 
depends on agency as well as rules of signification and legitimation. Conversely, 
structures of domination can shape norms of conduct and actors’ interpretations (Sydow 
and Windeler, 1998). The client’s market power enables their requirements (mobilisation 
of power) normally influence supply chains’ conduct perceived as legitimate and 
interpretation of what is value.  
Structures equip actors with rules and resources that they integrate in order to co-produce 
core offerings and value propositions, exchange service and co-create value; in doing so, 
they form dynamic service ecosystems of resource-integrating actors connected by shared 
institutional structures (Grönroos, 2008; Chandler and Vargo, 2011; Akaka, Vargo and 
Lusch, 2013; Frow et al., 2014; Vargo and Lusch, 2016). Therefore, the continuity of 
service ecosystems relies on the production and reproduction of structures in order to 
support value co-creating processes.  
5.1.2 Agency and service interactions 
The duality structure has the dimension of action that shapes practices as observable 
expressions of structures. Rules and resources in the institutional, social and 
organisational environment constrain and enable practices in interactions. 
Knowledgeable actors, on the other hand, are capable of choosing among multiple rules 
and resources to communicate meanings, deploy power and invoke sanctions, which 
might also modify original rules and resources (Giddens, 1984). The implications for trust 
theories is that although trust in the reliability of systems lays a good foundation for trust 
in actors embedded in systems, it is acknowledged that actors can act otherwise, which 
calls for interactions to sustain, develop or reduce trust. In structuration theory, agency 
refers not to intentions or motivations within individuals, but to their capability of acting 
otherwise (Giddens, 1984). Actors do draw upon pre-existing rules and resources to act, 
thus reproducing structures. But they are first knowledgeable of pre-existing rules and 
powerful of using resources to reproduce or transform their setting through flows of 
actions (Manning, 2008). Relating to service-dominant logic (S-DL), actors can be 
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understood as knowledgeable and capable of exerting themselves structurally and 
interacting creatively in order to co-create value in the given context (Edvardsson, 
Tronvoll and Gruber, 2011).  
Furthermore, the continuity of flows of actions relies on reflexive monitoring. That is to 
say, understanding the conditions of system reproduction becomes part of those 
conditions of system reproduction as such. Giddens (1984) differentiated reflexive 
monitoring from rationalisation of action. The latter refers to actors’ capability of giving 
reasons for their actions such that if asked by others they can explain their actions. 
Reflexive monitoring refers to the intentional character of human behaviour with regard 
to the flow of activity of the actor. Reflexive monitoring operates largely in practical 
consciousness that consists of tacit and practical knowledge without being able to 
discursively explain (Giddens, 1984).  
The flow of action continually produces consequences which are unintended by 
actors, and these unintended consequences also may form unacknowledged 
conditions of action in a feedback fashion. Human history is created by intentional 
activities but is not an intended project; it persistently eludes efforts to bring it 
under conscious direction. 
(Giddens, 1984, p. 27) 
Therefore, in structuration theory, service interactions as one type of social interactions 
have a dual nature. They are purposive and emergent (Edvardsson, Skålén and Tronvoll, 
2015). In both cases, they feed back into systems to form conditions for future service, 
hence either reproducing or modifying properties of structures. It also relies upon the 
actors to use the systems in effective ways. In this way, how actors use the systems and 
develop their interactions can improve over time. 
5.1.3 Recursiveness of value co-creation in service ecosystems 
It has been argued that value co-creation in construction supply chains is a function of 
core offerings and value propositions and of purposive resource integration (see 3.2.3). 
From the lens of structuration theory, to understand the recursiveness, or continuity of 
value co-creation needs to examine it within multilevel service ecosystems. Both co-
production of core offerings and value propositions and resource integration to use service 
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are actor driven. For it is through actors that value propositions and core offerings are 
developed, resource are integrated, and value is co-created in service ecosystems. 
Zooming out, actors refer to structures of signification, legitimation and domination at 
different levels of service ecosystems to gain rules and resources for value co-creating 
activities; in doing so, they recreate structures of rules and resources.  
On the other hand, the recursiveness of value co-creation relies on the interrelationships 
between the three dimensions of structure and the three dimensions of action. The concept 
of resource needs notion here. As mentioned (see 3.2.2), S-DL conceptualises operand 
and operant resources and recognises the dynamic aspect of resources in relation to 
actions; resources are not but rather they become (Zimmermann, 1951). Structuration 
theory emphasises the control of resources, which is similar to, but does not resemble, 
the notion of ‘resource becoming’ in S-DL (Edvardsson, Skålén and Tronvoll, 2015). As 
implicitly mentioned in previous subsection, Giddens (1984) distinguishes two types of 
resources, authoritative resources to coordinate human activities and allocative resources 
to control material goods and services. Structuration therefore can be viewed as a process 
in which 1) the availability of resources can be either authoritative or economic and 2) 
access to resources is governed by rules of signification and legitimation of particular 
systems (Edvardsson, Skålén and Tronvoll, 2015). Hence, to continuously draw on 
resources for value co-creation, actors need to have shared understanding of meanings 
and norms in context in order to communicate and conduct in a collectively-accepted 
way. 
In summary, the recursiveness of value co-creation in service ecosystems rely on the 
duality of structure (illustrated as vertical arrows in Figure 7) and interrelations between 
three dimensions of structure and of action (illustrated as horizontal arrows in Figure 7). 
Trust is of importance for both categories as will be explained in next section.  
5.2 Synthesis: the theoretical framework  
Based on literature review on structuration theory, S-DL and trust theories, this section 
provides a synthetic picture of the theoretical framework of this thesis.  
Trust is fundamental to relationships and can be viewed as a structural property of 
relationship systems (Powell, 1990; Sydow, 1998; Smyth, Gustafsson and Ganskau, 
2010). In the theorem of the duality of structure, generating trust is to raise the perception 
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of trustworthiness (interpretative rule), use trust relations to allocate resources (facility of 
resources) and legitimate relational norms that constrain opportunism and encourage 
trusting and trustworthy behaviour (normative rule). This occurs in the dimension of 
action. In service interactions, frequent and open communication, effective and efficient 
resource mobilisation and collectively-accepted conduct may attribute to the perception 
of trustworthiness in terms of competence and intentions. Using trust relations to allocate 
and integrate resources may arise from perceived trustworthiness, service efficiency or 
equitable service exchange in terms of the process and outcomes. The recursive patterns 
of trusting and trustworthy behaviour may generate norms in day-to-day interactions 
(Macneil, 1980) between main contractors and subcontractors, which, in turn, legitimate 
patterns of trust-based behaviour. Experiences from past and expectations on future 
relationships may also influence the way of interaction, hence trust. Apart from 
interaction processes, rules and resources from projects, organisations, inter-
organisational networks and organisational fields form structural conditions for 
interactions that may develop or erode trust. Experiential and reflexive learning ensures 
the reproduction and transformation of trust in service interactions. The phenomenon of 
trust, in terms of trust perceptions (competence trust and intention trust), orientations 
(self-interested trust and socially-oriented trust) and trusting behaviour, is consequently 
constituted.  
Service manifests itself within and among relational processes and the co-creation of 
value might be intensified with trust (Fyrberg and Jüriado, 2009; Makkonen and 
Olkkonen, 2017). Exchange relations in essence are “overlaid with social content that 
carries strong expectations of trust and abstention from opportunism” (Granovetter, 
1985, p. 490). In the theorem of the duality of structure, trust as rules of signification and 
legitimation and authoritative resource of domination may improve service experiences 
by enhancing service communication, facilitating resource allocation and stabilising 
relationships in relational risks (Sydow, 1998). As such, project actors may perceive 
better service experiences that enable them to achieve higher performance as service 
outcomes. For project businesses, meso-level service interactions with supply chains may 
occur at the project level, organisation level or both. Good service experiences and 
performance at the project level may also induce future business and long-term 
relationships at the organisation level and social recognition and reputation at the inter-
organisational networks level, hence a ‘bottom-up’ structuration process.  
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Apart from the perspective of duality (vertical relations between structure and action), 
trust can affect collaboration and value co-creation through interactions between the three 
elements of structure and of action (horizontal relations between elements). The 
perception of trustworthiness and relational norms may influence the way of mobilising 
power in resource integration. Conversely, trust as an authoritative resource of 
domination may shape actors’ interpretations and norms of conduct in value co-creation. 
Trust, according to structuration theory and S-DL, is as much an outcome as a medium 
of collaboration and value co-creation. 
5.3 Summary 
The theoretical framework provides an analytical lens of investigating how trust develops 
and unfolds value in service ecosystems. The recursiveness of trust and value co-creation 
can be understood from the theorem of duality (top-down and bottom-up processes) and 
the interrelations between elements of structure dimension and action dimension.  
Chapter 6, 7, 8 and 9 will use the framework to analyse empirical data from the case 
study.  
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Chapter 6 Case Alpha 
Case Alpha tells the story of an inter-organisational relationship between Road Ltd. and 
its surfacing contractor, referred to herein as Surface Ltd., in a highway construction 
project. 
6.1 Project overview 
Alpha was a highways improvement scheme costing £7 million, which aimed to mitigate 
queuing and congestion due to increase in traffic levels from local housing and business 
growth, improve road safety and help create opportunities for local development. The 
project widened the road to include additional lanes in approaches from different 
directions to a roundabout and increase the size of the roundabout controlled by traffic 
signals. The overall project began in January 2016 and was completed in May 2017. 
Surfacing was the largest specialist package in the project, and it consisted of two phases. 
The first phase included widening the road and the roundabout, profile planing3 the 
roundabout, and laying the binder course onto the roundabout and roads to the 
roundabout. The second phase was to lay the surface course onto the roads to the 
roundabout, which was also the completion of project Alpha. 
 
Figure 8 The process and events of project Alpha 
This chapter particularly concerns the Alpha surfacing project, which was delivered by 
Road Ltd. as the main contractor and Surface Ltd. as the surfacing subcontractor. The 
process and main events are illustrated above in Figure 8. 
                                                 
3 Profile planing, also called cold planning or profiling, is the process of removing at least part of the 
existing surface prior to application of a new surface course. The aim is to improve the shape of an existing 
road (Mineral Products Association, 2009). 
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6.2 Service ecosystems 
6.2.1 Project participants 
Road Ltd. was a UK construction company and had businesses across various sectors 
such as highways, aviation and energy. Case Alpha involved the highways sector of Road 
Ltd. For pinch point programmes, which were designed to deliver smaller-scale 
improvements to highways, Road Ltd. had a project manager to manage a programme of 
projects. At the project level, Road Ltd. directly employed most of the on-site operatives 
including a site agent managing the project, quantity surveyor, engineers, supervisors and 
foremen. Direct employment of operatives enabled Road Ltd. to closely engage with 
supply chains at the project level. 
Surface Ltd. was an independent surfacing company operating nationally in the UK and 
delivered in sectors such as highways, airports and defence. Surface Ltd. divided its 
organisation into different geographic branches; each branch had a general manager and 
functional managers such as commercial manager and operations manager as the 
management team responsible for all projects in the local area. At the project level, a 
supervisor managed the site team to deliver construction works. Alpha was one of the 
projects delivered by Surface Ltd.’s West Midlands branch. The West Midlands branch 
was newly initiated to expand businesses across the Midlands and North.  
The client, HA, is a UK government agency charged with operating, maintaining and 
improving motorways and roads in England.  
6.2.2 Structures 
Procurement systems 
To achieve the best value for highways projects, HA proposed a series of procurement 
and supply chain strategies and then procured different collaborative procurement 
frameworks for different types of motorway and road construction projects. A limited 
number of appointed main contractors were then able to bid on projects within the 
framework. The framework ensured a relatively stable load of jobs for main contractors. 
More importantly, it increased the main contractors’ confidence to collaboratively 
manage supply chains, at least in a similar way to HA, which was the case of Road Ltd., 
as discussed in the next subsection. From the perspective of the supply chains, main 
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contractors having a long-term relational contract with the client may be perceived as 
more reliable.  
Each project within the framework was under the adapted form of New Engineering 
Contract 3 (NEC3) Main Option C, target cost with activity schedule together with 
relevant percentages and rates. The completion price was compared to the target price, 
usually adjusted due to compensation events. HA and the main contractors shared the 
gain from saving or the pain from overspending. Incentive payment promoted cooperation 
and shared intention to meet the target. However, the effect is not automatic; it depends 
on how realistic the target is and the agency of the actors. The collaborative framework 
also extended to supply chains to some extent. The framework required NEC3 as the 
standard form of subcontracts; yet the specific option was decided by the main contractors. 
HA initiated open accounts with contractors and supply chains within projects and they 
could monitor the payment from main contractors to supply chains. Open account 
mitigates opportunistic behaviour towards supply chains, particularly late payment, and 
increases client involvement in projects. The latter can influence relationships between 
main contractors and subcontractors.  
Asset support framework (ASF) was one of the procurement routes under HA 
collaborative strategies and was used for road improvement projects with relatively small 
value4. Road Ltd. was one of the companies appointed to the ASF, which enabled Road 
Ltd. to secure the main contract of project Alpha.  
The surfacing contract was under NEC3 Main Option B, remeasurement of bill of 
quantities. Under Main Option B, Surface Ltd. was paid for the actual quantity of work 
carried out at the rates in the bill of quantities, meaning that Road Ltd. took on the risk of 
cost increase as any inaccuracies in the bill of quantities would be corrected through 
remeasurement. Remeasured contract and open account increased the supply chain’s 
sense of security, which is key to inducing trustworthiness. On the other hand, in this 
scenario supply chain partner might lack the incentive to increase efficiency and achieve 
the target price of the main contractor, which calls for efforts to motivate the supply chain 
to meet the agreed price.   
                                                 
4 Generally with value <£20 million (The National Archives) 
111 
Organisational systems 
Road Ltd. categorised their subcontractors and suppliers into four tiers based on criteria 
such as organisational values and visions, health and safety (H&S), welfare and 
wellbeing, quality, environment and financial status. Subcontractors and suppliers were 
also assessed against these criteria post completion. Supply chain management was 
supported by information and communication systems. Tier-one suppliers were awarded 
strategic agreements with planning works for three or four years ahead and expected to 
help research, develop the main bid and value engineering at the front end, and swiftly 
adapt to changes during execution. Specialist subcontractors were selected from 
shortlisted supply chain partners by a procurer from the business development 
department, the project manager and site agent. The strategic agreement and long-term 
relationship gave Road Ltd. confidence in sharing risks with the supply chain. According 
to Road Ltd.’s project manager: 
…we haven’t tiered much risk down to the subcontractor, which is why we all 
need confidence in them delivering, I suppose. We don’t want to get to the 
situation where we are pursuing a large amount of money from subcontractors. 
They are usually small companies. We try not to put them in that situation.  
From the perspective of supply chains, the main contractor refraining from imposing risks 
induces perceived reliability and being burdened with fewer risks furnishes a sense of 
security. Both elements are conducive to trustworthy behaviour.  
The collaborative framework of HA and the strategic framework of Road Ltd., working 
together, made the continuity of supply chain relationships possible. Reliability and 
continuity increased the supply chain’s commitment to the relationship and motivation 
towards learning for the future and investing in the relationship. From the perspective of 
the main contractor, the supply chain’s commitment expanded their resource base and 
can increase their competence in the market. This way of managing relationships is 
closely aligned with management approaches taking the perspective of transaction cost 
theory.  
Surface Ltd. was expanding its market in the Midlands area, meaning that building 
relationships and obtaining repeat businesses was especially important for the company. 
This was evident in the ‘can do’ ethos that Surface Ltd. was oriented to satisfying the 
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main contractors’ requirements by maximising operational flexibility. However, this way 
of organising projects and building relationships was largely reactive from the perspective 
of Surface Ltd., as mentioned by the general manager: 
We do react, like, very flexibly and probably our biggest problem is that we don’t 
say “no” enough… it is hard to guarantee continuation, continuous resources, 
allocation of resources. Because you are just reacting and trying to fit the pieces… 
considering what it needs to be really. 
The “can do” ethos in essence was to maximise economic value at the expense of resource 
continuity and integrity that was vital to developing trust and relationships.  
Surface Ltd. regarded Road Ltd. as the key client in the Midlands region because it was 
one of the main contractors under collaborative frameworks with HA and the strategic 
framework brought about sustainable jobs and hence incomes, saved the cost of 
competitive procurement and provided the opportunity for shaping value propositions by 
early involvement at the front end. 
[Road Ltd.] have got really a strong hold in this market… we are just in that 
market and it could be anywhere in the country… So, whoever has main contracts 
with [HA], [Road Ltd.] or another, we target it. 
(General manager, Surface Ltd.) 
Main contractors were targeted as a bundle of operand resources with no identities, 
indicating a highly transactional approach to manging relationships that accords to the 
perspective of transaction cost theory. 
6.2.3 The shadow of the past and future 
Surface Ltd. as a whole company has worked with Road Ltd. for 14 projects throughout 
the UK over the past two years. Road Ltd. was considering including Surface Ltd. as one 
of its tier-one supply chain partners. Project Alpha was regarded as a test before the 
decision. A (potential) shadow of the future was established, which could influence 
service interactions in project Alpha. The newly-established West Midlands branch had 
just completed a major project with Road Ltd., during which they had resource and supply 
problems. This was partly because the West Midlands branch used Surface Ltd.’s main 
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resource base, which was remote and thus took longer to allocate resources. Surface Ltd. 
recognised the negative impact of the last project and the importance of project Alpha. 
Before project Alpha, the West Midlands branch started to resource from various local 
contractors and suppliers. The learning was cognitive- and behaviourally-based and 
future-oriented. It revealed Surface Ltd.’s willingness to invest in the relationship with 
Road Ltd. 
6.2.4 Case analysis 
Conditions for trust 
The service ecosystem has been illustrated. This section focuses on structures and time 
dimensions that can enable and constrain interactions for trust and value co-creation.  
At the inter-organisational networks’ level, HA’s collaborative framework procurement 
increased Road Ltd.’s confidence in structuring supply chain relationships on a relative 
long-term basis. The framework ensured the continuity of resources and the experience 
of involvement in the framework and collaborating with the client helped increased Road 
Ltd.’s capability of implementing the strategic framework, leading to the company’s 
confidence in collaborating with supply chain members. Such confidence lays a good 
foundation for trust in that it increases the trustor’s general propensity to trust. Following 
up, the strategic framework at the organisation level depicted a shadow of the future – the 
possibility of continuing relationships and commitment to supply chain members. From 
the perspective of Surface Ltd., resource continuity increased their perception of the main 
contractor’s reliability in collaboration and motivated them to build relationships at the 
organisation level, manifested as learning from past experiences, foreseeing and 
addressing Road Ltd.’s possible concerns such as resource issues. Supply chain members’ 
cognitive and behavioural learning set a positive condition for mitigating the negative 
influence of past experiences and stimulating competence trust. 
Finally, the power relation between Road Ltd. and Surface Ltd. was severely imbalanced 
as Road Ltd. had relatively stable resources in the local market on the one side and Surface 
Ltd. was expanding its business on the other side. Power can be used in various ways that 
have different implications for trust, as is discussed below. 
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Initial trust 
The shadow of the past raised Road Ltd.’s awareness of Surface Ltd.’s previous 
incapability to provide consistent and reliable resources. Therefore, the initial competence 
trust was low. Yet this is different from distrust, in which case Road Ltd. would be less 
likely to involve Surface Ltd. in project Alpha. A low level of competence trust means 
that trust is suspended until further evidence that induces the perception of incapability, 
opportunism or trustworthiness. 
The orientation was self-interested. The attitude towards the supply chain was, “What can 
you do for me?”, as mentioned by the supply chain manager of Road Ltd.,  
So, we expect them to help us on tenders; we expect them to put us high in priority 
for servicing our jobs. If there are performance issues, we want them to be able 
to resolve very quickly… so if we say we want some cement, they don’t always just 
give us cement. They will say, “We can give you that. But if you think about those 
other options, these other options might be safer, cheaper, greener, quicker to 
install and all the rest of it.” Less maintenance cost for the client, for the future. 
The approach to managing relationships was transactional, implying the intention of using 
Surface Ltd. as an operand resource to satisfy needs and burden risks.  
6.3 Procurement and preconstruction stage 
6.3.1 Early involvement in main bid submission 
Road Ltd. started to prepare the main bid for project Alpha in January 2016. The 
procurement unit involved and shared project information with Surface Ltd. early on, to 
improve the programme and lower the bid price. Surface Ltd. allocated a specific general 
manager who had successfully delivered projects for Road Ltd. and worked with Surface 
Ltd.’s site agent and quantity surveyor before. Staffing facilitated interactions and trust 
development at the micro-level, as indicated by the following quotation: 
It [the previous project] wasn’t particularly positive. So, we’ve really gone back 
to the basics. We put someone in full time, we really engaged the client, we really 
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planned well together, really spent time on this one. So, although we did know 
that was key to success, it made us more aware. 
(General manager, Surface Ltd.) 
The involvement of a general manager raised the awareness of the relationship with Road 
Ltd., which can lead to the perception of commitment on the main contractor’s side. 
Surface Ltd. provided a bill of quantities and a price quotation, which was cheaper than 
if Road Ltd. delivered the surfacing works by themselves. The bill of quantities and the 
rates were thus adapted and included in the main bid, which helped Road Ltd. win the 
main contract in April 2016. Although driven by the main contractor’s self-interest in cost 
efficiency, early involvement of supply chain partners in the main bid submission 
increased Surface Ltd.’s knowledge about the project and Road Ltd. that could be used in 
surfacing procurement and generate competence trust. 
6.3.2 Limited competitive procurement 
Shortly after winning the main contract, Road Ltd. invited Surface Ltd. and another 
subcontractor to competitively bid for the surfacing package. Limiting the number of 
bidders facilitated the restructuring of the negotiation process to satisfy Road Ltd.’s 
advantage. Surface Ltd.’s general manager was involved in the procurement. His 
knowledge about Road Ltd., together with the project information secured through early 
involvement, enabled Surface Ltd. to show their good understanding of the project, which 
can generate the perception of competence. The interpersonal relationship with Road 
Ltd.’s site agent, who was also involved in the procurement, increased familiarity and 
confidence at the micro-level.  
I worked with a couple of them before, so I know they are good [at] their jobs, 
anyway. I’m familiar with how they work, knowing that their work would suit our 
work to a degree. 
(Site agent, Road Ltd.) 
Micro-level confidence and relationships are conducive to the perception of 
trustworthiness at the meso-level.  
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Nevertheless, Surface Ltd.’s price was higher than that of their competitor. To balance 
the needs of strengthening the supply chain at the organisation level and of achieving 
lowest costs at the project level, the buyer from the business development unit and the 
project manager of project Alpha hid the other subcontractor’s price and tried to lower 
Surface Ltd.’s price as much as possible. The capability of ensuring short-term efficiency 
was key to establishing collaboration at this stage, even if it might be at the expense of 
long-term effectiveness. During procurement, information was very asymmetric. 
Opportunism was revealed at this point, which replaced trust. Surface Ltd. complied with 
Road Ltd.’s requirements, largely to increase the likelihood of gaining the strategic 
agreement. Nevertheless, the use of power to control Surface Ltd.’s actions against their 
willingness generated the perception of inequity and insecurity on the supply chain’s side. 
If our competitors certainly were 5% cheaper than us over the whole scheme, we 
wouldn’t be able to win the job without matching that… It was never kind of, “Hey, 
it is the best price. If not, you won’t win it.” If we were higher or lower, we were 
never told a specific number. But we were always guided to where our price 
should be before the contract. So, we always felt like we had the last shout, so to 
speak.  
 (General manager, Surface Ltd.) 
Perceived unfairness and insecurity caused defensive attitudes and behaviour that 
substitutes trustworthiness. 
In contract negotiation, Road Ltd. raised two specific issues regarding Surface Ltd.’s 
resources, a consistent project team and resource reliability. Surface Ltd. assured Road 
Ltd. that they would maintain the same project team throughout the project and had 
already strengthened their supply chains by using local suppliers. Structuring and 
planning at the organisation level potentially ensured consistency and reliability of 
resources at the project level in execution. Consistency and reliability are conducive to 
building shared meanings and trust at micro- and project levels  
After understanding Surface Ltd.’s ‘can do’ ethos, Road Ltd. agreed a two-week 
notification for changes with the supplier. Also, little indemnity and liquidated damage 
was charged, meaning that Road Ltd. took on the majority of risks relating to delay. 
Adapting the contract to include the supply chain’s specific needs and reducing the risk 
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to the supply chains can ensure the effectiveness and reliability of resource allocation, 
hence value co-creation at the project level, but also encourage trustworthy behaviour on 
the supply chain’s side.  
6.3.3 Early enabling works 
During August to December 2016, Surface Ltd. delivered surfacing works for a car park 
and trench crossing as additional packages. Road Ltd. reviewed Surface Ltd.’s risk 
assessment and method statement (RAMS) and held a pre-start meeting with the general 
manager, commercial manager and supervisor to instruct them on the overall programme. 
Surface Ltd. checked in detail to ensure that the programme conformed to the contract 
and made resource plans based on the programme. During delivery, Road Ltd. monitored 
Surface Ltd.’s performance through site diaries and Surface Ltd. asked for formal consent 
before every change. Communication was highly contractual and task-focused, mainly 
through exchange of RAMS, site dairies and resource plans.  
I think on a particular contract like this is, we heavily rely on [it] because it’s 
substantially our money, substantially our risk for either party. We all rely on 
correct terms being in place which are jointly agreed... it’s essential. It’s such a 
large amount of money. 
(General manager, Surface Ltd.) 
Surface Ltd. used contractual mechanisms to protect their own benefits. This defensive 
attitude and behaviour imply that Surface Ltd. was insecure in collaboration, which 
rendered difficulty for structuring trust relations at the project level. 
Nevertheless, the highly-structured formal interactions, as they were repeated, ensured 
regular face-to-face communication between actors, in which familiarity at the individual 
level and security at the project level can emerge. Also, the good performance of Surface 
Ltd. also maintained competence trust, which paves way to value co-creation. 
At the later stage of delivering the trench crossing works, in order for more efficient 
resource use and lower costs and risks, Road Ltd. suggested changing the existing 
programme and resource plans. The change was beyond the contract specification and 
required Surface Ltd.’s collaboration; Surface Ltd.’s attitude towards this change and how 
they managed it were key to the relationship in the future. Surface Ltd. cooperated with 
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Road Ltd. and the two parties engaged with each other to optimise the current resource 
plan to be more efficient as well as reciprocal to both parties. 
And the best way they can help us is to engage us. Let us be a part of it. Listen to 
what we’ve got to say – and they do that, as much as they can… That mitigates 
our risks as well.  
(General manager, Surface Ltd.) 
Whereas the efficiency and effectiveness of delivery led to perceived competence, the 
process of jointly managing the change provided opportunities for shared learning about 
each other. 
Apart from signalling Surface Ltd.’s capability to manage planned changes and 
commitment, the delivery of enabling works also demonstrated Road Ltd.’s strong 
operations capability.  
The team they’ve got on site is quite knowledgeable on what they are doing. 
Sometimes you are going to meetings and the company you go with are not used 
to building roads. Whereas [Road Ltd.] seem quite knowledgeable on what they 
do. They can see the similar sorts of risks we are against…Which makes our jobs 
easier. Because sometimes, when you get on site, if they don’t understand the risks 
you are looking at, they are trying to point out you are just trying to create 
problems and to get extra money. 
(Commercial manager, Surface Ltd.) 
From the perspective of the supply chain the main contractor’s good level of operational 
knowledge and understanding encouraged communication and knowledge sharing, which 
can increase competence and benevolence trust. 
…with the trench crossing, the material we are going to use, they came to us and 
said, “This is actually more expensive. There are alternative, cheaper materials 
you can use, which also meet your specification.” So, in advance we are able to 
save some costs. 
(Quantity surveyor, Road Ltd.) 
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Although communication was still task-focused, Surface Ltd. became more proactive 
than at the beginning of the enabling work. The supply chain’s knowledge appeared to 
improve the efficiency of resource integration and project outputs in terms of time and 
cost.  
The relationship between Road Ltd. and Surface Ltd. developed in the shared experience 
of co-producing trench crossing works and encouraged future value co-creation. It is 
evident that the two parties jointly remeasured the works and settled down the final 
account of enabling works within one week, which was perceived as rare and proof of a 
good relationship.  
From the perspective of Road Ltd., Surface Ltd.’s cooperation induced intention trust. 
And from what I’m aware at the moment in terms of on site, they just make sure 
they are available when we need them to be. That ticks the box. 
(Quantity surveyor, Road Ltd.) 
Nevertheless, the above quotation indicated the orientation of trust was still self-
interested, which was “What can you do for me?” 
From the perspective of Surface Ltd., the sense of equity increased in the experience of 
joint planning, managing and measuring trench crossing works as well as the fair payment 
for enabling works. Perceived equity reduced safeguarding and increased confidence in 
subsequent value co-creation. 
6.3.4 Case analysis 
Interactions 
This section focuses on the bottom-up direction of duality, namely interaction processes 
that constitute trust as structures of signification, domination and legitimation.  
At the micro-level, boundary agencies such as Surface Ltd.’s general manager and Road 
Ltd.’s site agent were heavily relied on to increase mutual understanding and confidence, 
hence laying the foundation for trust development at the organisation level. Moreover, 
boundary agencies helped transfer knowledge from past to present projects, early 
involvement to procurement and from the organisation level to the project level when 
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enabling works started. On the supply chain’s side, such knowledge enabled them to 
consistently understand and satisfy the main contractor’s requirements, generating the 
perception of trustworthiness. Apart from familiarity, mutual understanding was further 
improved by the equivalent knowledge between project actors. As mentioned, Road Ltd. 
directly employed most of their operatives who could understand operational problems. 
Equivalent knowledge bases enhanced communication and can reduce suspicion and 
perceived opportunism that negatively influence trust, because actors are able to make 
sense of and internalise each other’s meanings.  
Interactions before and during procurement occurred at the organisation level. The 
suspension of trust in Surface Ltd.’s resource reliability was cancelled by Surface Ltd.’s 
future-oriented learning that strengthened its supply chain.  
So, they’ve got more locally-based resources than the previous job. Because we 
knew [about the] problems we had previously, we got assurances that they’ve 
done things to make sure that would not happen again. So, because we knew them 
already, we knew the questions to ask to get the right answers or to put the security 
in place when you order with them. 
(Project manager, Road Ltd.) 
The cognitive and behavioural learning from the past demonstrated Surface Ltd.’s efforts 
to take the responsibility in the present, which offered the main contractor a sense of 
security. In this vein, negative past experiences turned into a positive condition for trust 
and value co-creation. 
Involvement in the main bid submission provided Surface Ltd. opportunities for securing 
explicit and implicit knowledge about project Alpha and Road Ltd. Such knowledge was 
transferred to the bid team through agency, namely Surface Ltd.’s general manager, 
which, together with the general manager’s relationship with Road Ltd., increased 
Surface Ltd.’s competitiveness in the procurement.  
They gave me the best feedback and they gave me the best indication that they 
would do that job for us. You know, I get some confidence from meeting their 
people. 
(Site agent, Road Ltd.) 
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Competence trust increased, to the extent that Road Ltd. was confident that Surface Ltd. 
had the capability to complete the project. 
Nevertheless, collaboration at this stage was to use Surface Ltd. as an operand resource 
to maximise project efficiency, indicating that the essence of value co-creation, hence 
trust, was self-interested. Self-interested trust is evident in the use of market power to 
manipulate and control Surface Ltd.’s price to Road Ltd.’s own advantages in the bidding 
process. At this point, power substituted trust as an authoritative resource, hence 
hindering the structuration of trust. On the supply chain’s side, the perception of 
insecurity and inequity that resulted from manipulating and opportunistically using power 
raised Surface Ltd.’s awareness of opportunism and caused a defensive attitude and 
behaviour; this is evident in the service interactions at the early stage of enabling works. 
Communication largely stayed at the level of transmitting planned messages such as 
changes in programmes and prices and took place when either party received information 
and derived meanings that might be different from what the other intended. Contract was 
utilised to effectuate consents and transfer liabilities, as the commercial manager of 
Surface Ltd. commented, “Things go well as long as you stick to what we’ve got on the 
contract”. This was in contrast to the future-oriented learning before procurement, 
indicating the negative influence of manipulation. In other words, controlling the other 
party against its wishes results in manipulation-safeguard patterns of behaviour in service 
interactions, which can render a ‘win-lose’ situation and hinder trust and value co-
creation. 
Power can also be used to help in structuring the perception of trustworthiness, hence 
trust as a rule of signification. Controlling at the structure level, formalising project 
procedures and processes, clarifying roles and responsibilities, and planning resources 
can ensure consistency and reliability of service provision at the project level. The 
inclusion of the supply chain’s needs in structuring the project mitigated potential 
resource conflicts at the organisation level, hence facilitating resource allocation and 
integration at the project level. From the supply chain perspective, they are able to better 
plan and allocate resources between projects or adapt programmes to support service 
provision at the project level, which can mitigate opportunism. Moreover, as actors 
repeated the highly-structured patterns of interactions, they built up familiarity at the 
micro-level and shared understanding of technical and organisational issues at the project 
level. Structuring at the organisation level helps establish common knowledge in 
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interactions and generate a sense of security at the project level, laying a good foundation 
for developing trust and value co-creation. 
The perception of competence at the project level emerged as a result of monitoring 
Surface Ltd.’s performance and was rapidly developed in joint activities that improved 
project efficiency, such as the delivery of trench crossing, and footpath works. 
It’s a small risk coming out of the project but it’s two parties agreeing 
opportunities to do more works and assurances that the night works would be 
delivered in the timeframe we are allowed. And we have four-night shifts, and all 
performed well… we achieved it!  
…There are lots of benefits but just being able to have that discussion, what other 
opportunities are there, improves quite a good relationship… Because the two 
items they’ve come to site to do have gone well. So, our confidence is increasing 
in [Surface Ltd.’s] ability. 
(Project manager, Road Ltd.) 
Apart from satisfying requirements, cooperative intention was signalled and perceived in 
shared experiences, which increased intention trust. Competence and intention trust can 
develop or erode as a consequence of intended learning about the other party’s 
trustworthiness, such as during the procurement, but also as an unintended consequence 
of monitoring and joint activities.  
The phenomenon of trust 
This section focuses on the three elements in the dimension of structure and their 
interrelations. Trust as a rule of signification, especially the perception of competence, 
was generated as Surface Ltd.’s cognitive, behavioural and future-oriented learning 
mitigated the suspicion about resource reliability, good understanding of the project and 
performance in delivering enabling works. Whereas competence trust can develop 
through indirect interactions, monitoring and reviewing site diaries, for instance, intention 
trust develops particularly in the shared experience of joint problem solving, in which the 
commitment can be signalled and comprehended through actor-to-actor (A2A) 
interactions.  
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The increasing perception that Surface Ltd. was trustworthy in terms of competence and 
openness was associated with Road Ltd.’s increasing engagement with Surface Ltd., 
where the two companies shared problems and produced solutions in order to increase 
project efficiency. Trust as a rule of signification and value co-creation formed a virtuous 
cycle, in which competence and intention trust drove Road Ltd.’s actors to co-produce 
the core offering with Surface Ltd., and the associated efficiency and equity in service 
experiences and outcomes in turn reinforced trust and value co-creation. The structure of 
domination started to move from the side of power relationship to the side of trust.  
The orientation of Road Ltd. was largely self-interested at this stage, though the 
orientation was ready for transformation after the shared experience of delivering trench 
crossing and footpath works.  
The value of trust 
This section focuses on the ‘top-down’ process of duality, namely the effects of trust as 
rules and resources on service communication, resource integration and service 
coordination. 
First, competence trust increased communication at the organisation level such that 
perceived trustworthiness in terms of competence motivated Road Ltd. to use Surface 
Ltd.’s knowledge and skills to enhance project efficiency and outputs. The main 
contractor’s openness and equity increased the supply chain’s confidence in knowledge 
sharing and thereby further intensified service communication. From the perspective of 
Road Ltd., they gained specialist information and knowledge that were used to improve 
immediate outputs such as the main bid and trench crossing works. From the perspective 
of Surface Ltd., they gathered information about Road Ltd.’s requirements that helped 
them win the contract. Trust as a rule of signification leads to informative experiences for 
both main contract and the supply chain. 
Apart from project outputs, informative service experiences generated shared 
understanding between the two parties, at both project and organisation levels. Shared 
understanding facilitated resource integration in the subsequent phase, hence levering 
future service value in use, as discussed in the next section.  
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6.4 Execution stage 
The execution of surfacing started in January 2017. Although Surface Ltd. maintained the 
involvement of their general manager, interactions between the two parties at the 
execution stage largely stayed at the project level. The involvement of Surface Ltd.’s 
general manager at the project level indicated the company’s investment and commitment 
to the potential long-term relationships. On the other hand, the project manager of Road 
Ltd., who managed a programme of projects and represented the organisation level, 
reduced their involvement in project Alpha because of the project’s relatively small value. 
This indicates that the organisation level of Road Ltd. took a transactional approach to 
managing supply chains and relationships. 
At the micro-level, confidence maintained between the general manager and site agent, 
which can support trust and trustworthiness at the project level. Trust-based 
communication in delivering the enabling works was maintained at the project level. 
Consistency can maintain familiarity and the level of trust. As mentioned by the general 
manager of Surface Ltd., 
…there was a consistent set of people delivering for [Road Ltd.] and a consistent 
set of people delivering for [Surface Ltd.]. The familiarity encourages the whole 
relationship and encourages honest and open speaking throughout, which 
encourages their planning, which encourages mitigating of risks. So that 
[consistency] is probably the key to each other. 
Consistency and familiarity increased the effectiveness and efficiency of value co-
creation. 
The positive influence of consistency and familiarity on the co-creation of value can also 
be seen in the clear roles and responsibilities in service exchange and routines established 
in service interactions. For instance, in pre-start meetings both companies jointly planned 
sequences of works and levels of resources for the first-phase execution. Road Ltd. and 
Surface Ltd. had weekly collaborative meetings to review progress and jointly make 
weekly programmes. Road Ltd. forecasted quantities of works and provided engineering 
information, based on which the two parties jointly made short-term programmes, 
sequences of works, activities and resource plans. Road Ltd.’s site agent or subagent had 
daily progress meetings with Surface Ltd.’s supervisor. Project routines can sustain 
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security and trustworthiness in operations. In other words, Road Ltd. and Surface Ltd. co-
produced the core offering as project contents – a type of value co-creation from the 
perspective of the client. The service outcome of co-producing, such as knowledge and 
relationships, was useful for value co-creating in the supply chain relationship.  
Furthermore, the open and communicative way of resolving problems, which was driven 
by competence and intention trust during delivering enabling works, had been gradually 
routinised at this stage. At a meeting in which the researcher attended, Road Ltd.’s 
supervisor was observed to often lead the conversation about how to solve Surface Ltd.’s 
problems, which contrasted with the early stage of delivering enabling works. This 
indicates that an enhanced co-producing process resulted from the development of trust. 
Also, Road Ltd. introduced and employed GPS measurement to measure quantities of 
works, which furnished more accurate and fair measures. The communicative and 
collaborative approach and objective measurement indicate more equitable interactions 
at the project level, which can prevent the potential erosion of trust.  
At the early stage of execution where few changes occurred, Surface Ltd. kept achieving 
the programme requirements, which maintained the level of trust. Road Ltd. maintained 
fairness in both the process and payment; the sense of security and trustworthiness was 
sustained. A series of changes then emerged, as discussed below, during which trust 
continued to develop.  
6.4.1 Emergent defect repair 
Soon after execution started, HA asked Road Ltd. to repair existing damaged road 
surfacing. Due to the emergency nature of the work, Road Ltd. did not formally issue the 
instruction; instead, the site agent telephoned Surface Ltd.’s general manager to ask about 
the company’s availability for the emergent task. At this point, Road Ltd. relied on 
Surface Ltd. to deliver the service in a short period of time; that is, using trust relations 
to facilitate resource allocation. As the informal request was within the two-week 
notification specified in the contract, Surface Ltd. had the right to refuse. Also, Surface 
Ltd. might lack the capability to manage emergent change and complete the work within 
the required timeframe. Surface Ltd. prioritised resources for project Alpha and adapted 
its existing programmes of projects to cooperate with Road Ltd. Such relationship-
specific investment can induce competence and intention trust. 
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6.4.2 Binder course5 change 
Closely following the defects’ repair, the delivery of the binder course was changed from 
daytime to night-time. Road Ltd. made a mistake in procurement that included the binder 
course as daytime works. Although rates for night works and quantities of works were 
well specified in the contract, both parties did take risks as they did not formally invoke 
the information change procedure as required by the NEC3 contract and hence relied on 
each other’s intentions and actions. For Road Ltd., the risk was Surface Ltd. asking for 
the formal procedure to take action, not coming at night, or coming with insufficient 
resources. For Surface Ltd., the risk mainly related to Road Ltd. not paying night work 
rates, which were higher than day works ones.  
However, none of these risks occurred; both parties acted in a collaborative and honest 
way and successfully delivered the binder course works. Road Ltd. first admitted their 
mistake and promptly informed Surface Ltd. of the change. Surface Ltd. cooperated with 
Road Ltd. to minimise any negative consequences. The two parties jointly adapted the 
programme, resources and activities in the weekly collaborative meeting. While 
supervisors and engineers of both parties delivered the project together, commercial 
teams completed the formal procedures in accordance to the contract. The core offering 
was co-produced by the two companies. After completion, Road Ltd. quickly agreed 
Surface Ltd.’s payment application. Both the process and outcome of value co-creation 
in the binder course change demonstrated Road Ltd.’s openness, honesty and fairness at 
the project level, which appeared to reduce perceived risks and encourage trustworthiness 
on the supply chain’s side.  
6.4.3 Profile planing change 
Profile planing was originally to be delivered in four nights. In order to accelerate the 
overall programme, Road Ltd. and Surface Ltd. jointly decided to shorten the duration to 
two nights, agreed methodologies and a working programme, and allocated resources 
accordingly. The above series of actions depended on the accumulation of competence 
and intention trust, especially in the shared experience of joint managing the defect repair 
and binder course changes. Nevertheless, the client, HA, changed the information, which 
                                                 
5 The binder course is also known as the base course, the layer under the surface course or wearing course. 
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extended the duration of profile planning by two days. This information change, if not 
well managed, would severely cost both parties since resources for the related activities 
had been planned based on the two-night programme. 
Instead of blaming each other and referring to the contract to safeguard their own 
positions and transfer liabilities, Road Ltd. and Surface Ltd. shared the risk and discussed 
the information change and its consequences in an open and honest way. They adapted 
plans to minimise the cost for both parties, regardless of whose risk it was. They also 
agreed to re-programme the second part of the surfacing beginning in April and conduct 
more works each night. Supervisors of both parties produced, coordinated and measured 
the works together. In dealing with the profile planning change, the two parties 
demonstrated their shared intention to try to deliver on time. For instance, in an area where 
Road Ltd. could not provide the quantities of works and thus make the short-term 
programme, Surface Ltd. sent engineers to work with Road Ltd.’s engineers to solve the 
problem and build a model together to forecast the quantities. Co-creating activities 
started to emerge in the shared experience of managing profile planning, which goes 
beyond co-producing of core offerings.  
After the first-phase execution, Road Ltd. and Surface Ltd. had a review meeting, which 
presupposed trust-based relationships at the micro- and project levels. Surface Ltd.’s 
general manager, commercial manager and supervisor and Road Ltd.’s project team 
formed a shared understanding of how the process went in order to learn for the next 
phase execution, which can benefit service use in the future.  
6.4.4 Case analysis 
Interactions 
The inconsistent involvement of the project manager on the main contractor’s side and 
the transactional approach taken by the main contractor organisation impeded trust 
development at the organisation level. Nevertheless, at the project level, competence and 
intention trust were maintained by consistent project teams, enabled by resource 
programming and coordinating, which avoided shuffling core staff between projects. 
Consistent core actors maintained ties and also shared understanding between the two 
parties. Although explicit knowledge can be transferred through documents, tacit 
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knowledge such as the other party’s preferences and ways of thought might be hard to 
transfer and need time to internalise in day-to-day communication.  
Moreover, consistency helped clarify roles and responsibilities and form routines. Roles, 
procedures and process of resolving problems formed common knowledge that implied 
rules of conduct in interactions between Road Ltd. and Surface Ltd. This common 
knowledge sustained security and trust at the project level.  
Everyone knew their role within the project to make it a successful project. We 
knew our position through communication meetings, emails, correspondence. I 
agreed drawings. And then the way we measure that throughout the scheme is 
through regular communication during the visit, before the visit… through 
meetings after [the visit] with the site teams to review how the visit went, so that 
we can learn to get the benefits for the next visit. And then commercially, I and 
[Road Ltd.’s] QS [quantity surveyor] would speak regularly. If we had another 
thought [that] we might have a slight issue or that is not quite what we thought, 
these potential commercial implications, we regularly spoke throughout the 
project. 
(General Manager, Surface Ltd.) 
Regular communication and addressing problems and doubts in an open and 
communicative way have been comprehended as ‘business as usual’ and embedded in 
day-to-day interactions. 
In short, maintaining consistency sustains the sense of security, confidence and trust at 
micro- and project levels.  
At the early stage of execution, apart from efficiency, equity became the other factor that 
sustained and developed value co-creation. On Surface Ltd.’s side, the perception of 
equity nurtured the perception of Road Ltd.’s reliability.  
From an operational point of view, I think the way in which they use GPS 
equipment on site to record volumes of quantities… takes any arguments away. 
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So, they are proactive on that, which shows me they are an honourable contractor 
because they want to pay for what we’ve done... They are very fair.  
(General manager, Surface Ltd.) 
The GPS measurement as a clearly-defined and mutually-accepted measure which serves 
as a common ground that can prevent trust erosion due to different interpretations and 
muddled communication. More importantly, from Surface Ltd.’s perspective, Road Ltd.’s 
willingness to use GPS measurement was interpreted as demonstrating integrity and 
fairness.  
The belief, together with the expectation of a strategic relationship and future business, 
motivated Surface Ltd. to prioritise resources to repair defects within one night, deliver 
binder course change during nights before formal instructions were received, and jointly 
deal with profile planning change with Road Ltd.  
They knew they would get compensated. And they will. They carried out the work 
with good faith… everyone has got faith for that… when [the] time comes, we will 
implement that as a compensation for them and pay them what they are due.  
(Quantity surveyor, Road Ltd.) 
From the perspective of Road Ltd., knowing the ‘faith’ that the other party had in itself 
induced responsibility, “they will [get compensated]”, which reciprocated that faith. In 
this vein, the relationship management approach started to move from the side of 
transaction cost economics towards the side of social capital theory.  
Reciprocity emerged in service interactions. Specifically, the equity and integrity of Road 
Ltd. was reciprocated by Surface Ltd.’s cooperation and risk taking; the latter, in turn, 
generated Road Ltd.’s responsibility to maintain integrity and compensate Surface Ltd.’s 
efforts. Reciprocity here was in an economic sense: actors sharing resources and helping 
each other with the expectation that the investment will be reciprocated by good project 
performances that lead to higher transactional value. The exchange of small-scale actions 
nurtured the perception of honesty and integrity. Competence and intention trust 
developed as Surface Ltd. effectively allocated resources and repaired the defects to meet 
the requirements. 
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And that needed to be repaired at night... There’s a notice period in [the] contract, 
which they could say, “We cannot come in two weeks”. But they looked at and 
programmed their resources and said, “If we move these [programmes] around, 
we can help you out.” And that is all about relationships. Without that 
relationship, that wouldn’t happen. I don’t know what we would do… on this job 
they’ve confirmed when we needed them. 
(Quantity surveyor, Road Ltd.)  
Surface Ltd.’s relational investment, in the form of prioritising resources to help Road 
Ltd. through difficulties, generated the perception of benevolence, hence intention trust.  
The effective management of the defect repair demonstrated Surface Ltd.’s resource 
reliability and commitment to the project, which paved the way to using trust relations to 
deal with the binder course change. Although still at a nascent stage, opportunities for 
transformation of the domination structure emerged at this point. 
Following up, on managing the binder course change, which resulted from Road Ltd.’s 
own mistake, Surface Ltd.’s integrity in management and delivery increased intention 
trust. 
…at nights, we have planned closures. They are not changing. “We need you on 
these dates.” They turned up, carried out their works and completed them. So, I 
think that’s when you get a good idea how reliable they are. It’s night works when 
you’ve got a strict timetable. 
(Quantity surveyor, Road Ltd.) 
Surface Ltd.’s cooperation and flexibility raised Road Ltd.’s perception of their integrity. 
In managing a series of changes, trust relations were used to facilitate resource allocation 
and integration, instead of contractual mechanisms. In other words, trust as a resource of 
domination was generated in service interactions, signalling an increase in social capital 
and thus relationship value. The effectiveness of using trust relations to facilitate resource 
integration reinforced trust as a resource of domination in service interactions. 
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The phenomenon of trust 
Trust as a rule of signification was reinforced and sustained by small steps, or ‘business 
as usual’ in day-to-day interactions, which, in the face of uncertainties and risks, 
promoted the use of trust relations as authoritative resources. In other words, trust as a 
rule of signification helps generate trust as a resource of domination. The structuration of 
trust as a resource of domination relied on reciprocal service exchanges. The effectiveness 
of using trust relations to allocate resources, especially in a series of changes and 
uncertainties, in return developed competence and intention trust. At this point, Road Ltd. 
trusted that Surface Ltd. would maintain competence, integrity and benevolence in the 
future should they face the opportunistic opportunities that were unspecified ex ante. The 
most obvious improvement is the interpretation of Surface Ltd.’s intentions. After the 
delivery of trench crossing works in December 2016, when asked if there was a 
probability that Surface Ltd. would take advantage in the process of measurement, the 
quantity surveyor of Road Ltd. thought that, 
Because I will be there, measuring with them that they cannot really take an 
advantage… So, it’s up to us really to make sure that we don’t just bend over and 
agree to that… there’s a scope there if you are not on the boat [to jointly measure 
the job]. 
When asked the same question after completing the first part of the works in March 
2017,  
They might put a forecast together and say, “This is what we believe it will need 
to take.” In reality, sometimes it can be different for varieties of reasons... You 
could say, “This is going to take five men on this job. Only four came because one 
guy was not available for whatever reason.” … I do believe they will be honest.  
(Quantity surveyor, Road Ltd.) 
With the trust that Surface Ltd. was not opportunistic, Road Ltd. accepted its own 
mistakes in delivering the binder course.  
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…if I’ve got a problem, I will tell them… Just by the way I act with them, they can 
see that I trust them. And I think if they didn’t, they wouldn’t tell me the things 
that they do. 
(Site agent, Road Ltd.) 
The perception of competence, integrity and benevolence sustained Road Ltd.’s 
willingness to share and learn with Surface Ltd. The communication initiative was driven 
by a series of emergent changes and risks, but also out of what had been embedded in 
service interactions at the procurement and preconstruction stage around trust. 
Intention trust also enabled Road Ltd. to tolerate more uncertainties in the service 
provision. 
They’re supposed to do things like testing and provide us [with] resources within 
24 hours. Sometimes it has been two weeks before they sent it. Part of the 
requirements of our information which we gave them is to supply this… So, their 
paperwork could be better. But since I’ve been annoying them, annoying them, 
annoying them [by telephone], it has got better. 
(Site agent, Road Ltd.) 
Apart from intention trust, trust as a resource of domination also mitigated the use of 
contractual mechanisms in service interactions. To sustain trust relations, uncertainties 
were addressed in a relational way. 
The orientation of trust started to transform from self-interested to socially-oriented with 
the emergence of shared intentions, as discussed in the next subsection.  
The value of trust 
Trust as a rule of signification sustained two-way communication in daily interactions but 
also encouraged openness and integrity in emergent changes and uncertainties. As 
mentioned, perceived trustworthiness motivated Road Ltd. to share informative resources 
and learn with Surface Ltd. On Surface Ltd.’s side, project actors perceived the sharing, 
learning and no-blaming actions as the willingness to engage with them and thus a signal 
of trust. 
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So, if we feel that we’ve got a good enough relationship, if we feel there’s a better 
way, more efficient, or a more cost-saving way of doing something which would 
benefit all parties… we are confident to be able to say, “I think we should do this. 
I think we should have at least a discussion about how we go on from here”, which 
[Road Ltd.] embrace, I think. They enjoy the collaborative nature of it, because I 
think really this is how they manage their supply chain... Being able to have 
confidence to give them the bad news as well as good news. And the confidence 
to do that is probably the main one because, like I said, sometimes some 
contractors may prefer you to just keep below their part… just turn up and do it. 
But that doesn’t necessarily create the best way for the environment [nor is it] 
most beneficial for all parties. 
(General manager, Surface Ltd.) 
The perception of being trusted increased Surface Ltd.’s confidence in service 
interactions. Confidence mitigates the danger of exposing information beyond 
accountability, especially problems to main contractors, which is perceived to induce 
blame or increase the supply chain’s costs. Surface Ltd. therefore became more open to 
sharing knowledge, problems and solutions, making service experiences more 
informative. Attitude and behaviour described above were in contrast with those in 
delivering enabling works, where communication was to effectuate consent and hence 
transfer liabilities.  
Shared understanding accumulated as trust enhanced service communication at the 
project level. Shared understanding made resource allocation and integration more 
adaptive and absorptive to changes. This was because actors were able to quickly 
understand the situation undergoing changes and adapt resources to each other’s 
expectations. In other words, shared understanding as a service outcome accumulated in 
previous interactions levers value in the present service use.  
Trust as a resource of domination also made resource allocation and integration more 
adaptive. The use of trust relations to allocate resources mitigates the use of contractual 
mechanisms. In delivering binder course works, for instance, both companies were able 
to focus on delivering service contents instead of contractual procedures, which 
contrasted with the previous stage where the contract was heavily relied on to make sure 
“things go well” (Commercial manager, Surface Ltd.). Reciprocity enabled serial equality 
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that eliminated the necessity of immediate return for any inputs, although the overall 
balance was expected within the project lifecycle. 
Furthermore, shared intention emerged in the shared experience of managing changes. 
Theoretically, that [binder course change] does put us in a risk. Because we never 
instructed them to come at night and they could turn around and say, “We are not 
coming at night. You never instructed us to do the binder.” Theoretically, that 
could have [been] done. Again, [we] worked together for a common goal... They 
carried out the work, working with us rather than against us… It’s good to have 
that good relationship that when you are behind on bits of paper that works still 
go ahead. Paperwork can just follow afterwards. 
(Quantity surveyor, Road Ltd.) 
Likewise, on the supply chain’s side, 
Because, like I said, it feels, especially on this site, the shared responsibility… It 
really feels like we took a joint interest of shared responsibility in the whole 
project to ensure that we deliver it well. 
(General manager, Surface Ltd.) 
Shared intentions as a service outcome induced shared responsibility and joint interests 
at the project level, indicating the emergence of value co-creation in the supply chain 
relationship. Shared intentions can increase the willingness to mobilise one’s own 
resources and thereby enhance resource integration and value co-creation. 
Finally, under shared intentions and understanding, service coordination was more 
effective. 
…the key thing to that is the communication between the two companies… Stuff 
like that [the informant pointed to a wall of collaborative plans], the diaries… we 
are coming to be part of this. [Road Ltd.] are particularly good at this. By getting 
everyone involved, they understand the importance of the supply chains… not all 
contractors do that. 
(General manager, Surface Ltd.) 
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Supply chains were involved and became “part of this” project organisation, indicating 
a cohesive service experience at the project level. The above also indicates that the 
identity of Road Ltd. started to emerge in the engaging environment, which can encourage 
a higher level of relationship-specific investment, hence social capital in the future. Social 
capital is associated with the structure of relationships such as trust and can be used to 
benefit service outcomes post service experiences. 
6.5 Completion stage 
6.5.1 Early warning of compensation 
At the beginning of the last stage, Surface Ltd. initiated an early warning of compensation 
for profile planning, which was a formal procedure to apply for compensation under 
NEC3 contract. Under NEC3, compensation is issued through the process of early 
warning, communication and decline/instruction. Initially, Road Ltd. and Surface Ltd. 
were not in agreement with the amount to be compensated.  
There are a couple of changes… which now have caused a little bit [of] discussion 
[on how] to handle it commercially about money: we think they owe us, but they 
may not get paid [from HA]. So, that potentially might have a lightly negative 
influence on the relationship… at the minute we are still trying to work 
collaboratively, so we can both get paid for the changes.  
(General manager, Surface Ltd.) 
Early warning put the relationship between the two companies at risk. 
Trust helped stabilise the relationship, at least to some extent. Instead of blaming and 
relying on the contract to safeguard their own benefits, the two parties had a meeting to 
build mutual understanding of each other’s position and try to find a middle ground that 
best suited them both. In this manner, Road Ltd. and Surface Ltd. co-created the shared 
intention to develop a claim of mutual benefits that was acceptable to HA. While largely 
based on Surface Ltd.’s original claim, the new one was adjusted to HA’s requirements 
according to Road Ltd.’s knowledge. This way of managing the relational risk indicates 
social orientations of both main contractor and subcontractor. HA accepted the claim and 
paid the compensation for profile planning. 
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6.5.2 Second-phase surfacing works 
To mitigate delay due to the profile planning change and achieve the programme on time, 
Road Ltd. and Surface Ltd. adapted and agreed the short-term programme, resource plans 
and activities in the second phase, which presupposed shared understanding between the 
two parties. Service communication became more intensive at the project level. The open 
and communicative way of interactions and associated patterns of behaviour were 
sustained, such as maintaining a fair process and payment, agreeing measures, taking 
responsibilities, sharing risks and no blaming. These routinised interactions can maintain 
trustworthiness between two parties. At the micro-level, actors respected each other’s 
opinions and suggestion. Supervisors and engineers of both companies worked together 
on site. They jointly confirmed engineering information, delivered contents and 
remeasured quantities. During execution, Road Ltd.’s site agent and subagent 
spontaneously gave daily feedback to Surface Ltd.’s general manager through emails, 
telephones and face-to-face discussion, communicating problems but also expressing 
their satisfaction. This can maintain shared understanding but also Surface Ltd.’s 
confidence in interactions.  
Learning became more future-oriented and focused on the organisation level, such as 
Road Ltd.’s requirements regarding tier-one suppliers, which can be applied in future 
service. Road Ltd. and Surface Ltd. also had mutual feedback through review meetings, 
survey and report post completion. Surface Ltd.’s performance was assessed against tier-
one criteria, which were transferred to the business development and supply chain 
management units through supply chain management systems. The aim was to increase 
mutual understanding and thus continuous improvement in future business.  
Road Ltd. and Surface Ltd. achieved the programme and successfully delivered project 
Alpha. After completion, both parties expressed satisfaction about the project 
performance but also their experiences with each other. Surface Ltd. gained the tier-one 
strategic agreement after project Alpha, meaning that relationship, trust and learning, 
which were established in the project lifecycle, can realise value in the future.  
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6.5.3 Case analysis 
The conditions for trust 
The shadow of the future formed future thinking that sustained cognitive and behavioural 
learning in interactions since relationships and knowledge obtained in the present might 
be transformed and reused in the future.  
So, we kind of learnt different methods that [Road Ltd.] have and their programme 
of work and their way of organising … [The benefit was] for future work with 
[Road Ltd.]. Obviously, we can go into their next project, hopefully and know 
exactly how especially their management structure works… So, it is just being 
able to cooperate effectively on the next job. 
(Commercial manager, Surface Ltd.) 
Future-oriented learning goes beyond project-specific tasks and problems; it is a prelude 
to enhanced co-creation. 
Interactions 
Continuous learning at the micro-level, such as informal feedback between managers, 
enabled behavioural learning at the project level.  
And because [Surface Ltd.’s] general manager worked with me for a while, he 
sorts of knows what I want. That has sort of changed the way the team works a 
little bit [, for example,] when they gave me information, we both know what each 
other expected. 
(Site agent, Road Ltd.) 
Again, agencies and ties at the micro-level maintained mutual understanding, confidence 
and thereby trust at the project level.  
Trust as the structure of domination promoted and was strengthened by the bounded 
solidarity that Road Ltd. and Surface Ltd. formed while dealing with early warning. 
Solidarity was bounded in that it was based on the shared intention to minimise negative 
impacts of profile planning change and the shared recognition that to guarantee mutual 
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benefits required collaborating with each other instead of safeguarding their own self-
interests and using contractual mechanisms. 
So, we went through that [early warning]. We agreed on the number… which 
satisfied all. We just talked around the table, and we agreed on the figure. It didn’t 
go any further. It was rectified amicably... We just recognised the change in the 
works information between us and then we spoke to the client. And they agreed 
and we all got paid. 
(Site agent, Road Ltd.) 
The legitimacy of relational norms generated trust as a rule of legitimation at the project 
level. The open and communicative way of interactions, as they were continuously 
repeated, eventually formed relational norms at the project level, which in turn sustained 
trustworthy behaviour and thereby relationship stability under relational risks.  
…we will talk through [the early warning] this afternoon. We will tell them our 
position on it. And they will tell us their position on it. We will talk through. We 
will listen to what they have to say, and they will listen to [what we] have to say. 
Hopefully we can come to a mutual agreement.  
 (Site agent, Road Ltd.) 
Relational norms induced the relational obligation that sustained trustworthiness but also 
constrained the opportunistic behaviour that broke the obligation. In other words, 
relational norms, as they were legitimated in A2A interactions, formed relational control 
and structured trust as a rule of legitimation at the project level.  
…agreements [on early warning] are made by discussion between the key people 
within two parties to ensure that things are set out in a fair and reasonable, 
considered manner, and not detrimental to either party… So, we are not overly 
contractual or commercially aggressive by playing [the] contract to our 
advantage and trying to profit from that... So, it’s all called gentlemen’s 
agreements, really. 
(General manager, Surface Ltd.) 
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The legitimacy of a “fair and reasonable, considered manner” described above formed 
“gentlemen’s agreements” that controlled actors’ and organisations’ behaviour in a 
relational way different from controlling them through contractual mechanisms.  
The latter involved control of the other party’s behaviour to achieve one’s own 
expectations whereas the former was more about self-control in accordance to relational 
norms formed in the actor-to-actor interactions. In this manner, relational control 
sustained the virtuous cycle of trust and value co-creating. The relationship management 
approach at the project level has been on the side of social capital theory. 
Furthermore, in the shadow of the potential strategic agreements and thus a long-term 
relationship, reciprocity started to go beyond the economic sense. Social reciprocity 
emerged that drove mutual service with the expectation of returns in future service. 
The phenomenon of trust 
Trust as a rule of signification and a resource of domination continued to mutually 
influence each party. As competence and intention trust grew as the result of successfully 
managing a series of emergent changes at the execution stage, Road Ltd. were more 
willing to engage with Surface Ltd. in operations and take responsibilities and use trust 
relations in the co-creating of value. The effectiveness of value co-creation, in turn, 
induced more intention trust, as confidently specified by the site agent of Road Ltd., 
…if they said they were going to do something, I believed they are going to do it. 
And I also do believe they will do it competently. They will do [it] how they said 
they are going to do. And I trust they are going to give me all the information 
saying that they’ve done it, how they are going to do [it], not just doing the work. 
Trust in Surface Ltd.’s integrity helped Road Ltd. tolerate uncertainties in Surface Ltd.’s 
performance and sustain co-creating activities in relational risks. 
Continuously mobilisation of trust relations shaped relational norms in supply chain 
relationships, hence generating trust as a rule of legitimation. Social orientations 
developed, which is evident in the continuous learning for the future and considering 
mutual benefits when dealing with disagreement on early warning. 
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The value of trust 
Competence trust, under the shadow of the future, motivated communication beyond the 
current project. The depth of communication increased in that both parties shared 
knowledge not least to find a voice for co-determining solutions for current problems. 
Knowledge and relationships gained in the service experience can lever value for future 
service because both parties have gained a shared understanding and stronger relationship 
that can better inform their interactions.  
Trust as a rule of legitimation increased the cohesion of service interactions. The 
legitimacy of relational norms and relational control helped stabilise the relationship by 
encouraging a communicative and open way of resolving disagreement and refraining 
opportunism. It also enabled the suspending of judgement in the interactions and 
sustained value co-creation in uncertainties. This is evident in that, while the early 
warning was not resolved, both parties maintained their progress in delivering Alpha. 
Dealing with relational risks in this way helped shape and reshape shared intentions. 
Under shared intentions, actors proactively took responsibilities, allocated their own 
resources and jointly transformed resources for the benefits of both parties, as the case of 
co-developing claims for compensation. Cohesive experience ensures the efficiency of 
service provision. 
Furthermore, Road Ltd. and Surface Ltd. co-created shared identities through the service 
experience in project Alpha. For Surface Ltd., Road Ltd. changed from ‘anyone’ “whose 
main contract is with [HA]” to a client that was “particularly good at… getting everyone 
involved… [to] understand the importance of the supply chains”, which “not all 
contractors do” (General manager, Surface Ltd.). For Road Ltd.,  
I don’t think they [Surface Ltd.’s rank] were very high. Within [Road Ltd.], you 
know, someone would say, “Who is the best surfacing contractor?” It wasn’t 
[Surface Ltd.]. [Surface Ltd.] wouldn’t have been anyone near the top. I think 
they’ve definitely got closer to [the] top [of] that list now. So, I think [Surface Ltd.] 
is definitely somebody that we will use again. 
(Site agent, Road Ltd.) 
Shared identities, knowledge and relationships can lever value in future service, should 
they be transferred from the project level to the organisation level.  
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Finally, better service experiences led to higher performance. Trust at the project level, 
as they were transferred to the firm level through agency and supply chain management 
systems, helped Surface Ltd. become first-tier partner and secure a strategic agreement 
for future business.  
In summary, case Alpha demonstrated an external supply chain relationship in the shadow 
of a potential long-term relationship at the organisation level. At the network level, the 
main contractor was under the long-term collaborative framework with the client This 
chapter has analysed case Alpha by using the theoretical framework that emerged at the 
early stage of data analysis. 
In the theorem of duality, bottom-up interactions that generate trust as structures of 
signification (e.g., reflexive and experiential learning from shared experiences of 
managing a series of changes generated perceived competence and integrity), domination 
(e.g., reciprocal service exchanges) and legitimation (e.g., forming “gentlemen’s 
agreements”) were found. Particularly, the relationship of trust and power was found to 
be more complicated than substituting or complementary in interactions. If excised in a 
certain manner, structuring project procedures and clarifying roles, for instance, power 
can offer opportunities for developing trust relationships, which, in turn, can strengthen 
organisations’ or actors’ powerful position. On the other hand, mobilisation of power to 
manipulate the other party against their wishes can damage trust and trustworthiness. For 
project businesses, service interactions in theory simultaneously occur at micro-, project 
and organisation levels throughout the project lifecycle. However, the involvement of 
organisation level, especially on the main contractor’s side, was inconsistent, indicating 
a management approach aligned with transactional cost theory. The structuring of the 
trust relationship was mostly at the project level. Actor-to-actor (A2A) interactions in 
execution generated relational norms such as equity, reciprocity and bounded solidarity 
that supported collaboration and motivated value co-creation, an emergent phenomenon 
that strengthened relationships in a self-efficient way, which is aligned with social capital 
theory. 
In turn, trust as a rule of signification, a resource of domination and a rule of legitimation 
improves service communication (e.g., sharing achievements but also problems), 
resource integration (e.g., allocating an engineer to co-develop the model with Road Ltd.), 
service coordination (e.g., dealing with early warning according to mutual benefits) and 
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service outcomes levering value in use (e.g., shared identities and long-term relationships), 
which are better service experiences and outcomes from the lens of S-DL. 
In terms of the interrelations between elements of structure dimensions, the perception of 
trustworthiness increased the confidence in using trust relations as authoritative resources 
to facilitate resource allocation. The process of structuring trust as a resource of 
domination strengthened competence and intention trust on the one hand, and, on the 
other hand, legitimated relational norms and thereby generated trust as a rule of 
legitimation in service interactions. 
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Chapter 7 Case Beta 
Case Beta tells the story of an inter-organisational relationship between a UK construction 
firm, referred to herein as Office Plc. and its piling and foundation contractor, referred to 
herein as Found Gamma, in an office building project.  
7.1 Project overview 
Beta was one of the office buildings in the first phase of a city redevelopment scheme in 
the UK. The scheme aimed to transform the area into a vibrant mixed-use development 
of commercial, civic, retail, leisure and hotel space. The scheme consisted of three phases 
and is delivering 1.8 million square feet of space for up to 10 new buildings including 
offices, shops, bars, café, restaurants and a hotel in the next decade. The first phase started 
with a programme of enabling works, infrastructure, and two office buildings including 
Beta. Enabling works and infrastructure started in the third quarter of 2015 and two office 
buildings started in 2016. Beta was completed in 2018 and the other building in 2019. 
The processes and main events of Beta are illustrated in Figure 9.  
 
Figure 9 The process and events of project Beta 
This chapter particularly concerns the piling project of Beta, which was delivered by 
Office Plc. as the main contractor and Found Gamma as the piling subcontractor. The 
ground condition of project Beta was uncertain. Several service tunnels were under the 
construction site. There was a high risk that the piling project could damage the service 
tunnels. 
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7.2 Service ecosystems 
7.2.1 Project participants 
Office Plc. was the main contractor of enabling works, infrastructure and the office 
building Beta. Office Plc. was a UK major construction firm providing facilities 
management and construction services. Their business was across various sectors such as 
aviation, commercial, retail, residential, transport, healthcare and education. For the 
building Beta, Office Plc. had a project director who also oversaw other projects such as 
infrastructure within the programme. At the project level, they had a quantity surveyor, 
project manager and package manager who was contracted from an agency. The package 
manager was specifically assigned to work with Found Gamma. Using contracted 
operatives makes establishing and hence reusing interpersonal relationships at the project 
level more difficult.  
Found Gamma was the piling and ground engineering unit of Gamma UK, a major 
construction firm in the UK. Found Gamma had several business streams in different 
locations throughout the UK. Each stream had a project director who was responsible for 
all projects in that region, and functional managers who were responsible for operations, 
commercial, production, preconstruction, project bids, etc. At the project level, each 
project was managed by a project team including a project manager, engineers, a quantity 
surveyor and a supervisor. Project Beta was procured and operated by Found Gamma’s 
Southern business stream.  
The client was a private-public joint venture, referred to herein as BetaJV, consisting of 
the City Council and two private sector partners managing private sector funding and 
development of the scheme. 
7.2.2 Structures 
Procurement systems 
Three phases of the city redevelopment scheme were further divided into programmes of 
projects and each programme was competitively procured among various main 
contractors, meaning that the relationships between BetaJV and the main contractors 
might be inconsistent between programmes. In this case, Office Plc. competitively bid for 
the main contracts of the infrastructure, enabling works and the office building Beta. 
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However, for the other building in the first phase, Office Plc. lost to their competitor. 
Therefore, the client and main contractor relationship was transactionally-based, and no 
future relationship was structured after project Beta. 
Office Plc. and BetaJV agreed on a lump sum contract for on-site works including the 
demolition, foundations, podium and the office building Beta. The contract was under 
Joint Contracts Tribunal 2011 (JCT 2011) with 30-day payment. The client was 
responsible for planning and design. The lump sum contract transfers risks from the client 
to the main contractor, which can drive main contractors to pass these risks further down 
to supply chains. The burden of risks can induce insecurity and opportunism in supply 
chains when uncertainties arise during operations. Partly because of the lump sum 
contract and one-time relationship with the main contractor, BetaJV had limited 
involvement in the supply chain, hence little influence on supply chain relationships. The 
design and build (D&B) of the piling and foundations was competitively tendered among 
three piling contractors that had been invited by Office Plc. The D&B piling contract was 
under JCT 2011 with 45-day payment. Originally, the contract was a lump sum, but it 
was changed to remeasurement during execution. Changing a contract from lump sum to 
remeasured means that risks are transferred from the subcontractor to the main contractor, 
indicating the main contractor’s willingness to take the risk for the subcontractor’s 
actions, hence increasing the level of trust. 
Competitive procurement systems cannot ensure the continuity of relationships, either 
between the client and main contractor or between the main contractor and supply chain. 
The initiation of trust and trustworthiness thus mainly relies on agency and ties at the 
micro-level.  
Organisational systems 
Office Plc. had a supply chain management (SCM) system to ensure that their suppliers 
were qualified for bidding projects. Suppliers had to register on an online system if they 
wanted to become part of Office Plc.’s supply chain. The online system stored suppliers’ 
information such as finances, quality, health and safety, sustainability and commitment 
to transparency. The SCM system also had a scoring system regularly assessing and 
recording suppliers’ technical, relational and organisational performance during 
execution and post completion. When Office Plc. needed to procure specialist projects, 
the SCM unit selected three or four suppliers based on supplier information and scores 
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and the procurement team invited these suppliers to the competitive bidding process. 
SCM systems can transfer information at the project level to the organisation level and 
vice versa. Potentially, this ensures links between the project and organisation levels in 
the project lifecycle and can at least maintain ‘sleeping’ relationships with supply chain 
members until the next project is activated. 
As mentioned before, Found Gamma was the piling and ground engineering unit of 
Gamma UK, a major construction firm. Found Gamma’s operations were supported by 
the enabling functions of Gamma UK, such as finance, communications, and health and 
safety systems. Support from the parent organisation can ensure resource continuity and 
increase the reliability of Found Gamma. 
7.2.3 The shadow of the past 
At the organisation level, Found Gamma as a whole company conducted businesses with 
Office Plc. every year. A recent project with Office Plc. completed by the London 
business stream had quality issues and reduced Office Plc.’s competence trust in Found 
Gamma. The Southern business stream had successfully completed two building projects 
several years ago. 
In the face of problems in the recent project, Found Gamma admitted its own mistakes: 
The previous contract, we didn’t help ourselves where we didn’t achieve what we 
said we were going to achieve, contractual wise and [in] the programme. And 
there’s a number of quality issues on that job as well.  
(Quantity surveyor, Found Gamma) 
The acceptance of mistakes was associated with learning from lessons and identifying 
and correcting problems. It also raised a spirit of improving the reputation, which can 
help sustain trustworthy behaviour in interactions. 
At the micro-level, Office Plc.’s project director in project Beta had worked with Found 
Gamma on more than five projects and had maintained active ties with the Southern 
business stream’s managers over a number of years. They had continuous informal 
business interactions to ask each other’s advice on their own projects. Such continuous 
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relationships and interactions can sustain mutual understanding of each other’s 
requirements and interpersonal trust.  
7.2.4 Case analysis 
Conditions for trust 
Past experiences reduced Office Ltd.’s competence trust in Found Gamma, particularly 
the capability of ensuring quality. From the perspective of Found Gamma, partly because 
of the long-term relationships between key actors, Found Gamma had the spirit of 
improving their reputation in the face of the negative experiences and outcomes of the 
London project. Such spirit added an element of relational orientation, a sense of 
responsibility and the awareness of proactive relationship management at the micro-level, 
which was conducive to trustworthy interactions. Moreover, the spirit of improving 
reputation can facilitate a transformational approach at the project level. A 
transformational approach differs from a transactional approach, which predominantly 
focuses on costs and project efficiency, even if it is at the expense of the collective value 
of programmes of projects. The former, in contrast, relies on leadership, norms, cultures 
and codes of behaviour to achieve effectiveness and continuous performance in a self-
sustained way. However, the effect of a transformational approach at the project level can 
be constrained by a transactional approach at the organisation level. The discontinuity of 
relationships and a lump sum contract implies the management of projects in a project-
by-project way, although SCM can help sustain weak relationships between projects. 
Without well-structured relationships or relationship management systems across 
projects, the transformational approach needs to be built from scratch in each project and 
the effect tends to be inconsistent. 
Initial trust 
At the organisation level, the threshold of competence was low: Office Plc. was concerned 
about Found Gamma’s capability to manage projects to the quality standards. In contrast, 
at the micro-level, the project director’s trust in Found Gamma and long-term interactions 
and relationships between key actors maintained a high degree of competence and 
intention trust between the two parties. 
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7.3 Procurement and preconstruction stage 
7.3.1 Proactive involvement in main bid submission 
In the main bid submission, Found Gamma proactively engaged with Office Plc. and gave 
professional advice. At the micro-level, Found Gamma allocated a bid manager who had 
a long-term relationship with Office Plc.’s project director as the main contact between 
the two parties. Familiarity and mutual understanding at the micro-level can facilitate 
service interactions and trust development at the project level. The proactive engagement 
was also supported by the spirit to “make a good impression” and “get back into [Office 
Plc.’s] good books” (Project engineer, Found Gamma).  
At the organisation level, Found Gamma helped improve the main bid, and foresee and 
address potential problems in project Beta. The shared experience of early involvement 
optimised value propositions on the one hand, and, on the other hand, built a shared 
understanding of project requirements and risks between organisation levels. The process 
of intense interactions at the front end and the outcomes in terms of winning the main 
contract, knowledge and relationships can induce trust at the project level and lever 
service value in future use.  
7.3.2 Limited competitive procurement  
Office Plc. started to procure the piling D&B and, in August 2014, piling works were 
tendered among three subcontractors prequalified by Office Plc.’s supply chain 
management (SCM) system. Found Gamma had a good overall performance score that 
enabled them to tender for project Beta, despite the London project. The SCM system 
was also used in selecting suppliers. By looking at the information and scores in the 
system, key actors who had no prior experience with Found Gamma, such as Office Plc.’s 
quantity surveyor and project manager, were able to know about Found Gamma beyond 
the recent project. As mentioned, SCM systems transfer knowledge between the 
organisation and project levels and thereby support a more comprehensive way of 
learning about supply chains. Thus, in this case, the negative influence of the London 
project on trust and relationship at the meso-level was reduced. 
Knowledge secured in the early involvement, when combined with Found Gamma’s own 
specialist knowledge and skills, demonstrated Found Gamma’s technical, organisational 
and financial capabilities in procurement. Mutual understanding at the micro-level, 
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knowledge about main contractor’s value and the shared understanding of project risks 
can generate the perception of trustworthiness and enhance service interactions at the 
meso-level. 
Found Gamma’s bid was not the lowest. However, the project team preferred Found 
Gamma due to the complexities and uncertainties of project conditions that required 
experienced subcontractors with reliable resources and insurances such as Found Gamma. 
…we picked [Found Gamma] because they’ve got the expertise and competence 
there [to deliver] this type of piling. There are not many [that] can do this. There 
are maybe four or three. 
(Project director, Office Plc.) 
The project requirements limited the number of choices in the market, potentially leading 
to a more balanced main contractor and subcontractor relationship.  
Nevertheless, at the organisation level, senior management was suspicious about Found 
Gamma’s capabilities due to the problems in the London project. To persuade senior 
management, Office Plc.’s project director had meetings with the managing director and 
shared his experiences with Found Gamma – how they collaborated to deliver projects 
and maintained goodwill for mutual benefits over the years. They also discussed causes 
of the problems in the London project and how to mitigate these problems. In doing so, 
confidence at the organisation level increased. 
On Found Gamma’s side, apart from the bid manager, Found Gamma allocated estimators 
who had experience with Office Plc. They also had the project manager participate in the 
bidding process to create continuity between the procurement and execution phases. None 
of the actors in project Beta had been involved in the London project. These staffing and 
relationship management practices indicated that Found Gamma learned from the past, 
foresaw potential problems and mitigated relational risks in advance, which can increase 
familiarity and reduce potential conflicts, hence reducing the possibility of trust eroding 
at the project level. 
In early 2015, Office Plc. directly informed Found Gamma of their decision and did not 
try to lower or manipulate Found Gamma's price, even though the price was not the lowest 
amongst the bidders. From the perspective of Found Gamma, this signalled Office Plc.’s 
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trust in them and increased the reliability of Office Plc. From the perspective of Office 
Plc., the collective faith was that Found Gamma were able to understand project 
requirements, ensure operations, provide flexibility and produce solutions to complex 
issues. 
However, at the beginning of contract negotiation, Office Plc. attempted to impose risk 
terms of the main contract to the piling contract in order to transfer its own risks to Found 
Gamma, even though they knew that subcontractors would reject certain terms, which 
indicates the opportunistic intention of the main contractor. An example was the 
liquidated damage charge for delay. This term was unfair in that some delays might be 
caused by factors out of Found Gamma's control. Also, the amount was high considering 
the value of the piling contract. Found Gamma responded to the action with a defensive 
attitude, for instance, “We have [stated] very firmly that we are not going to engage in 
doing that” (Project director, Found Gamma) and “If there is something that we cannot 
accept, we will not take the job” (Bid manager, Found Gamma). Both opportunism and 
defence are harmful to trust and trustworthiness in service interactions. 
Instead of persisting with these terms, Office Plc. was willing to negotiate with Found 
Gamma to reach “somewhere in the middle” and “a fair conclusion” (Quantity surveyor, 
Office Plc.). The practice of imposing risk terms first and negotiating later implies a 
transactional approach to managing supply chain relationships and hinders 
trustworthiness and trust in supply chains. The subsequent negotiation was open and fair 
as perceived by both parties. Different opinions were expressed with reasons and 
discussed until agreement was reached. Terms and conditions were largely co-determined. 
Two-way communication can induce the perception of equity and reciprocal value 
propositions, which is conducive to initiating and sustaining trust and trustworthiness in 
interactions. 
7.3.3 Early involvement in the design 
While contract terms were still in negotiation, Found Gamma were involved early to help 
design and apply value engineering. They set up design meetings and risk workshops to 
share project information, identify risks and discuss solutions, and, in this way, optimise 
piling design as well as the overall scheme. Intense interactions prior to execution can 
optimise value propositions and core offerings, which is a type of value co-creation in a 
broader sense and potentially leads to value for the client. More importantly for the supply 
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chain relationship, it can create operant resources such as knowledge and relationships 
that can lever service value in future use.  
For instance, the ground condition of Beta was uncertain, and the risk of disturbing 
service tunnels was high. In order to gain better solutions and mitigate the risk, Found 
Gamma shared their specialist knowledge and remained responsive to Office Plc.’s 
requirements. They produced variable risk assessment and methods statements (RAMSs) 
and, as Office Plc. reviewed, demonstrated their rigorous procedures and systems. On the 
other hand, Office Plc. proactively engaged with Found Gamma and shared quality 
information to facilitate Found Gamma’s design. Mutual service is built upon trust 
relationships. Through joint activities, risks were mitigated and design was optimised. 
Shared understanding and improved relationships can enhance value co-creation and trust 
at later stages.  
7.3.4 Case analysis 
Conditions for trust 
The SCM system created a condition for better learning about supply chains by providing 
information about suppliers’ overall performance. As actors referred to the information, 
the SCM system helped mitigate the negative influence of the London project. Moreover, 
the status and reputation of Gamma UK, Found Gamma’s parent organisation, reduced 
perceived external risks. 
I think [Found Gamma] probably do reduce the risks… We know they are big… 
If you get a cheap price with a small company, they could go into liquidation 
halfway through. That is a big risk for us… I think having a company like [Gamma 
UK] to do it certainly makes us more comfortable. Because we know their 
experience and they have the right level of PI [professional liability] insurance as 
well to cover everything that might have or could happen. 
(Quantity surveyor, Office Plc.) 
The above quote indicates the systematic information about Found Gamma’s financial 
capability and the reputation of their parent organisation provided a sense of security that 
made Office Plc. “more comfortable”. 
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The complexity and uncertainty of project Beta led to there being fewer alternatives 
equivalent to Found Gamma in the market and hence a more balanced power relation 
between Office Plc. and Found Gamma. Although the use of power depends on agency, 
actors in balanced power relations have fewer opportunities for opportunistically 
imposing power on the other party. Hence, fewer alternatives in the market potentially 
created a conducive environment for establishing trust and trustworthiness.  
Interactions 
At the micro-level, boundary agencies such as the bid manager of Found Gamma and 
project director of Office Plc. induced familiarity and mutual understanding in service 
interactions at the organisation level.  
I’ve done piles with them before and I understood what they need to do and how 
they need to go by doing it… It’s having those relationships once you’ve finished. 
[If] you have a good job, if you’ve got good people, you always keep relationships 
with people... Because at some stages you might come across something that you 
want somebody that can give you some advice… I’ve done that with [Found 
Gamma] since 2007, 2008… [Found Gamma] know what I expect on my projects.  
(Project director, Office Plc.) 
Continuous interactions and mutual understanding increase confidence in the supply 
chain’s capability and intention, which can have implications for trust at the meso-level. 
In this case, interpersonal trust influenced trust at the organisation and project levels 
through interactions between Office Plc.’s project director, senior management and 
project team.  
At the organisation level, Found Gamma’s cognitive and behavioural learning from the 
past and proactive involvement in the main bid mitigated the negative influence of the 
London project prior to the procurement stage. The shared experience of co-producing 
the main bid demonstrated Found Gamma’s specialist knowledge and experience but also 
showed their commitment to Office Plc.  
Early understanding of what they are doing can make a big difference to what we 
do. Because sometimes they say, “Here’s the price”, and we will say, “You are 
doing this and this. But if you just change that a little bit, we could do this, which 
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will improve the programme by half.” You won’t get that if you don’t have the 
early involvement to try to understand what is going on around, not just we are 
going to do but what other people are going to do around us.  
(Bid manager, Found Gamma) 
Intense interactions at an early stage benefited core offerings but also generated operant 
resources such as knowledge and relationships that can lever service value in the future. 
 Knowledge gained through early involvement was transferred to the procurement stage 
through the boundary agency, together with long-term interpersonal relationships, 
reduced perceived external and relational risks, and generated competence trust.  
I think that [trust in Found Gamma] has been [increased by] putting the right 
staff on it. And early engagement with us to understand what our drivers are, what 
restrictions are for the project. They just understand the project. And they [were] 
involved early on, before the bid, to give us some early advice.  
(Project director, Office Plc.) 
Shared experiences such as design meetings and risk workshops provided opportunities 
for mutual learning, though such learning was not necessarily intentional. The primary 
intention of joint activities was to resolve project-specific tasks and problems. The 
perception of competence and integrity emerged reflexively as Found Gamma maintained 
their integrity in providing effective solutions. In other words, project actors engaged with 
each other to address emergent changes or identify risks, but, through these experiences, 
Found Gamma gained competence and intention trust. 
During the tendering, they were with us. When they won the job, they worked with 
us to make sure that we’ve got a) the right solution, b) understood the problem of 
the main tunnel… There’s been a lot of communication, coordination and 
consultation about working close to that road tunnel underneath. So, before and 
after they won the job, in terms of communication and working with us and solving 
problems, they’ve been really good.  
(Project manager, Office Plc.) 
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The above quote also indicates that trust was mainly built upon the capability of 
improving project efficiency. Up to this point, maintaining the collaborative relationship 
was to utilise Found Gamma’s resources to reduce costs and external risks, avoid rushed 
plans and have an early start, hence trust being largely self-interested. 
Self-interested orientations are evident in contract negotiation when Office Plc. attempted 
to impose risk terms on Found Gamma. The opportunistic behaviour of transferring risks 
might be partly attributed to the lump-sum main contract, no relational continuity post 
completion and associated transactional approach to managing projects at the 
organisation level. The mobilisation of power as an authoritative resource to control the 
other party against their wishes hindered the structuration of trust as a resource of 
domination. Moreover, it formed a ‘win or lose’ situation in which the other party was 
defensive and threatened the supply chain relationship.  
The tension in the contract negotiation was alleviated in two ways. The first was the 
project condition discussed above. The fact that there were fewer alternatives to Found 
Gamma in the market, hence a more balanced power relation, was conducive to initiating 
equitable communication. The second was the two-way communication.  
We would generally either speak to them on the phone or email them but with 
reasons why: “…however, we don’t feel it’s safe because… we will suggest this 
might be a better way to do it.” And they obviously will review that and either 
agree or they might come up with another solution… just conversation that 
happens between the two parties to try to make sure everybody is happy with what 
we are going to do. 
(Quantity surveyor, Office Plc.) 
The dialogic communication, or a “conversation”, indicates an equitable relationship 
between the main contractor and subcontractor. In dialogues, the main contractor and 
subcontractor expressed their own views, listened to the other’s views and, in doing so, 
co-produced value propositions reciprocal to both parties.  
The phenomenon of trust 
At the organisation level, trust as a rule of signification was largely built upon established 
interpersonal relationships and trust at the micro-level. The latter provided a sense of 
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familiarity and mutual understanding that increased confidence at the meso-level, 
including project and organisation levels. Competence and intention trust further 
developed in shared experiences of co-producing value propositions. The collective 
perception was that Found Gamma was experienced, professional and knowledgeable, 
hence capable of completing project Beta to the contract requirement, and had integrity.  
Competence trust and intention trust motivated actors to ask for Found Gamma’s 
specialist advice and share quality information to facilitate Found Gamma to find 
solutions and mitigate risks in design.  
We expect to have some open and honest two-way conversation, really, to be 
provided with the technical information that we need to actually design and price 
the works properly. And then, really, it’s a good level of quality information.  
(Project director, Found Gamma) 
Office Plc’s openness and responsiveness to Found Gamma’s requirements indicates their 
reliance on Found Gamma to deliver technical solutions. At this point, trust relations were 
used as authoritative resources for resource allocation and integration – the structuration 
of trust as a resource of domination. 
Nevertheless, the orientation of maintaining trust relations at the procurement and 
preconstruction stage was largely self-interested. This was particularly evident in the 
contract negotiation where Office Plc. tried to transfer risks by imposing unfair terms. 
Maintaining a collaborative relationship was to utilise Found Gamma’s resources to 
reduce costs and external risks, avoid rushed plans and had an early start. 
The value of trust 
Trust as a rule of signification, or the perception of trustworthiness, encouraged more 
service communication. As mentioned, the dialogic communication emerged as 
competence and intention trust developed and resulted in an equitable relationship and 
reciprocal value propositions. From the perspective of Found Gamma, perceived equity 
and reciprocal benefits, as well as relationships at the micro-level, increased their 
confidence in sharing knowledge and offering advice. Service experience therefore 
became more informative. Shared understanding of project requirements and risks and 
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each other’s organisations increased as a service outcome at this stage, which can benefit 
future service use.  
The effectiveness of value co-creation, in terms of both core offerings and shared 
understanding, strengthened competence and intention trust and encouraged using trust 
relations in interactions, hence trust as a rule of signification and resource of domination. 
In other words, trust and collaboration formed a self-reinforcing cycle, or positive path 
dependency. 
7.4 Execution stage 
7.4.1 First-phase piling works 
The piling project started in August 2016. The original programme was 15 weeks with 
two phases. The first phase was seven weeks. When execution started, Found Gamma 
allocated an operations manager who had a good relationship with Office Plc.’s project 
director to project Beta in order to develop a solid relationship at that level of the 
hierarchy. The same project manager remained throughout the project. Office Plc.’s 
project director also continued to engage in the piling operations. The consistency of key 
relationships can sustain mutual understanding and trust at the micro-level. Apart from 
established ties, Found Gamma were proactive to initiate and develop new relationships 
through face-to-face communication, such as the relationship between quantity surveyors.  
Multiple routes and levels of communication were built between the two parties during 
execution. At the organisation level, Office Plc.’s SCM unit made monthly and quarterly 
assessments of subcontractors and suppliers’ performance. Results were retained in the 
SCM system as well as fed back publicly on a board on site, which can align 
understanding between organisation and project levels. On the operations side, project 
directors from both companies maintained regular contact. The project director of Office 
Ltd. had his office on site and thus co-located with operatives, which enabled him to 
communicate with project actors and know about project issues. Also, Office Ltd.’s 
director had an engineering background and so was able to understand Found Gamma’s 
technical operations. At the project level, Office Plc. and Found Gamma, as well as other 
subcontractors and suppliers delivering services at the same time, had various formal and 
informal meetings. Specifically, all supervisors had daily meetings before operations 
commenced. Project managers had weekly logistics meetings and fortnightly 
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collaborative planning meetings. Quantity surveyors had informal meetings each week, 
during which disagreements or questions were resolved. Office Plc. had a contracted 
package manager to work with Found Gamma on site, keeping site dairies, reviewing 
Found Gamma’s progress and reporting weekly progress to the project management. The 
package manager had weekly progress meetings with Found Gamma’s project manager.  
Structured formal interactions ensured regular communication between actors and the 
multiplexity of communication ensured shared understanding across hierarchical levels 
within the organisation, different functions and organisation boundaries. Communication 
in this way can provide a sense of security that is conducive to trust development at the 
project level.  
Through multilevel direct and indirect communication, Office Plc. learned that Found 
Gamma continuously achieved goals, provided effective solutions, mitigated risks related 
to damaging service tunnels and tried to exceed the daily programmes whenever possible, 
which increased their perceived competence. They completed the first stage of piling 
operations in the first five weeks, two weeks in advance of the programme. 
7.4.2 Method and contract change 
In delivering the first phase, Office Plc. and Found Gamma found existing foundations 
that obstructed piling operations and were hard to remove because doing so could damage 
the service tunnels. On the basis of the competence trust established in previous 
interactions, Office Plc.’s project director asked Found Gamma for a solution to continue 
piling while minimising the risk of damaging the tunnels. Found Gamma proposed to 
change the existing method and use coring piles, which saved the effort of removing any 
obstructions. This method change further led to contract change. The first option was to 
keep the lump sum contract and adapt the price to the coring operations. A lump sum 
contract meant Found Gamma took most of the risks. However, the estimated price was 
very high due to the uncertainties about the ground conditions and the difficulties of 
predicting the quantity and length of coring piles required. The lump sum price included 
various changes and risks that might or might not occur.  
Office Plc. took the second option, remeasured contract. While Office Plc. could have 
tried to negotiate a lower cost and keep the lump sum contract to transfer most of the risks 
to Found Gamma, instead they openly discussed their own financial difficulties with 
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Found Gamma and the two parties jointly formulated the contract. The use of a 
remeasured contract meant Office Plc. being burdened with the external risks since 
payment was made on the basis of the actual amount of work Found Gamma carried out 
or the time Found Gamma spent and the rates for a unit of work. The decision, although 
partly due to the high price of a lump sum contract, reflected a high level of trust in Found 
Gamma because Office Ltd. relied on Found Gamma’s capability and integrity to deliver 
and also to reduce the risk of going over budget.  
7.4.3 Suspension of piling works 
After completing the first phase, Office Plc. could not provide sufficient areas for piling 
operations due to the demolition delay. Found Gamma had to suspend their operations in 
September 2016 and agreed to leave the site for one month so that Office Plc. could save 
some costs. During their leave, Found Gamma reserved piling equipment that was hard 
to book for Office Plc., a signal of their commitment to Office Plc. that is associated with 
intention trust.  
On Found Gamma’s side, the problem of a lack of working areas persisted and delayed 
Found Gamma’s operations. Relational risks were perceived by Found Gamma at this 
point, as illustrated by the company’s project director, 
I think what is going to happen is that they are going to finish this quite restricted 
area and we are going to a wider area where our production should increase. I 
think at that point what we are going to do is to save all the delays… when the 
deal is done, they wouldn’t want to pay [for] our delays and they will argue, “Well, 
you’ve gone faster in this bit. You have not really lost any money. All you lost is 
your opportunity to go quicker and better in your programme and make more 
profit.” … But that’s the prejudging of the situation based on my experience. But 
we will see how that develops. 
Despite the perceived risks, Found Gamma maintained production and delivered as much 
as they could under the constraints, instead of stopping operations and claiming for 
compensation. This action, as perceived by Office Plc., was relational and indicated 
Found Gamma’s integrity.  
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7.4.4 Case analysis 
Interactions 
Maintaining the consistency of key ties sustained familiarity and shared meanings 
established at the front end. Boundary agencies such as Found Gamma’s project manager 
and Office Plc.’s project director transferred shared meanings at the organisation level to 
the project level. Ties and trust at the micro-level ensured the effectiveness of service 
interactions at the project level.  
We are always aware that big rigs are quite a scarce commodity. You should get 
them secured quite early. To be fair, [Found Gamma] worked quite well on that. 
So, when we finished visit one after four, five weeks, [and] the pile rigs are for 
three to four weeks, they agreed to leave [the] pile rigs there… It’s just about 
people being honest and practical. 
(Project director, Office Plc.) 
The relationship-specific investment relied on agency and mostly from Found Gamma’s 
side, indicating Office Plc.’s self-interested orientation at this stage. Yet it signalled 
Found Gamma’s commitment and, as perceived by Office Plc., increased perceived 
benevolence. 
Also, the two parties structured regular communication at both project and organisation 
levels. Multiple routes and levels of communication created abundant connections that 
ameliorated the need for ‘safety nets’ to prevent communication breakdown, which raised 
the sense of security in interactions. Moreover, repeated communication built new ties 
and the multiple routes and levels of connections ensured a shared understanding at 
different levels between the two parties. For instance, assessment results at the 
organisation level were fed back to the project level. 
People are very pleased to see the scores we receive in terms of performance of 
the site team and everything. So, it has been given a positive feeling in [Found 
Gamma] that we can actually work with [Office Plc.]. 
(Project director, Found Gamma) 
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The increase in morale and satisfaction of service experiences can sustain trustworthiness 
on the supply chain’s side. 
The shared understanding was further ensured by equivalent knowledge bases between 
the two parties. The allocation of the package manager and the involvement of the project 
director (both had engineering knowledge and experience) ensured the effectiveness of 
communication from operations to management levels. 
We’ve got [the project director] who is a very experienced engineer and very 
experienced with piling. He knows a lot about piling. He’s able to have that high-
level engineering conversation. We make sure that the person looking after them 
is equally knowledgeable about pilling… we’ve made sure that they get an 
engineer that does know about piling [so] that they can have that sort of high-
level discussion, especially when they hit a problem – you need to have two people 
having the same knowledge talking to each other. Also, we’ve got the director to 
back up his knowledge. 
(Quantity surveyor, Office Plc.) 
Equivalent knowledge bases helped Office Plc. make sense of and internalise Found 
Gamma’s technical problems and solutions, reducing perceived risks and suspicion due 
to cognitive distance. The potential for trust erosion was thus mitigated.  
Regular and multilevel communication, consistent ties and the capability of 
understanding the other party fostered a sense of security in service interactions that trust 
can be built upon. 
Structured formal communication, such as project meetings, short-term programmes and 
regular performance assessment and feedback, enabled Office Plc. to monitor project 
performance and through this process know whether and how Found Gamma delivered 
the project. Multiple routes and levels of communication increased the reliability of 
results. On Found Gamma’s side, they signalled their competence by providing reliable 
records and achieving and excelling in respect of the programmes. The perception of 
competence increased. As appraised by the project manager of Office Plc., 
We can rely on them doing what they say they are going to do. If they are going 
to do 10 piles a week, they did 12 piles a week, which is good. So, they always 
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slightly exceeded the expectation. So, that is a benefit, doing a little bit more than 
what [was] planned, which is great.  
The indirect interaction, such as monitoring, increased competence trust. In terms of 
intention trust, it was generated in actor-to-actor (A2A) interactions in joint activities such 
as solving tasks and problems. For instance, after Found Gamma helped Office Plc. solve 
problems caused by demolition delay, the project manager of Office Plc. commented,  
We’ve had some problems on the project because of tunnels and other things. 
[Found Gamma] have worked with us to solve any problems on site, which has 
been very good. They are certainly not looking to take advantage of situations.  
Direct interactions increased the confidence in the other party’s intentions, which was 
‘certainly’ not opportunistic. In other words, trust as a rule of signification can be formed 
in the direct as well as indirect interactions.  
Furthermore, trust as a rule of signification partly drove the choice of remeasured contract, 
as discussed in the next subsection, indicating that trust relations were used as an 
authoritative resource for service delivery. Moreover, the shared experience of co-
determining contract terms sustained perceived equity, especially on the supply chain’s 
side, which encouraged reciprocal interactions between the two parties. 
It is about making as [little] pain as possible. But also making sure that we get 
paid [as] we are entitled to… You’ve been proactive, you are helping. “You 
scratch my back, I’ll scratch your back.” 
(Quantity surveyor, Found Gamma) 
Reciprocity at this stage was economically-based. The expectation was to gain economic 
returns through service exchanges. For instance, Office Plc. provided resources for Found 
Gamma’s requirements and needs, therefore better assisting the piling operations, and 
expected an efficient and effective delivery process and outputs. Found Gamma achieved 
programmes and tried to satisfy Office Plc.’s needs, expecting to obtain fair payment and 
profits in delivering the service. Reciprocity and perceived trustworthiness ensured the 
recursive use of trust relations to deal with uncertainties. In this vein, reciprocity 
generated and maintained trust as a resource of domination in the supply chain 
relationship, which, in turn, reinforced reciprocal interactions for economic value.  
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The phenomenon of trust 
Competence trust increased as Found Gamma continuously achieved goals but also 
excelled in the programme during the first-phase piling works. Found Gamma’s 
consistent service quality, willingness to cooperate with Office Plc. and help in solving 
Office Plc.’s problem, as perceived by Office Plc. in service interactions, generated the 
perception of integrity and benevolence. Intention trust encouraged Office Plc. to be open 
and honest with problems and tolerate more uncertainties such as changing to a 
remeasured contract. 
Trust as a resource of domination was reinforced by the perception of trustworthiness. 
Specifically, the perception of integrity and benevolence, together with ties and trust at 
the micro-level, motivated Office Plc. to manage contract change jointly with Found 
Gamma, hence using trust relations as a facility of resource allocation. From Office Plc.’s 
perspective, the remeasured contract might mean they ended up either saving the costs of 
not-happening or non-existing risks or spending more than the lump sum price due to the 
emergence of unexpected changes and risks. Found Gamma’s opportunism might also 
increase costs. The final cost depended on project conditions but also Found Gamma’s 
capability and integrity. In other words, Office Plc. relied on Found Gamma to deal with 
project uncertainties. Although partly because of the financial problem, the decision was 
driven by perceived trustworthiness accumulated in previous interactions. 
We trust them to get on with them [the tasks] because they are specialists… I’m 
pleased with them that way… So, we take the risk on that [remeasured contract]. 
(Project director, Office Plc.) 
The choice of a remeasured contract avoided a ‘win or lose’ situation and thereby reduced 
the potential to erode intention trust.  
Increased competence and intention trust and the use of trust relations in resource 
allocation motivated Office Plc. to give more flexibility to Found Gamma. 
They rarely step in to stop us, to say that, “I think something could have been 
done better.” So, on many jobs you could be stopped regularly by the client who 
thinks we could be doing this in a different way or safer way or another way to 
produce a better product. But this doesn’t happen [here] as they monitor our work, 
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to step in to express some kind of concern or disappointment or something. They 
basically let us get on [with] the job and don’t meddle too much in what it is and 
how it is doing. There’s a trust from them that we have the skills and the 
knowledge of the company and we get it [to] go the way they want. 
 (Project manager, Found Gamma) 
Giving flexibility was perceived as a sign of trust, which can induce trustworthy 
behaviour to ensure that “we get it [to] go the way they want”. 
Furthermore, this trust-trustworthiness interaction resulted in Office Plc.’s perception of 
Found Gamma as “…taking great pride in delivering a quality product in time” (Project 
manager, Office Plc.). The perception of “taking great pride” mitigated opportunism and 
strengthened the perception of trustworthiness. Therefore, the mobilisation of trust 
relations supported the structuration of trust as a rule of signification. 
Lastly, the orientation of trust was still self-interested, which was to use Found Gamma 
to achieve Office Plc.’s goals. As mentioned, this is evident in the limited relationship-
specific investment of Office Ltd. at this stage, though the emergence of shared intentions 
laid the foundation for transformation, as discussed in the next subsection. 
The value of trust 
Two-way communication and the phenomenon of trust ensured the intensity but also 
increased the content of communication as Office Plc. shared information beyond project 
Beta per se and included information about the company.  
Office Plc.’s willingness to share and learn with Found Gamma, as perceived by Found 
Gamma, motivated Found Gamma to be open and honest and go ‘the extra mile’. As the 
project director of Found Gamma observed,  
We felt like we will be listened to when we have problems and that makes you 
want to go on and do the extra bits to be able to help solve the problems…We 
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were open and honest when we had mistakes… we had to put something right and 
we do it. Such two-way communication and behaviours all the time. 
The perceived trusting behaviour was reciprocated by trustworthiness. Thus, service 
experience was more informative than the last stage and knowledge secured can help 
produce or optimise solutions. 
Using trust relations reduced the use of contractual mechanisms as safeguards when faced 
with uncertainties. This was evident at the beginning of the second phase of piling works. 
Although Found Gamma were uncertain about whether Office Plc. would compensate 
them for delays, they kept cooperating with Office Plc. and producing as much as they 
could to achieve the programmes. In this vein, the phenomenon of trust made service 
experiences more flexible and ensured the continuity of delivering service contents and 
the value proposition.  
The structuration of trust as an authoritative resource induced shared intentions as a 
service outcome, which can be inferred by the repeatedly mentioned phase, “you are only 
as good as your last job”, by interviewees from both parties.  
It’s the phrase, “You are only as good as your last job.” If you are as good as 
your last job and that’s a good job, that’s a reputation. 
(Quantity surveyor, Found Gamma)  
…we all get on, we all want to make it successfully… You are only as good as 
your last job, so why don’t we make it work… The other thing is we’ve got pride 
in what we do... If you’ve got pride, you want to do a good job anyway. 
(Project director, Office Plc.) 
Shared intentions increased Found Gamma’s confidence and satisfaction in the service 
provision.  
I think that’s been very positive within the business for [Found Gamma] to see 
[positive feedback] after we had a… big problem [in the] contract with [Office 
Plc.] in London. 
(Project director, Found Gamma) 
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Shared intentions and satisfaction in service experiences, or “taking great pride”, laid the 
foundation for sharing responsibilities, co-creating value in the supply chain relationship, 
and transforming self-interested orientation to social orientations at the completion stage. 
7.5 Completion stage 
7.5.1 Second-phase piling works 
Throughout the project, Office Plc. and Found Gamma maintained consistent project 
teams. Consistency can sustain ties, shared meaning and trust at the micro-level but also 
the way of interactions and service quality at the project level.  
The collaborative way of interactions was sustained and routinised at the project level, 
which supported as well as was supported by the phenomenon of trust in previous 
interactions. In the face of the difficulty of having sufficient working areas and operating 
productively, Found Gamma maintained trustworthiness by providing a consistent 
service, trying to achieve programmes under constraints and finding the best solutions. 
On Office Plc.’s side, they did not blame Found Gamma for the delay and tried to resolve 
problems according to Found Gamma’s needs, a signal of competence trust. They 
maintained fairness in service interactions. Reciprocally, when Office Plc. had difficulties 
in setting up certain areas for piling operations during weekdays, Found Gamma 
proactively proposed to work at weekends in order to facilitate Office Plc.’s works and 
achieve the programme. The management of project and relationship at the project level 
moved towards an approach based on social capital theory. 
Found Gamma’s perception of relational risks as demonstrated at the beginning of the 
second phase was mitigated. This is evident when Office Plc. declined Found Gamma’s 
monthly payment application in the middle of the second-phase execution. In the face of 
uncertainties, Found Gamma’s operational actors maintained production while their 
commercial actors sought constructive communication with Office Plc.’s commercial 
team. Through formal and informal communication between their commercial teams, 
Office Plc. and Found Gamma resolved the misunderstanding and the payment issue. 
Rather than blaming or relying on the contract to transfer liabilities, the disagreement was 
eventually resolved in a relational way.  
166 
7.5.2 Project completion 
However, the effects of the relational approach on trust and value co-creation at the 
project level were constrained by the discontinuity of the relationship and transactional 
approach at the organisation level. As project Beta came to an end and no future business 
was secured, both parties tended to focus on profits that could be actualised in the project. 
On Office Plc.’s side, they reduced their involvement in the piling works and started to 
prepare for specialist projects following the piling project. Office Plc. authorised Found 
Gamma to make most of the decisions related to the piling operations. Although an 
indication of trust, less involvement can hinder further trust development. On Found 
Gamma’s side, they had no further interactions with Office Plc. at the organisation level. 
Learning was largely based on project-specific tasks, “whatever [was necessary] to get 
the job built quicker and more efficiently” (Project manager, Found Gamma), which 
indicates a more transactional approach to managing relationships.  
The piling project was completed in late March 2017. Found Gamma and Office Plc. 
applied, negotiated and settled the final account for project Beta within one week, 
indicating a good service experience. The programme had been delayed for nearly two 
months. Nevertheless, both parties were satisfied with the outputs and relationships with 
each other. Office Plc. saved £150,000 in coring operations. Found Gamma increased the 
scope of works by 30-40%, hence increasing the project’s profits. However, despite the 
good performance, the two parties rushed to their next projects and had little reflexive 
learning, indicating a transactional approach at the organisation levels.  
7.5.3 Case analysis 
Interactions 
Maintaining consistency had a two-fold meaning. The first was that both parties 
maintained the same teams throughout the project lifecycle. As discussed before, 
consistent personnel helped sustain shared meanings that ensure the effectiveness of 
service interactions at the project level; the latter induced trust in the supply chain. The 
second meaning was routinising the collaborative way of service interactions, hence 
maintaining the quality of service experience and value co-creating, especially under 
uncertainties. 
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…they were quite happy to keep going and trying to find different solutions for 
us… So, I think that is probably what made us feel more comfortable. 
(Quantity surveyor, Office Plc.) 
Maintaining a consistent service also provided a feeling of being “comfortable”, or a 
sense of security, that helped sustain trust at the micro- and project level. 
Repeatedly going the extra mile, such as proactively working during weekends, 
strengthened the perception of integrity and benevolence. 
…we were working together as a team… you got the same sort of values that you 
have… they understand the bigger picture… they want the project to be a success, 
not just get their work done and go.  
(Quantity surveyor, Office Plc.) 
Shared intentions were also reinforced and recreated trust as a rule of signification. In the 
last-round interviews with different informants on both sides, terms indicating shared 
intentions or mutual benefits, such as “understand[ing] each other”, having a “two-way 
street” and “the same mind/level/bases/page/attitude/point”, appeared as frequently as 
28 times.  
Furthermore, shared intentions drove social orientations. Under social orientations, Office 
Plc. considered Found Gamma’s value in order to uphold the relationship.  
…having that good relationship would always be the best part for the job… trying 
to understand the other person’s point of view, where they are coming from and 
why they are arguing about something or [in] dispute about something.  
(Quantity surveyor, Office Plc.) 
Social orientations sustained the use of trust relations, reduced the use of contractual 
mechanisms but also encouraged taking responsibility in value co-creation. This is 
evident in the way and attitudes Office Plc. used in resolving piling delays. In other words, 
value co-creating activities intensified with the structuration of trust as rules and 
resources.  
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The effectiveness of value co-creating and economic reciprocity motivated actors to 
continue trusting and trustworthy interactions, which gradually fostered relational norms. 
These actor-generating norms, in turn, guided the behaviour of both parties at the project 
level.  
…working together, collaboratively, understanding each other’s drivers and 
trying to help each other… We have to do what we say on the table… if you are a 
gentleman, if you have a handshake, you have to stick to [it]. Integrity and 
honesty… it should go for both companies.  
(Project director, Office Plc.) 
Relational norms such as integrity and honesty motivated actors and organisations to 
work collaboratively, try to understand each other’s drivers and help each other: “do what 
we say on the table” and take responsibility for their own mistakes. Actors and 
organisations would “stick to” a gentleman’s agreement on creating value. In this vein, 
actor-generating norms emerged and were legitimated in day-to-day interactions at the 
project level, generating trust as a rule of legitimation. Relational norms raised relational 
thinking that emphasised the integral role of the relationship in exchange, hence 
maintaining the social orientation and constraining opportunism or coercive power in the 
service provision. These norms formed relational expectations that were fulfilled by 
collectively-accepted ways of delivering service and value. In other words, trust and value 
co-creation formed a virtuous cycle at the completion stage.  
Conditions for trust 
However, the cycle was counter-balanced by the foreshortening shadow of the future 
between the two parties. The inter-organisational relationship was largely constrained by 
the short-term transactional value and the project-by-project managing approach, as the 
project director of Office Plc. implied, 
[Found Gamma] are stronger in some areas of works than the others. But other 
companies are probably better on other types of piling works... They won’t want 
all the money in one basket, anyway. 
With no business secured in the near future or a well-structured strategic relationship, 
social orientations at the last stage remained at the project level, which was to ensure 
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mutual benefits that could be co-created and distributed within project Beta. Learning 
was also constrained, as the project director of Found Gamma mentioned, 
I wouldn’t say we have a formal method [for learning with Office Plc.], such that 
it tends to go on a project-by-project process… We should probably try to sit down 
at higher level with [Office Plc.] and try to understand better why this project 
went really well or really bad... I don’t think we are very good at doing that in 
construction, actually. It tends to wait until the next project comes along... 
particularly if you have problems… nobody wants to go back and think about them 
again. 
On Office Plc.’s side, although project learning could be transferred to the organisation 
level through the SCM system, to use resources obtained in project Beta to achieve 
continuous improvement required well-structured relationships that ensured regular 
business interactions. Without such guarantees, the value of knowledge, relationships and 
trust in the future use largely depended on agencies. The project director might continue 
to regularly contact Found Gamma’s director and managers after the completion; 
relationships kept levering value for the organisations in this case. But others might not. 
As the project director of Found Gamma demonstrated, 
Not formally [learning with Office Plc. after completion]. It sounds crazy… what 
we rely on is actually their director’s feedback into [Office Plc.] that “We worked 
well with [Found Gamma].” There’s never an agreed incentive to go back to a 
client. Because everybody just wants to move on. 
The transactional approach at the organisation level constrains the transferring of 
resources from the project level to the organisation level and the emergence of service 
ecosystems. Resources and processes that emerged at the project level can hardly 
influence processes and value co-creation at higher-level service ecosystems. In this vein, 
without organisational support and structured relationships for future business, 
relationship value and trust might easily be lost when individuals are redistributed, and 
trust relations are not embedded at the organisation level. 
The phenomenon of trust 
Using trust relations as authoritative resources in service interactions reinforced the 
structuration of competence and intention trust. Competence and intention trust gave 
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Found Gamma more flexibility, hence authority in the piling operations. The mobilisation 
of trust relations, furthermore, shaped the rule of legitimation as relational norms emerged 
and were legitimated in recursive trust-based interactions. Trust as a rule of legitimation 
sustained the use of trust relations and trust-based interactions, especially in uncertainties, 
through relational control.  
Social orientations emerged and promoted actors to take responsibility and rely on 
established relationships rather than contractual mechanisms to deal with disagreements 
and misunderstandings. However, under the foreshortening future, social orientations at 
the last stage remained at the project level, namely ensuring mutual benefits that could be 
co-created and distributed within project Beta. 
The value of trust 
The two parties collaborated to jointly pursue mutual benefits, facilitating the co-creation 
of value both in terms of the service experience of the two parties and other organisations 
directly involved in the execution, and in terms of inducing the potential for project 
outcomes that realised greater value in use. The emphasis in the analysis below is on the 
service experience where trust was a key part of the developing interactions and hence 
the inter-organisational relationship. 
As mentioned, trust as a rule of signification and resource of domination helped form an 
open and equitable environment where actors were receptive to opinions and addressed 
discontents in a professional, yet relational way and facilitated resource allocation and 
integration for value co-creation. In this vein, service experiences became more 
informative and flexible and created shared understanding and intentions, which levered 
value of service use in subsequent interactions.  
At the completion stage, trust as a rule of legitimation increased the cohesion of service 
coordination. Cohesion first indicated the stability of the relationship especially under 
uncertainties. 
And we’ve continued to find out that [Office Plc.] are not great payers, their cash 
flow is really [bad]… that could be really frustrating sometimes… but… what we 
learnt from [Office Plc.], from my perspective, is about that team, the correct site 
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team. And [Found Gamma] as a whole has learnt we don’t have to have that 
experience like the previous project. We can have a different and better experience. 
(Project director, Found Gamma) 
Relational norms furnished the relational thinking and avoided opportunism in 
uncertainties such as payment delay. 
Moreover, cohesion meant that both parties maintained their integrity and focused on the 
mutual benefits, as illustrated by both parties when they negotiated the final account for 
project Beta, 
In the end, we focused our final account onto delivering exactly that, no more no 
less. I didn’t try to make the extra… I directed my guys you know, “We just want 
this amount of money.” 
(Project director, Found Gamma) 
That was the quickest final account I’ve ever settled… So, we talked it through 
and managed to get to sort of how we win-win. We were both fairly happy with 
what we can settle [for].  
(Quantity surveyor, Office Plc.) 
Finally, shared identities emerged as a service outcome in trust-based interactions in 
which the other party’s value was considered in one’s own decision and actions.  
So, they’ve got a saving on it and we got paid for the time and materials we did 
incur. So, I feel like we made a fair profit and they must feel like they knew they 
got a fair solution that was very transparent…We’ve proved that we can work 
very well with [Office Plc.]. Benefits are that internally we’ve proved that we can 
manage change on a project very well... And you know, satisfying the customer, I 
think that is just fantastic… I think we’ve done a good job for them. 
(Project director, Found Gamma)  
The relational elements such as shared identities, pride and reputation increased social 
capital that could lever service value in the future. Nevertheless, without structuring 
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relationships at the organisation level, the value of social capital relies on agency. It can 
be lost when actors are reallocated.  
In summary, case Beta demonstrates an external supply chain relationship with no 
shadow of the future between the main contractor and the client or between the main 
contractor and the supply chain. The supply chain management (SCM) system of the main 
contractor facilitated learning about the supply chain at the front end by transferring 
information between the organisation and project level, hence the management of a 
‘sleeping relationship’. In the shadow of a negative past, a spirit of improving reputation 
formed among supply chain actors that drove the proactive communication at the 
organisation and project levels.  
In the theorem of duality, the lack of structured relationship management was 
supplemented by agencies and ties at the micro-level and multiple routes and levels of 
formal communication. The former increased mutual understanding and confidence that 
benefited trust and value co-creation at the project level. The latter relied on structuring 
and ensured regular A2A interactions where relational norms can emerge. Shared learning 
and monitoring occurred at different hierarchical levels, across functions and boundaries, 
hence facilitating trust development and shared understanding at the project and 
organisation levels. The use of trust relations was driven by the contract change but was 
based on competence and intention trust at the project level, implying the influence of 
structure of signification on domination. That latter led to trust-trustworthiness patterns 
of behaviour, which further induced relational norms and the structure of trust as a rule 
of legitimation. 
Top-down, trust as rules and resources influenced communication, resource allocation 
and coordination in co-creating value and delivering service, and generated social capital 
such as shared understanding, intentions and identities increased as an outcome of value 
co-creating. Yet, due to the foreshortening future, its value depended on ties and agencies 
and could be lost when actors were relocated post completion. In other words, to enhance 
value generated at the project level requires 1) linking systems between project and 
organisation levels and 2) structures to ensure the continuity of the relationship, hence the 
value of social capital, in order to influence events and processes at the organisation level 
and enhance value co-creation in the service ecosystem over time. 
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Chapter 8 Case Gamma 
Case Gamma tells the story of an inter-organisational relationship between Found 
Gamma as the piling contractor and its sister company, referred to herein as Build Gamma 
as the main contractor, in a multiple-use building project. 
8.1 Project overview 
Gamma was a 27-storey building project in central London. Once completed, Gamma 
would provide nearly 150 residential apartments and 1,800 square metres of multi-use 
space on one of the busiest transport hubs in London. The construction site was next to 
two underground lines. The main risk was disturbing underground transport operations, 
which can have significant costs and social impacts. The main contract was procured in 
two stages and the first stage started in August 2015. To satisfy the client’s requirements 
for early involvement to start piling works, Build Gamma started to simultaneously 
source the piling contractor; the aim was to involve the piling contractor to jointly develop 
the main bid. Despite having an in-house sister company, Build Gamma went out to the 
market to ensure price competitiveness. The processes and main events of case Gamma 
are illustrated in Figure 10. 
 
Figure 10 The process and events of project Gamma 
This chapter particularly concerns the piling project for case Gamma, which was 
delivered by Build Gamma as the main contractor and Found Gamma as the piling 
subcontractor. 
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8.2 Service ecosystems 
8.2.1 Project participants 
The main contractor, Build Gamma, and piling contractor, Found Gamma, were two 
functional units of Gamma UK, a major construction company in the UK. Build Gamma 
was responsible for building projects whereas Found Gamma provided geotechnical 
engineering solutions and services.  
As already mentioned (see 7.2.1), Found Gamma had several business streams in different 
locations throughout the UK. Project Gamma was delivered by the London business 
stream. In contrast, each of Build Gamma’s project directors were assigned to one project 
at a time and were responsible for that project from the beginning to the end. The project 
Gamma team comprised a project manager, commercial manager, planner, construction 
manager and site engineers. 
The client, referred to herein as Alliance Property, was a property company notable for 
developing iconic building projects. The main external stakeholder was a government 
body responsible for transport, herein referred to as City Ltd. As mentioned, the site was 
close to underground lines. Build Gamma and City Ltd. had frequent communication 
regarding the risk of disturbing underground operations.  
8.2.2 Structures 
Procurement systems 
The client used a two-stage procurement process for the main building. The first-stage 
appointment was made mainly on the basis of 1) a preconstruction and construction 
programme, 2) preliminaries including staff costs, and 3) agreed fees for preconstruction 
services. The second procurement stage was to negotiate and agree on the price. Two-
stage procurement can encourage the development of an integrative project team, but it 
depends on the management approach at the meso-level; it is either transactional or 
transformational. Moreover, two-stage procurement cannot ensure continuity of 
relationships or help structure relationships either between the client and main contractor 
or between the main contractor and subcontractor. Therefore, the client and main 
contractor relationship was in essence transactionally-based. 
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To start piling works early, as required by the client, Build Gamma procured the piling 
project and appointed Found Gamma while preparing the first-stage bid. Intense 
interactions at an early stage signalled a type of value co-creation – the co-producing of 
value propositions. Build Gamma succeeded at the first stage and was awarded a 
Preconstruction Agreement (PCA) under Joint Contracts Tribunal 2011 (JCT 2011). The 
standard PCA under JCT 2011 does not contain provisions describing a two-stage pricing 
process or pre-agreement of the contractor’s profit and overheads in advance of its 
second-stage tender. The client has no obligation to accept the second-stage tender of the 
preferred main contractor. This leaves a considerable scope for misunderstandings and 
disagreements that can influence the client-main contractor relationship and potentially 
supply chain relationships as well. 
After winning the PCA, Build Gamma started preconstruction services such as site 
management, traffic management and enabling works while preparing the second-stage 
bid with Found Gamma. The client paid a monthly management fee to Build Gamma. 
Meanwhile, Build Gamma and Found Gamma negotiated and signed the piling contract. 
The piling contract was under JCT 2011 and had a lump sum price, which would be 
included in the main contract if Build Gamma was awarded the contract at the second 
stage. A lump sum contract transfers risks to the supply chain and can cause conflicts of 
interests that negatively influence trust, trustworthiness and value co-creation.  
At the second stage, Alliance Property and Build Gamma could not reach an agreement 
on price and the main contract was back to single-stage procurement in September 2016. 
Build Gamma re-tendered along with a number of new bidders; none of them could offer 
the price expected by the client. Failing to pass the second stage and losing the main 
contract caused uncertainties for Build Gamma and fluctuation of the client and main 
contractor relationship, which can influence the relationship with supply chain members. 
Alliance Property and Build Gamma agreed on an extension of the PCA to manage the 
piling works and preconstruction services until a main contractor was appointed. 
However, at the time of piling completion, the main contract remained unsettled  
Organisational systems 
The parent organisation, Gamma UK, is governed through a UK board, executive 
management team and senior management. The organisational structure comprises nine 
units operating in different sectors, each having its own managing director and leadership 
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team. Build Gamma and Found Gamma as internal units of Gamma UK shared common 
systems, procedures and standards such as finance, health and safety, environment and 
communications, which can facilitate joint activities and communication between sister 
companies and mitigate the potential for trust erosion due to conflicts of practices.  
However, apart from sharing some resources from enabling functions, Found Gamma was 
relatively independent with other operating units as main contractors, such as Build 
Gamma. Found Gamma and Build Gamma had different business, profit goals and 
organisational structures. Found Gamma needed to bid as an external subcontractor for 
Build Gamma’s project. In this sense, the relationship between Build Gamma and Found 
Gamma was inter-organisational at the project and programme levels. The organisational 
structure that separates internal businesses to achieve cost efficiency causes discontinuity 
of internal relationships. Furthermore, the hierarchical relationship as the structure of 
domination – that is, the mobilisation of internal relationship to allocate resources instead 
of trust relationship – can hinder the structuration of trust. 
In order to fully utilise its collective knowledge and experience across operating sectors, 
Gamma UK promoted a ‘One Gamma’ policy to encourage service integration between 
internal units. This enabled Gamma UK to provide non-stop solutions in order to increase 
its competence and reputation. As ‘One Gamma’ is dispersed within the organisation and 
continuously communicated between actors, it can influence actors’ interpretations such 
as the meaning of internal relationship, ways of utilising internal resources and the 
intention of collaborating with internal companies. In other words, organisational policy 
sets up a rule of signification that can affect the structuration of trust. On the other hand, 
actors’ interpretations are also affected by their own experiences in interactions, in which 
trust might develop or erode.  
At the middle management level, directors of Build Gamma and Found Gamma had 
biannual business-to-business (B2B) meetings. Routines between internal units provided 
opportunities for regular communication, developing relationships and co-creation of 
value between sister companies.  
8.2.3 The shadow of the past 
The most recent project the two companies delivered before Gamma was project Lemon. 
Both parties perceived the experience of project Lemon as negative. The potential for 
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conflicts and trust erosion was embedded by the time project Lemon started. The start 
date was delayed for nearly one year because of the delay in demolishing the previous 
structure. Although Found Gamma and Build Gamma spent a lot of time together to co-
produce value propositions, jointly agreeing and understanding project requirements and 
contract terms, for instance, when the project started, the original project teams on both 
sides were moved to other projects. Inconsistency caused the loss of shared understanding 
of the project and ties at the micro-level. The new Build Gamma project team had recently 
joined Gamma UK from an external company, and the management approach was 
transactional in a sense that Found Gamma was treated as an external subcontractor. This 
caused disappointment and the perception of inequity on Found Gamma’s side, which 
can reduce the motivation for value co-creation. As the project manager of Found Gamma 
commented, the Build Gamma project team was “not [as] good as a ‘One Gamma’ 
manager”.  
Furthermore, the lump sum main contract did not include the risk of demolition delay, 
meaning that Build Gamma could not be compensated by the client for the loss of time. 
In order to make up the time delay and mitigate the risk of delay, Build Gamma changed 
Found Gamma’s programme and forced Found Gamma to accept it, in the name of 
Gamma UK – that is, mobilising a hierarchical relationship as the authoritative resource 
to control the other party. From the perspective of Found Gamma, the changed 
programme was impractical and inefficient, but their voice was neglected. The lack of 
communication caused a series of problems that negatively influenced the service 
experience and mutual trust.  
During execution, a highly transactional approach was employed in that programmes 
were frequently changed and imposed on subcontractors to achieve short-term efficiency, 
even at the expense of long-term effectiveness. The causes of underperformance and 
effective solutions in the long term were largely ignored by Build Gamma in the face of 
the tight programme. The transactional approach to managing the project indicates the 
structure of domination was allocative-resource-based; that is, resource allocation 
according to cost efficiency. For instance, Build Gamma repeatedly asked Found Gamma 
to add an additional piling rig to accelerate production. From the perspective of Found 
Gamma, increasing resources and equipment was unhelpful and the root cause of delay 
was insufficient working area. From the perspective of Build Gamma, Found Gamma was 
uncooperative and unable to achieve programmes, so they had to control the programmes 
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by themselves. At this point, value was non-created in interactions in that neither party 
could reach a better value proposition and plan for value co-creation.  
The use of power to transfer risks and liabilities caused resistance on Found Gamma’s 
side. Power use and resistance formed a vicious cycle that ultimately led to an adversarial 
relationship and atmosphere. 
…if there’s any issues, problems, then [Build Gamma] were very much, “It’s your 
issue you sort it out. Come back with the solution.” …They apparently watched 
us very closely… When there was a problem, it’s quite negative... it was more 
hostile… 
(Project engineer, Found Gamma) 
Trust rapidly erodes in a hostile environment where constant changes, misunderstandings 
and underperformance result in suspicion and blame.  
Communication eventually became contractual and the focus was “just to execute 
obligations” (Project manager, Lemon). Both parties increasingly referred to the contract 
and formalised everything to safeguard their own interests. However, claims and requests 
were repeatedly questioned, denied and unsolved. Value was co-destroyed at this point. 
The process of value co-creation, non-creation and co-destruction in project Lemon was 
associated with the worsening relationship between Build Gamma and Found Gamma.  
When project Lemon was completed, Build Gamma and Found Gamma were in extensive 
disputes, which were unresolved by the time the new project Gamma started. Build 
Gamma charged Found Gamma 25% of the contract value for delay whereas Found 
Gamma asked for compensation for additional works resulting from changed 
programmes. The relationship at the organisation level was exacerbated by financial 
disputes.  
In the biannual B2B meeting in March 2015, directors of the two parties supported their 
own project teams and could not reach a shared understanding of problems and 
responsibilities. As the operations manager of Found Gamma said, they wanted to “cut 
ties” with each other. The internal relationship complicated the issue as the two 
companies could not use legal orders to resolve their disputes. Ultimately, the issue was 
raised for investigation at the Gamma UK board level. The executive management team 
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urged Build Gamma and Found Gamma to minimise the negative influences on future 
business.  
8.2.4 Case analysis 
Conditions for trust 
The experience of project Lemon negatively influenced the relationship and trust between 
Build Gamma and Found Gamma. Specifically, the difficult experiences of working with 
each other and resolving financial issues with an internal company increased perceived 
risks of interdependence and lowered the expectation in future business. The delayed 
programme and financial loss also reduced expectations in Found Gamma’s capability to 
complete a contract to the minimum requirements.  
The parent organisation, Gamma UK, influenced trust in two ways. First, it promoted 
interactions between Build Gamma and Found Gamma in order to repair the relationship 
at the organisation level after project Lemon. Additionally, routines between internal 
units such as the biannual business-to-business (B2B) director meeting provided 
opportunities for joint learning from the past. 
But the effectiveness was constrained by the current organisational structure. The 
organisational structure of Gamma UK separated Found Gamma’s business from other 
functional units’ and allowed the contractual obligations to dominate the in-house 
relationship. 
[Found Gamma] have to be careful because they work for other clients, so they 
work for other contractors. So, there has to be a balance, or otherwise other 
contractors will never ask them to price the work… And there’s a fine balance of 
what they do. And it’s the same for us. If we are doing pilling and we ask other 
piling contractors to quote for us… if we are not seen to be… reasonable, then 
other piling contractors won’t price for [Build Gamma], and we won’t become 
possibly competitive. So, you have to balance that.  
(Project director, Build Gamma) 
The autonomy of internal units’ business, though it seemed to mitigate complacency and 
maintain the competence of in-house service, encouraged main contractor units such as 
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Build Gamma to capture short-term profits, even if it was at the expense of long-term 
benefit across projects. Furthermore, the transactional approach at the organisation level 
promoted discreteness and transactional practices at the project level. The long-term 
benefits from trusting and well-structured relations between internal relations were 
largely ignored at both levels.  
From the perspective of Found Gamma, this form of organisation induced a sense of 
insecurity at the organisation level. 
It is a very contractual and transactional relationship. It shouldn’t be, but it is... 
And, because we are the subcontractor, we are always at the bottom of the food 
chain. 
(Project director, Found Gamma) 
Such insecurity can lead to a transactional approach at the organisation level, as well as a 
defensive attitude and safeguarding behaviour, which prevent value co-creating activities.  
The structure further constrained the implementation of the ‘One Gamma’ policy that was 
supposed to encourage service integrations and continuous relationships between internal 
units. Under the current organisational structure, and particularly after project Lemon, 
actors from Found Gamma perceived 'One Gamma' as a rhetoric of using their resources 
to facilitate other units as main contractors. To look better as a whole, Gamma UK’s 
management might try out of self-interest to capture Found Gamma’s profit but not 
adequately pay them. Found Gamma’s project manager in the Lemon project made the 
following observation, 
And when we said that in the first place it couldn’t be done in 14 weeks but 16 
weeks, they didn’t believe us. They said, “As a [Gamma UK] company you need 
to first assist this.” But when we couldn’t complete this they said, “You are 
[Found Gamma] and we are [Build Gamma]”. 
Contractual relations dominating in-house relations generated the perception of 
unfairness at the project and organisation levels of Found Gamma, which can dramatically 
hinder the development of relationship and trust 
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Interactions 
The middle management failed to establish shared learning and invoke actions to exploit 
the past for future benefits. Directors lacked first-hand experience in the project, and thus 
belief in the other party’s competence and intentions was hard to form. As a consequence, 
directors avoided rather than dealt with problems.  
The last one [B2B director meeting] was a little bit like this [gesture: two fists 
against each other]. Because [the Lemon project] was still very current. So, there 
was a lot of talk about [the Lemon project]. People got annoyed, and their voices 
started rising. But we moved on and talked about other things. 
(Project director, Found Gamma) 
Cognitively, both parties denied their own mistakes. Behavioural learning from project 
Lemon was more about building safeguards than exploiting past experiences to better 
future collaboration. Learning from the past therefore was not constructive to building 
trust or value co-creation. 
Initial trust 
The above analysis indicates a very low degree of competence and intention trust due to 
the experience of project Lemon.  
So, at the very beginning of the job [Project Gamma], there was some resistance 
from [Build Gamma] to use us because of [the Lemon project]. And it took some 
higher-level people to say, “No, [Found Gamma] is our in-house company. We 
can’t dismiss them because of [the Lemon project]. We have to fix it and move 
on.” 
(Project director, Found Gamma) 
Service interactions relied on the hierarchical initiative of the parent organisation and 
routines between sister companies, which were obligation-based.  
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8.3 Procurement and preconstruction stage 
8.3.1 Piling procurement 
The main contract for Gamma was open to two-stage tendering in August 2015. To satisfy 
the client’s requirement to start piling early, in October 2015, Build Gamma invited 
Found Gamma and other two piling contractors for competitive tendering. The low level 
of trust at the front end influenced actors’ interpretations of each other. It is evident that 
inviting Found Gamma was regarded by Build Gamma as an obligation between internal 
units of Gamma UK under the ‘One Gamma’ policy. Most interviewees specifically 
stressed that appointing Found Gamma was because they offered the lowest price and 
Build Gamma would “treat them again as a subcontractor in terms of the contract” 
(Commercial manager, Build Gamma). 
8.3.2 First-stage main bid submission 
After Build Gamma had selected Found Gamma, the two companies formally engaged 
with each other at the organisation level to jointly develop the main bid. On Found 
Gamma’s side, this stage included the project director, bid manager and bid team. On 
Build Gamma’s side, the project director and his project team were involved at this stage. 
Early involvement to co-produce value propositions and the potential core offering, which 
is a type of value co-creation, can facilitate trust development. Found Gamma’s actors for 
project Gamma were largely the same as for project Lemon, whereas Build Gamma’s 
team was totally different. Therefore, there was the potential that Found Gamma’s project 
team would be more influenced by project Lemon than Build Gamma’s team. 
Found Gamma delivered services for a number of buildings near building Gamma and 
had information about ground conditions and relationships with the key stakeholder, City 
Ltd. Based on previous experience and information, Found Gamma optimised the main 
bid, which helped Build Gamma win the first stage. The process and outcome of early 
involvement demonstrated Found Gamma’s competence, which could cancel the 
suspension of competence trust due to project Lemon and induce the perception of 
trustworthiness.  
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8.3.3 Contract negotiation 
Build Gamma and Found Gamma started to negotiate the contract after Build Gamma 
signed the PCA. Learning from project Lemon, contract negotiation was more about 
building safeguards, especially on Found Gamma’s side. 
I think maybe the only thing perhaps carried from [the project Lemon] was that 
we did very clearly defend our programme at very early stages, the contract 
negotiation. We defended our position quite strongly and even when we were 
pushed to perhaps give up a little time... we made it clear on day one that the 
programme was the programme we submitted with the contract. 
(Operations manager, Found Gamma) 
The defensive attitude and behaviour indicate Found Gamma’s insecurity in collaborating 
with Build Gamma, which can hinder service interactions and value co-creation.  
Found Gamma refused any changes in their programme when the client asked to shorten 
the duration. At this point, Build Gamma supported Found Gamma and obtained the 
client’s approval to stick to Found Gamma’s programme, a manifestation of competence 
trust in Found Gamma resulted from early involvement. Moreover, the two-stage 
procurement caused a more equitable supply chain relationship in contract negotiation. 
…we probably got a better deal than we normally would do, because there’s a 
possibility that we might have to do the piling for somebody else. So, our tender 
has to be capable [of] being accepted by another main contractor. So [Build 
Gamma] couldn’t impose their own conditions on us because that might be what 
somebody else wouldn’t want. So, we were in a position to negotiate a better 
subcontract on [project Gamma] than we might be generally. 
 (Bid manager, Found Gamma) 
The piling contract was therefore jointly determined, which reduced the perception of 
inequity on the supply chain’s side and can increase the reciprocity of value propositions. 
Co-creation started to grow, which paves the way to trust and for trustworthiness. 
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8.3.4 Piling design and preconstruction 
On the other hand, the two parties started to co-produce the piling design. At the micro-
level, the operations manager and project manager of Found Gamma started to be 
involved at this stage, which can create consistent ties between the preconstruction and 
execution stages. Consistency can prevent the loss of shared meanings and furnish a sense 
of familiarity in order to facilitate service interactions and trust at the meso-level. Joint 
activities increased at the organisation level. The two parties had risk workshops where 
designers and managers identified risks and identified solutions together. Co-creation 
optimised the potential core offering but also mutual learning about each other. For 
instance, based on ground information from past experiences, Found Gamma reduced the 
number of possible clashes and associated costs. Through the shared experience of 
developing the main bid and design, competence trust in Found Gamma increased, which 
can be inferred by Build Gamma’s decision to involve Found Gamma in the client 
meetings and explain their design and technical solutions directly to the client. 
Build Gamma assisted Found Gamma’s site preparation and welfare, which was 
perceived as a signal of goodwill on Found Gamma’s side.  
[Build Gamma] were able to say, “Right we will go back to the client and get 
some more money for you to help pay for the welfare as well as these two cabinets.” 
They take all the stuff on the walkways around here to help the architecture… It’s 
good. It’s a suggestion of goodwill almost. But it helps build a good working 
relationship with them. 
(Project manager, Found Gamma) 
Perceived goodwill of the organisation can induce the perceived reliability of the main 
contractor and thereby reduce safeguarding on the supply chain’s side.  
8.3.5 Case analysis 
Conditions for trust 
The policy and practice of the parent organisation helped maintain interactions between 
Build Gamma and Found Gamma under disputes, such as inviting Found Gamma for 
competitive tendering. Nevertheless, the shadow of the past kept influencing current 
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interactions. Perceived risks in collaboration resulting from project Lemon induced a 
transactional approach to managing relationships with sister companies. To safeguard 
their own profits, both parties limited relational factors in future service interactions and 
maintained discreteness from each other.  
The two-stage procurement for the main contract provided opportunities for intense 
interactions and co-creation at an early stage. As discussed in the next subsection, 
although primarily to co-produce the core offering and increase cost efficiency, they 
learned about the project as well as each other in the shared experience. Increased 
knowledge mitigated perceived risks and opportunism, induced the perception of 
trustworthiness and can encourage trustworthy behaviour in future interactions. 
Moreover, the two-stage procurement helped balance the power relation between the 
main contractor and subcontractor. Although the mobilisation of power depends on 
agency, a more balanced power relation constrains the opportunity for imposing control 
on others against their wishes and thereby creates a better condition for trust development. 
On the other hand, a more balanced power relation encouraged co-determination of 
contract terms and conditions between the main contractor and subcontractor, which is a 
co-creating activity. Co-determination can reduce the probability of conflicts due to 
ambiguity and misunderstanding and lead to reciprocal value propositions. In this vein, 
two-stage procurement induced a more equitable supply chain relationship and co-
creating opportunity, which raised the perception of equity and alleviated the sense of 
insecurity on Found Gamma’s side.  
Interactions 
Trust as a rule of signification was generated in shared experiences, mostly enabled by 
structures of service ecosystems such as the two-stage procurement, organisational policy 
and routines. On Found Gamma’s side, they demonstrated their specialist knowledge, 
skills and resources in helping the main bid development and piling design. Through 
Found Gamma’s technical solutions and advice, Build Gamma learnt about Found 
Gamma’s specialist capabilities, although this was not an intended consequence. On 
Build Gamm’s side, they signalled their goodwill by supporting Found Gamma’s 
programme and welfare, which reduced Found Gamma’s perception of insecurity in 
collaboration. 
186 
Value co-creation in these shared experiences was self-interested. From the perspective 
of Build Gamma, involving Found Gamma early on was done to use Found Gamma’s 
resources, including ground information, technical knowledge and established 
relationships with City Ltd., to increase their own competitiveness as perceived by City 
Ltd. and reduce the risk of disturbing underground operations.  
It’s a benefited asset to [Build Gamma] … it’s just an asset to have to win jobs… 
We can use them to help for the technical systems… to pass on the risk.  
(Commercial manager, Build Gamma) 
Found Gamma was perceived as an operand resource to be profited from. From the 
perspective of Found Gamma, being involved in the main bid development was to direct 
the main contract content to its own interests, increasing profits and reducing risks in the 
project.  
Despite the self-interested orientations, competence trust increased reflexively as Found 
Gamma helped improve the value proposition. As commented by the project director of 
Build Gamma: 
…they did give us advice on the logistics and programme, which we used in our 
first-stage tender submission. So, we put that information in our first-stage tender 
submission… [Found Gamma] are very educated. So, they understand risks 
more… [In contract negotiation] [Found Gamma] would ask searching questions. 
At the end of the day, it is good because it protects everybody. 
Found Gamma’s competence, past experiences in the local area and relationships with 
City Ltd. ‘protect’ Build Gamma, indicating the emergence of security and competence 
trust. In shared experiences, knowledge about the project and the other party accumulate 
that can generate the perception of trustworthiness and enhance service use in subsequent 
interactions. 
The phenomenon of trust 
The above analysis demonstrated that, through the shared experience of co-producing 
value propositions and the potential core offering, competence trust in Found Gamma 
increased. Competence trust developed to the extent that Build Gamma was confident in 
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Found Gamma’s specialist capability to complete project Gamma to the requirements. 
The perception of competence motivated Build Gamma to consult with Found Gamma, 
share informational resources and involve Found Gamma in the client meeting. They were 
also responsive to Found Gamma’s requirements and needs due to their trust in Found 
Gamma’s knowledge and judgement. In other words, collaborating with Found Gamma 
reduced Build Gamma’s perceived external risks. 
Nevertheless, interdependence was perceived as necessary for successful project delivery 
but maintained at the level of being sufficient to complete the contract, within which 
behavioural risk was minimal and worth taking. This perception was shaped by the past 
experiences but also the organisational structure. Build Gamma was able to use the 
hierarchical relationship as an authoritative resource to use Found Gamma’s resources 
and the contractual relationship to achieve cost efficiency. In other words, the 
structuration of trust perception was influenced by the structure of domination at a higher 
level of service ecosystems. 
Trust was largely self-interested in that the expectation on Found Gamma was to “push 
back as much as in [the] main contract to subcontractors to pass on the risk” 
(Commercial manager, Build Gamma). Found Gamma was perceived as an operand 
resource to be profited from. The relationship at this stage was essentially transactional 
and unstable.  
The value of trust 
Competence trust increased the intensity of communication as Build Gamma shared 
information and consulted Found Gamma more frequently. The density of 
communication also increased in that Build Gamma involved Found Gamma in the 
meetings with the client, which further increased the effectiveness of service 
communication among multiple organisations in project Gamma. Enquiring, sharing and 
involving the supply chain in the client meetings indicated an increase in co-creating 
activities that were emergent and intensified with the quality of relationship, hence trust. 
Service communication therefore became more informative. From the perspective of 
Build Gamma, Found Gamma increased the knowledge about the ground condition and 
project risks. The opportunity for direct communication with the client, from the 
perspective of Found Gamma, enabled them to obtain quality information about the 
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project and build relationships with the client. The client was also able to be better 
informed about risks and technical solutions. More informative experiences enabled 
project actors to optimise value propositions that were reciprocal and potentially brought 
about a good project. On the other hand, shared understanding among multiple 
organisations as the service outcome at this stage can realise value in use in the execution 
phase. 
8.4 Execution stage 
8.4.1 Secant wall delivery 
The piling project started in June 2016. On Build Gamma’s side, the project director and 
team were consistent between the preconstruction and execution stages; on Found 
Gamma’s side, the project director, operations manager and project manager remained in 
the project. Consistent ties at the organisation and project levels can help maintain shared 
understanding. Found Gamma’s project manager can transfer shared meanings co-created 
at the organisation level to the project team.  
Project processes and procedures were structured. At the project level, supervisors jointly 
agreed daily reports and diaries. Project managers and engineers had weekly progress 
meetings on site to co-produce weekly programmes, resource plans, and risk assessment 
and method statements. Found Gamma also used rolling accounts to evaluate and predict 
the final account after each change and informed Build Gamma about their prediction. In 
this way, both parties jointly monitored project progress and dealt with issues 
immediately rather than leaving matters to the final account. Found Gamma’s operations 
manager met Build Gamma’s project manager fortnightly. At the organisation level, 
project directors of both parties were also scheduled to meet regularly. As actors follow 
formal procedures and processes in delivering the project, they can form shared 
understanding of roles and responsibilities and gain a sense of security in operations, 
which help maintain the level of trust. The regular actor-to-actor (A2A) communication 
can also build new ties and familiarity at the micro-level. In addition, as sister companies 
with shared systems and standards, Found Gamma and Build Gamma carried out a joint 
inspection on Health & Safety (H&S) and environmental issues, another shared 
experience enabled by the internal relation. Through direct and indirect interactions, 
Build Gamma learned that Found Gamma were able to achieve programmes and develop 
effective technical solutions, which can increase competence trust. 
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Yet, Build Gamma had little experiential and reflexive learning about Found Gamma’s 
actions, which is evident in Build Gamma’s insecurity when Found Gamma did not 
provide them with enough information. 
Sometimes, we don’t actually know how much float is in the programme… You 
don’t get a straight answer. That’s the thing they don’t tell you. I can’t 
understand… why you have a float in the programme. Is it because [a] machine 
breaks down? Things become unforeseen in some circumstances. 
(Project manager, Build Gamma) 
Lacking intended and unintended learning in direct interactions, actors and organisations 
could hardly form faith in each other. Relationships tended to become unstable when 
uncertainties occurred. 
8.4.2 Second-stage main bid submission 
In September 2016, as the client and Build Gamma could not reach an agreement on price, 
the main contract was back to tender. While delivering the piling works, Found Gamma 
and Build Gamma started to develop the main bid again. Apart from technical knowledge, 
Found Gamma used established relations to initiate relationships between Build Gamma 
and City Ltd. The relationship with City Ltd. was especially important for Build Gamma 
because City Ltd. was also the key stakeholder for their next project. Going the extra mile 
like this can induce the perception of benevolence. 
Nevertheless, Build Gamma failed the retendering. Although disappointed by the result, 
Build Gamma agreed to extend the PCA until piling was completed. To save costs, Build 
Gamma reduced resources at both organisation and project levels and only maintained 
key actors at the project level. Both project directors withdrew from project Gamma and 
delegated the management of the project to project managers, which weakened the link 
between project and organisation levels. This implies a transactional approach at the 
organisation level that can influence project-level trust and value co-creation between 
Build Gamma and Found Gamma. 
Despite resource reduction, Build Gamma and Found Gamma developed solidarity at the 
project level. They co-produced solutions and claims to ensure both parties’ interests. The 
goals were aligned and the responsibility in project delivery was clear. Specifically, 
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Found Gamma delivered the piling works in a more self-sufficient way while Build 
Gamma dealt with client-facing issues. This manifests the use value of shared 
understanding as a service outcome in service interactions.  
8.4.3 Case analysis 
Conditions for trust 
The shared systems and common knowledge about procedures and standards enabled 
joint activities between the sister companies.  
We do rely on them to do a good job, and we trust them to deal with what they are 
supposed to do in terms of quality, H&S, everything else… because you know they 
are… [Gamma UK], they follow the same standard as we follow, we rely on them 
to make sure that if there are procedures to follow… they will do it. We rely on 
them to do it. 
 (Construction manager, Build Gamma) 
With joint inspection, actors were able to identify, understand and solve project issues in 
A2A interactions, hence reducing misunderstanding and the perception of opportunism. 
The role of internal relations was two-fold here. On the one hand, the internal relation 
reduced perceived risks in collaboration and thus supported the virtuous cycle of 
competence trust and value co-creation. 
But then that risk would be less because it’s [Found Gamma], not supposed to be 
another third-party piling contractor. So, you should imagine that the risk is going 
to be less there. Because [the] two companies have a better relationship. [We] 
talk to each other and sort out the problems we are getting. If the situation was 
with another company, they wouldn’t have the same relationship.  
(Construction manager, Build Gamma) 
On the other hand, the belief in the internal relation substituted intention trust.  
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Because I know it’s [Found Gamma] …they follow the same standards as I do. I 
trust that he is doing the job that I would normally do… I don’t do as much 
checking things as I normally do because we are [Gamma UK] together.  
(Construction manager, Build Gamma) 
Found Gamma was seen as not opportunistic because of the internal relation and 
associated obligation. Yet, experiential and reflexive learning about Found Gamma’s 
intentions was not evident. Without intention trust, collectives of actors could hardly form 
faith in each other. Relationships tended to become unstable when uncertainties occurred. 
This was evident in circumstances where Found Gamma had incomplete information.  
A tension was embedded in the internal relation. On the one side was the ‘One Gamma’ 
policy that promoted value co-creating activities between sister companies; on the other 
side was the organisation structure of Gamma UK that facilitated cost-efficient activities. 
Such a tension put co-creating at the project and organisation levels to chance, largely 
depending on agency, as the project manager of Found Gamma commented: “when it 
works, it works.” In essence, as implied previously (see 8.3.5, subsection ‘the 
phenomenon of trust’), injecting market elements into internal relationships formed a two-
fold structure of domination in the relationship between Build Gamma and Found 
Gamma, the structure of allocative resource (market) and of hierarchical relationship as 
authoritative resource, which can compete with the structuration of trust as a resource of 
domination. 
The ‘One Gamma’ policy helped sustain the bounded solidarity after Build Gamma lost 
the main contract. As discussed in the next subsection, the withdraw of resources at 
organisation and project levels motivated Build Gamma to build closer collaboration with 
Found Gamma in order to protect their collective benefits from the client. 
They push hard with the [‘One Gamma’] approach… But really, we are instructed 
to rely on them… There’s a message that we are one [Gamma UK] and we should 
be working together all the time. It shouldn’t get to that contractual way.  
(Site engineer, Build Gamma) 
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‘One Gamma’ brought about norms sanctioning the use of legal orders against sister 
companies. Although driven by self-interests, bounded solidarity can drive shared 
intentions and social orientations.  
In addition, the loss of the main contract mitigated the potential conflicts of interests under 
a lump sum main contract, such as cost and programme, which formed a working 
environment of less financial and time pressure and therefore a positive condition for 
developing common goals and value co-creation.  
Interactions 
Staffing at the organisation and project levels ensured consistency between the 
procurement and preconstruction and execution stages. Ties, familiarity and shared 
understanding at the micro-level facilitated service interactions at the project level, which 
laid a good foundation for trust and trustworthiness. 
Before second-stage main bid submission, competence trust was generated in regular 
formal interactions from the project level to the organisation level. Formal interactions 
enabled monitoring and shared experiences. Monitoring project tasks and performance 
induced the perception of trustworthiness as Found Gamma achieved programmes and 
reduced external risks. Also, the shared experience of jointly developing the main bid for 
retendering, in which Found Gamma helped Build Gamma establish relationships with 
City Ltd. and provided solutions satisfactory to the client and City Ltd., increased 
competence trust. This way of interaction, as it improved service experiences and co-
created outcomes beneficial for future serve use, was reproduced and gradually 
routinised, embedding competence trust in the relationship between Build Gamma and 
Found Gamma. In other words, competence trust and value co-creation formed a virtuous 
cycle where competence trust served as the medium and outcome of value co-creation.  
After Build Gamma’s failure in the main bid, its transactional approach at the organisation 
level changed the structure of domination at the project level. In essence, reducing 
resources at organisation and project levels is to use Found Gamma’s resources at the 
project level in order to save its own costs and reallocate resources at the programme 
level. In doing so, Build Gamma can increase profits at the programme level.  
In the face of reducing resources and on the basis of the internal relationship, bounded 
solidarity formed between Build Gamma and Found Gamma at the project level.  
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[Internal relationship] A bit better with collaborating… kind of against the 
client… working together to make sure that both companies are achieving as 
much as they can and not making any mistakes that are going to affect the other 
company. 
(Construction manager, Build Gamma) 
Bounded solidarity meant that Build Gamma and Found Gamma formed shared intentions 
of protecting their collective benefits from the client. Bounded solidarity was driven by 
the recognition of their own powerlessness relative to the client and the economic return 
from collaborating with each other. As mentioned, the ‘One Gamma’ policy helped 
maintain solidarity by constraining the use of contractual mechanisms.  
Social orientations emerged as actors were concerned with their mutual benefits; the aim 
was to co-create value with the other party. 
[Build Gamma] as a company on this site, they have been very helpful and 
supportive. And they really try to understand what it is, what we really do, what 
we need… we do our best to be helpful, and they do their best to be helpful. 
(Project engineer, Found Gamma) 
The above quote also indicates the emergence of reciprocity in service interactions. 
Although reciprocity at this stage was in an economic sense – that is, expecting balance 
of the exchange within the project lifecycle – contractual elements were mitigated in the 
interactions.  
Also, the trust relationship started to be structured as an authoritative resource of 
domination at the project level – that is, allocating resources based on trust relations per 
se, rather than in-house or hierarchical relations. The co-creating of value emerged, as 
collectives of actors formed social orientations. Bounded solidarity and economic 
reciprocity supported the reproduction of value co-creating and hence competence trust 
and trust relations as facilities of obtaining resources; the more trust-based service 
reproduced, the more trust embedded in the relationship. In short, the process of 
structuring trust as a rule of signification and resource of domination reinforced value co-
creation and vice versa. 
194 
The phenomenon of trust 
Competence trust as a rule of signification was reinforced and encouraged more enquiries 
and information sharing with Found Gamma. On the other hand, the structuration of 
intention trust was still hindered by the two-fold structure of domination in the 
relationship between Build Gamma and Found Gamma, namely the structure of allocative 
resource (market) and of hierarchical relationship as authoritative resource. Relying on 
the internal relation constrained the development of intention trust and a sense of 
insecurity can emerge in the face of uncertainties, as in the case of incomplete 
information.  
Build Gamma’s loss of the main contract and reduction of resources changed the structure 
of domination at the project level. In forming and sustaining bounded solidarity to ensure 
collective benefits, social orientations and economic reciprocity emerged and promoted 
the structuration of trust as an authoritative resource of domination. The structuring of 
trust as a resource of domination enabled the delegation of authority to the supply chain 
in value co-creation, manifested in the increasing flexibility for Found Gamma. The 
effectiveness of value co-creation in turn led to the development of intention trust. In 
other words, trust as a resource of domination can influence trust as a rule of signification. 
Socially-oriented trust started to emerge as Build Gamma became concerned with mutual 
benefits in the service provision. Under social orientations, piling programmes, solutions 
and claims were jointly developed and were reciprocal to both parties. Build Gamma took 
on the responsibility for obtaining the client’s approval and dealing with stakeholder 
issues so that Found Gamma were able to focus on technical issues and operations. 
The value of trust 
Trust as a resource of domination delegated authority to the supply chain. From the 
perspective of Found Gamma, delegation of authority signalled trust and raised the belief 
that Build Gamma would take the responsibility in the project delivery rather than blame 
or transfer liability. Such belief increased Found Gamma’s confidence in service 
communication, as mentioned by their project manager, 
The best thing is to do is to sit down and chat with people. Surprises tend to be 
where conflicts come when people are surprised [at] what is happening or not 
happening. So, continue to speak to the other company to update our progress… 
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Because we have a good relationship with them, we are very open and honest to 
say, “This is our contract, programme and date. We think we can finish on this 
date instead of by doing this and this.” 
Found Gamma became more proactive in giving advice, which enhanced service 
experiences and potentially led to better core offerings. Also, frequent communication 
mitigated conflicts and “surprises about what is happening or not happening” (Project 
manager, Found Gamma), thus reinforcing shared intentions and bounded solidarity. In 
this vein, value co-creation became intensified with the development of trust.  
Furthermore, enhanced service communication generated knowledge and relationships 
that can lever value for future service use. From the perspective of Build Gamma, 
knowledge about City Ltd. could be reused in the next project in which City Ltd. was the 
key stakeholder. From the perspective of Found Gamma, they built relationships with the 
client that can bring about future business. 
Lastly, the use of trust relations reduced contractual mechanisms and suspending 
judgements in uncertainties. Resource integration became more flexible and the project 
became more absorptive and adaptive to changes and uncertainties.  
8.5 Completion stage 
At the project level, the collaborative way of interactions in which Found Gamma took 
the responsibility for delivering the contents and Build Gamma dealt with the client was 
routinised. Despite giving Found Gamma more flexibility in their operations, perceived 
risks reduced, and few contractual mechanisms were used at this stage.  
The virtuous cycle of trust and value co-creating enabled more joint activities not only to 
resolve project-specific tasks but also to help each other’s future projects. At the project 
level, Found Gamma engineers introduced Build Gamma to different types of pile and 
the requirements for their operations. Build Gamma shared their knowledge and 
experience as a main contractor to help the future business of Found Gamma where the 
client required Found Gamma to act as the main contractor and deliver integrated 
solutions including piling and temporary works. 
The project-level performance and relationship further improved the relationship at the 
organisation level. By the end of project Gamma, Found Gamma and Build Gamma had 
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secured future business with each other, an outcome of value co-creating activities. 
Furthermore, Build Gamma invited Found Gamma’s project directors to their internal 
directors’ forum in order to increase mutual understanding, produce better collaboration 
and identify potential business opportunities early. Value co-creation became intensified 
with the quality of relationship and can benefit services in the future. In other words, the 
relationship management approach at both the organisation and project levels moved 
towards the transformational side, which is based on social capital theory. 
Furthermore, the interpretation of ‘One Gamma’ changed, a service outcome of the co-
creating of value. Both parties formed a shared understanding of ‘One Gamma’ as 
openness, honesty, flexibility, listening, understanding, sharing and non-blaming. 
Piling was completed in December 2016, two weeks prior to the programme. Found 
Gamma gained a 15-25% increase in the value of the work and improved their internal 
status in Gamma UK.  
8.5.1 Case analysis 
Conditions for trust 
The shadow of the future encouraged the continuous learning at the project and firm 
levels. Learning was future-oriented so that resources gained in project Gamma might be 
reused and/or recombined in the future. Also, as discussed below, the shadow of the future 
facilitated the emergence of social reciprocity in the service interactions. 
The organisational routines and practices between internal units, such as director forum 
and B2B director meetings, facilitated the reinforcing and transferring of the project-level 
relationship to the organisation level. 
Interactions 
Familiarity, reciprocity and competence trust promoted sharing learning at the micro-
level, not only to resolve project-specific tasks. As mentioned above, learning was future-
oriented. The shared experience of mutual enquiring and learning strengthened perceived 
competence and integrity.  
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Future-oriented interactions, such as service exchanges for future business and project 
director forum, indicated an element of social reciprocity in the service provision. As 
mentioned by the project director of Found Gamma, 
What we expect is certainly to be approached for any job they have where they 
need piling or basement or foundations. The expectation is that at least they would 
approach us saying, “We’ve got this job. Can you help?” And I suspect conversely 
the expectation from them is that we would always do our bit to help… At least 
when these two people, [Build Gamma] and their competitor, both come to us, 
and say, “We’ve got this job”, we need to put [Build Gamma] ahead of whoever 
else. I think that’s the expectation from them. They expect us to give them the best 
service.  
Social reciprocity induces actions with no specified return within the duration of the 
current project. The balance of exchange is expected in future business. More importantly, 
social reciprocity goes beyond economic returns and includes expectations on benefits 
such as establishing status and reputations.  
The recurrent collaborative behaviour in using trust relations to allocate resources formed 
relational norms with which actors spontaneously complied. As mentioned by the 
quantity surveyor of Found Gamma, 
…I will say in any project there’s a chemistry of people managing it. So, the 
chemistry I would say is good enough to manage and establish trust… that you 
actually say what you would do. You are going to say as you do. Trust is built on 
that. You just have a far better working relationship.  
The chemistry of “say as you do” indicated that relational norms mobilised a trusting and 
trustworthy way of interactions and constrained contractual and opportunistic behaviour 
towards the other party.  
In other words, actors generated norms of conduct in the day-to-day interactions, which 
in turn formed relational control in interactions. Trust as a rule of legitimation was 
generated.  
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The phenomenon of trust 
Intention trust was structured as a rule of signification and enabled Build Gamma to 
tolerate more uncertainties. This is evident in the changing attitude of Build Gamma’s 
project manager towards Found Gamma’s missing information, which showed less 
insecurity on Build Gamma’s side.  
Using trust relations to allocate resources, together with the perception of trustworthiness, 
reduced unnecessary micromanagement and delegated more authority to Found Gamma. 
…we have full control of our own site and we’ve been able to do things and we 
order them as we want. And they kind of trust us for doing that. That’s made our 
life much, much easier. 
(Project engineer, Found Gamma) 
The perception of being trusted was reciprocated by the trustworthy behaviour of Found 
Gamma, which generated relational norms at the project level. In other words, the 
structuration of trust as a resource of domination shaped norms of behaviour, hence the 
structure of legitimation. 
Trust as a rule of legitimation encouraged trustworthy behaviour through relational 
control. As actors referred to relational norms, they were more likely to use trust as a 
mechanism for resource allocation. In this vein, trust as a rule of legitimation strengthened 
trust as a resource of domination. 
The value of trust 
As competence and intention trust maintained an open environment in which the main 
contractor, subcontractor and client shared information, service communication 
improved, not least between Build Gamma and Found Gamma. 
The client would be open to or more likely to pay and accept claims in certain 
areas. And the main contractor is able to understand where their areas are and 
where they are not. Because we are always part of their information. So, by having 
that relationship with them… [knowing] what we want to get, when we get paid, 
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and working out the mechanism to get paid. So, it’s to both our benefits. That 
comes about [from] having a good relationship with them. 
(Project manager, Found Gamma) 
Trust-based relationship and open communication at the project level strengthened shared 
intentions among all parties and enhanced the service experience of delivering outputs.  
Furthermore, shared intentions and understanding accumulated in trust-based interactions 
clarified roles and responsibilities in the co-creating of value and enabled actors to 
understand the other party and find suitable solutions more quickly. 
I think from both sides we were both quite open and honest with each other as to 
what the requirements were or what was important to the project. So, we were 
able to very quickly come to the best solution between all of us, [first] for the 
project, and second for each party, which avoids the conflict…It [good 
relationship] made an easier place to work. Everyone knew what everyone did. It 
made an enjoyable project to build. 
Resource integration and coordination became more adaptive and cohesive. Shared 
intentions and meanings at the micro-level therefore contributed to service experiences at 
the project level. The adaptive and cohesive experience was further supported by the use 
of trust relations for resource allocation that reduced redundancy in collaboration.  
Competence and intention trust also increased the confidence of the subcontractor such 
that they became spontaneous in knowledge sharing.  
We’ve always been talking with [Build Gamma] about new schemes they are 
looking at. We are helping them, trying to give them an idea what the piling will 
look like, roughly at what cost. So, they got that information… consulting with 
[Build Gamma] about other jobs we are pricing was more about the fact that 
we’ve got a good relationship now and we feel we can ask them for help. 
The depth of communication increase in that knowledge sharing was not only to solve 
problems and tasks within project Gamma but also to obtain a shared understanding of 
each other’s operations and organisation. Whereas the former improved the present 
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experience of delivering the project, the latter indicated a service outcome that can realise 
value for value co-creating in the future.  
Apart from mutual understanding, the co-creating of value and trust led to the shared 
meaning of ‘One Gamma’.  
The client is happy. [Build Gamma] are happy… because the client just sees 
[Gamma UK] here performing well… I think what this job has done is that it 
proved that we are not as bad maybe as they thought after [the Lemon project]. 
Because after [the Lemon project], they thought we were really bad and we were 
useless. They would rather not use us; they would rather use somebody else [for] 
this type of job… We proved to the doubters who still exist in [Build Gamma] that 
we can actually do this kind of work and we are competent. 
(Project director, Found Gamma) 
The identity of each other as sister companies improved relationships at the organisation 
level. Actors started to believe that the other party had goodwill not least because of the 
internal relationship; the belief was partly based on shared experiences of mutual service 
and reciprocal value propositions. 
They were very helpful… They provided all the services we needed. And when we 
asked for additional ones, they were more than helpful to do that. The money side 
is agreed; the time we needed to add is agreed as well. So, that kind of faith in the 
process happens between us. 
(Quantity surveyor, Found Gamma) 
Relationship value increased as both companies benefited more than simply delivering 
piling as an end product, which can lever value in use in future.  
In summary, case Gamma demonstrates the value of trust in an internal supply chain 
relationship. At the inter-organisational networks level, the client used two-stage 
procurement that helped promote an integrative team within the project by involving 
contractors and supply chain members early on. The shadow of the past negatively 
influenced the supply chain relationship at the individual, project and organisation levels. 
At the beginning of project Gamma, interactions at the organisation level were highly 
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structured by the internal practices and routines of the parent organisation. Nevertheless, 
the internal relation was embedded with a tension caused by the organisation structure of 
the parent organisation and negatively influenced value co-creating promoted by the 
organisational policy.  
In the theorem of duality, A2A interactions at the organisation level provided 
opportunities for mutual learning and generating competence trust. Increased knowledge 
about the project and each other was transferred to the project level through boundary 
agencies. Interactions at the project level reinforced competence trust, whereas the 
structuration of intention trust was constrained by the structure of domination at higher 
levels of the service ecosystem. The structure of the parent organisation comprised 
hierarchy relationship and contractual relationship as structures of domination, hence 
hindering the structuring of intention trust as well as trust as an authoritative resource, the 
influence of interrelations between elements of structure. 
The transactional approach on the organisation level drove Build Gamma to use Found 
Gamma’s resources to save costs in project Gamma on the one hand, and on the other 
hand increase their own profits at the programme level. The change at higher levels of the 
service ecosystem, however, drove bounded solidarity and reciprocity between the two 
parties at the project level, which promoted the structuration of trust and intensified value 
co-creation in delivering the project. In other words, value co-creation enhances as trust 
develops and the quality of the relationship improves. 
Internal routines and practices facilitated the bottom-up transferring of service outcomes 
generated at the project level, which influenced relationships and value co-creation at the 
organisation level. In this vein, case Gamma demonstrated not only top-down effects of 
higher-level structures of the ecosystem on value co-creation but also the possibility of 
transferring service outcomes at lower levers to higher levels and influencing higher-level 
events and processes including value co-creation.   
202 
Chapter 9 Cross-case analysis  
Three cases have been presented covering the processes of generating trust, the 
phenomenon of trust and the value of trust in individual case studies (see chapters 6, 7 
and 8). This chapter continues the analysis by comparing the similarities and differences 
between individual cases, presenting and consolidating findings, and building deeper 
explanations. The emergent theoretical framework provides mechanisms for 
understanding patterns of empirical findings and, by doing so, the framework is 
elaborated, refined and (re)contextualised for the research.  
From the perspective of structuration theory (Giddens, 1984), this research views trust as 
a structural property of relationship. The duality of trust means that trust is recursively 
constituted by interaction processes of actors and organisations (Sydow and Windeler, 
1998). Interactions are constrained and enabled by structures of multiple-level service 
ecosystems as well as time dimensions of past and future. The process of constituting 
trust generates, maintains or erodes the trust as a rule of signification (the interpretation 
of trustworthiness), a resource of domination (the use of trust or trust relations to facilitate 
resource allocation), and a rule of legitimation (the legitimacy of relational norms). The 
structuration of trust also relies on the mutual influence between elements of structure. In 
turn, from the lens of service-dominant logic (S-DL), trust as rules and resources 
influences service interactions, hence service experiences and outcomes. In short, the 
value of trust dynamically unfolds while interaction processes generate trust as rules and 
resources; the latter stimulates the generative mechanisms of trust in the interaction 
process. 
The analysis is structured in accordance to the research questions, which are: 
1) Whether and if so how does trust, from the main contractor to second-tier 
subcontractor, develop during service interactions between the two?  
2) Whether and if so how does trust, from the main contractor to second-tier 
subcontractor, dynamically help increase service value during service interactions 
between the two? 
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9.1 The development of trust 
9.1.1 Generative mechanisms of trust 
The data structure of the generative mechanisms of trust is shown in Figure 11. The 
analysis of individual cases through the dimensions of ‘duality’ and ‘interrelations’ 
identified various processes that structure trust as rules and resources. These processes 
were consolidated and summarised as first-order themes. Cross-case analysis then 
aggregated first-order themes into second-order themes as shown in Figure 11. The 
aggregation was bottom-up in essence but the labels of second-order themes, such as 
“routinising”, were enlightened by extant research (e.g., the relationship of trust and 
routinisation in Nooteboom, 2002). From the procurement to completion, these processes 
interacted with each other and generated trust by forming security and confidence, 
maintaining learning, and sustaining and promoting self-reinforcing cycles of trust.  
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Figure 11 Data structure: trust development 
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Learning 
Learning was the underlying process that promoted trust development. This is a mutually 
reinforcing process as learning and knowledge transfer are also initiated where there is a 
degree of trust present and may not induce defensiveness. Learning is both project-related 
and relational. To generate the perception of trustworthiness, legitimate relational norms 
and use trust relations to gain resources and co-create value, actors needed to learn about 
their partners as well as the project environment. The perception of trustworthiness could 
be a consequence of intentional learning from past experiences but also an unintended 
consequence of monitoring project performance, shared learning in joint problem solving 
and future-oriented learning that can lever value in service use. Through monitoring, 
shared learning and future-oriented learning, the perception of competence, integrity and 
benevolence emerged experientially and reflexively. 
Learning from the past took place at the front end and involved organisation levels of 
both main contractors and subcontractors. Main contractors referred to their own 
experiences, information retained in the organisational systems and their managers and 
colleagues to know about their supply chains’ financial and technical capabilities as well 
as collaborative intentions. However, learning from the past is insufficient to raise the 
perception of trustworthiness; it is also necessary to raise the willingness to take 
responsibility. Taking responsibility, particularly on supply chains’ side, demonstrated 
the commitment to the present project and relationship, which increased the sense of 
security on the main contractors’ side. In the Alpha and Beta cases, for instance, Surface 
Ltd. and Found Gamma cognitively admitted their own mistakes in the last projects and, 
behaviourally, improved their own service based on the lessons learnt. In contrast, in the 
Gamma case, both Build Gamma and Found Gamma were reluctant to accept their own 
mistakes, avoided liabilities and failed to reach shared understanding of problems in the 
project Lemon. The learning result was not to take responsibility but to adopt defensive 
attitudes and behaviour. The initial trust in the former two cases was higher than in the 
Gamma case.  
On the other hand, learning about the other party’s trustworthiness can be unintentional. 
The meaning of learning is twofold. On the surface is discursive learning, such as 
monitoring project performance and shared learning about tasks, risks and opportunities 
in joint activities. Monitoring refers to observing and reviewing project performance 
independent to the other party and implies a distance between main contractors and 
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subcontractors, which is indirect interaction in the service-dominant logic (S-DL) sense. 
In other words, the increased knowledge about subcontractors’ competence and intentions 
is not necessarily a strategic intention derived from a rational calculation. It can be an 
unintended consequence of service interactions for delivering projects. Monitoring does 
not necessarily mean distrust or a low level of trust; it is a neutral position. It is the 
negative result of monitoring, such as observed opportunistic behaviour, that erodes trust.  
Shared learning means gaining relational and technical knowledge in shared experiences, 
such as joint planning, risk identifying and problem solving – that is, direct interaction, 
or actor-to-action (A2A) interaction in S-DL. In shared learning, actors and organisations 
can express intent verbally and communicate the need for tactical action, which help 
increase mutual understanding and mitigate misunderstanding. Case findings reveal that 
the perception of competence emerged reflexively as main contractors learned through 
monitoring that subcontractors continuously achieved good performance. The perception 
of integrity and benevolence emerged experientially in shared experience in which 
subcontractors jointly resolved problems, reduced risks and went ‘the extra mile’. 
Competence trust, it was shown, can develop in indirect and direct interactions and 
intention trust mostly develops in direct interactions. 
Future-oriented learning means that actors and organisations foresee risks or 
opportunities in order to improve the status quo and lever value in future service use. At 
the front end of cases Alpha and Beta, actors and organisations foresaw risks based on 
the past experience, which demonstrated their commitment and induced the perception of 
reliability, hence the sense of security on the main contractors’ side. Future-oriented 
learning at the completion stage is driven by the shadow of the future at the organisation 
level, as identified in the cases of Alpha and Gamma. In contrast, in case Beta, the fading 
future between Office Plc. and Found Gamma discouraged continuous learning and actors 
mainly focused on project-specific tasks by the end of the project, which hindered trust 
development. 
Case findings point out that the learning process was supported by agency and ties at the 
micro-level and knowledge management systems at the organisation level. Both helped 
to an extent knowledge transfer between projects, and across hierarchical levels and 
organisation boundaries. However, both mechanisms were inconsistently used in the 
project lifecycle. At the front end, boundary agency and organisations systems helped 
create ties, familiarity, provide information and increased perceived trustworthiness at 
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organisation levels, as was the case in projects Alpha and Beta. During the execution, 
A2A interactions became weak at the organisation level and intensified at the project 
level. Future-oriented learning at the completion stage involved multiple levels, but it 
depended on the shadow of the future. In all three cases, knowledge transfer 
predominantly relied on agency and ties instead of knowledge management systems, 
which might cause the loss of the value of trust after project completion, especially if 
actors are reallocated.  
Generating foundations of trust 
To generate trust required a sense of security and confidence. Controlling is the process 
of reducing uncertainties and increasing confidence in the pursuit of value by influencing 
or maintaining influences on the behaviour of supply chains. One mechanism affording 
the ability to control is power, which is present in the market and embedded in the 
hierarchical structures of organisations. In all three case studies, power was used to 
structure positions, roles and procedures, providing formal mechanisms and connections 
that ensure regular communication and engender common knowledge between main 
contractors and supply chains. This is controlling at the structure level, which occurred at 
organisation (e.g., negotiating contract and forming strategic agreement) and project 
levels (e.g., establishing project meetings). Structural control also includes maintaining 
the same core members of project teams, communication and service quality throughout 
the project lifecycle. Expectations about formal roles and positions, the adoption of 
standard procedures, repeated interactions between actors and consistency across 
different stages of project lifecycle can mitigate perceived relational risks, form common 
knowledge and maintain shared meanings. Mutual knowledge maintained shared 
understanding in service communication but also facilitated the adaption of resources in 
emergent changes, which led to dynamics of meanings that require flexibility of routines 
and better performance, hence generating trust as a resource of domination.  
Furthermore, collectively-accepted norms of conduct were found at the project level of 
all three cases, which constrained the use of contractual mechanisms and encouraged 
collaborative actions, indicating the emergence of actor-generating norms, hence 
relational control in actor-to-actor (A2A) interactions. Relational control generates trust 
as a rule of legitimation at the project level that actors and organisations self-control their 
own behaviour to maintain the relationship and value co-creating activities. Main 
contractors also structured supply chain relationships for future businesses, as in the cases 
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of projects Alpha and Gamma, which induced the shadow of the future and future-
oriented learning. Structuring relationships provides opportunities for moving actor-
generating norms from the project level to the organisation level, hence generating new 
properties at higher levels of the service ecosystem. Controlling, therefore, raises a sense 
of security and confidence that generates and sustains trust as rules and resources, and 
helps the emergence of a service ecosystem by transferring processes at the project level 
to influence events at the organisation and inter-organisational network levels. This 
management approach accords to social capital theory. 
On the other hand, main contractors used power to impose risk terms and manipulate the 
price, as in the projects Alpha and Beta. Controlling in this way was based on the 
transactionally-based interpretations of supply chain relationships and practices. Using 
power to extract safeguards for self-interests hinders trust development and discourages 
trustworthiness. On the supply chains’ side, controlling in this way leads to defensiveness 
and the perception of inequity. This management approach accords to transaction 
economics theory. 
Relating provides informal socialisation mechanisms across different levels of service 
ecosystems. Case studies reveal the significant role of boundary agency at the front end 
in terms of building ties between hierarchical levels and across organisation boundaries, 
such as the general manager of project Alpha and project director of project Beta. In 
contrast, trust developed at a slower pace in the case of Gamma, where no boundary 
person was between the main contractor and subcontractor. Established ties convey 
shared understanding and mutual knowledge that increase confidence in service 
interactions, generating trust as a rule of signification at both organisation and project 
levels. However, since execution, ties between the two parties were weakly sustained at 
the organisation level, whereas ties at the project level were strengthened by structured 
interactions such as project meetings. Although consistent ties facilitate the co-creation 
of shared meaning, intentions and identities at the project level, weak links between 
organisation and project levels hinder the structuring supply chain relationships and trust 
at the organisation level. Moreover, due to the heavy reliance on boundary agency to 
transfer resources and value across levels, value co-created at the project level might be 
lost, especially when the boundary person is reallocated after the project completion.  
Apart from ties, main contractors and supply chains can be related through relationship-
specific investment. Relationship-specific investment in the case studies was more about 
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bounding two parties relationally than economically. On the supply chains’ side, 
relational investment started with small actions such as surpassing goals and using a 
relational approach to deal with main contractors’ mistakes. These small actions can 
contribute to main contractors’ perception of benevolence. As relationships developed, 
subcontractors invested in enhanced actions such as prioritising the main contractor’s 
needs, trying their best to achieve and surpass goals and mobilising more resources to 
cooperate with the main contractor in emergent changes. Such relational investment 
increases main contractors’ confidence in using trust relations to allocate resources and 
deal with changes jointly, generating trust as a resource of domination. Main contractors’ 
relational investment, on the other hand, motivates above enhanced actions, as 
demonstrated in the case of Alpha. The well-structured, long-term relationship and 
sustainable businesses increased both parties’ commitment and raised a sense of 
reciprocity that helped maintain trusting and trustworthy behaviour. The investment in 
the interactions and the enhanced relationships are evidence of the growth of social 
capital. 
Having equivalent knowledge bases, in the sense that actors are able to understand each 
other’s specialised knowledge, can reduce main contractors’ suspicion due to cognitive 
distance and thus the sense of insecurity. In the cases of Alpha and Beta, for instance, 
operatives and managers of the main contractors were able to understand technical 
requirements and causes of subcontractors’ operations and performance and both main 
contractors and subcontractors had more confidence in service interactions. In contrast, 
the lack of equivalent knowledge bases in the Gamma case caused ambiguity and 
insecurity between the main contractor and subcontractor.  
The effectiveness and efficiency of service processes and outcomes motivate actors and 
organisations to repeat the service interaction approach in order to benefit from 
collaboration continuously. Routinising service processes maintains security and 
confidence at the individual and project levels, hence sustaining virtuous cycles of trust 
and collaboration. 
Virtuous cycles of trust and collaboration 
On the basis of security and confidence, value co-creation creates shared experiences, in 
which trust as rules and resources can sustain, develop or erode. In turn, as it will be 
discussed soon, trust levers value either for current or future service through generating 
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the perception of trustworthiness, using trust relations to allocate resources and 
legitimating relational norms.  
Project efficiency drives the initial collaboration between main contractors and supply 
chains, in the form of involving supply chains early on in the process in order to jointly 
develop the main bid for instance. The case studies demonstrate that early involvement 
provided opportunities for optimising value propositions in the main bid. They built 
shared understanding of the project as well as each other in the process. This is a type of 
value co-creation, co-producing, meaning that actors and organisations collaborate with 
each other to jointly create value propositions or core offerings as construction projects, 
and in doing so, they co-create service outcomes that can lever value-in-use in subsequent 
or future service. Co-producing was firstly driven by project efficiency that could not be 
achieved by either party working alone. To sustain co-producing, however, requires 
perceived equity especially on the supply chains’ side.  
Collaboration only for efficiency and equity was largely self-interested in that joint 
activities were to convey persuasive message, instruct on plans and obtain consent, and 
subcontractors were used as operand resources to achieve main contractors’ own goals. 
Nevertheless, co-producing based on efficiency and equity can induce the perception of 
competence and intention as supply chains increase project efficiency, and perceived 
trustworthiness, in turn, sustains value co-creation. Trust as a rule of signification and 
value co-creation creates a positive path dependency that forms the belief in the other 
party's actions and encourages the use of trust relations in the pursuit of value under 
uncertainties, instead of being opportunistic.  
The continuous use of trust relations in service exchanges requires reciprocity and 
bounded solidarity in supply chain relationships. It was found from the case studies that 
reciprocity emerged during project execution as actors and organisations continuously 
exchanged service in a trusting and trustworthy way. Actors and organisations might be 
driven by the expectation of gaining economic returns such as more profits or fewer costs 
in delivering the current project, hence economic reciprocity. Main contractors and 
subcontractors formed bounded solidarity in co-producing core offerings as projects to 
ensure that both parties were fairly treated by the client. In other words, the use of trust 
relations as facilities of resource allocation induces reciprocity and bounded solidarity, 
which in turn sustain win-win value co-creation. Furthermore, through mutual service or 
forming bounded solidarity, actors and organisations can co-create shared intentions that 
211 
concern both parties’ value, hence social orientations and value co-creating. Social 
orientations mean sharing risks and responsibilities in service exchanges so that 
relationships can sustain, signalling an increase in social capital. Value co-creation under 
social orientations is more advanced than co-producing value propositions and core 
offerings. Value co-creating refers to collaboration that goes beyond ‘win-win’ and 
increases relationship value that can improve the wellbeing of those involved through 
service exchange and use.  
Following up, the recursive use of trust relations enables the emergence and legitimacy 
of relational norms in A2A interactions. Relational control forms relational thinking and 
expectations that restrain opportunism and encourage trust and trustworthiness in order 
to keep the stability of relationships, strengthen trust-based rules of interactions and 
therefore ensure mutual benefits in collaboration. The shadow of the future, as will be 
discussed shortly, can induce social reciprocity in service interactions. Social reciprocity 
means service exchange with unspecified returns in the current project but expecting the 
balance of the exchange to be achieved in the future. In cases Alpha and Gamma, for 
instance, under the strategic agreement and internal relation, main contractors and 
subcontractors were motivated to continue learning and value co-creating activities at 
both organisation and project levels in order to invest in the long-term relationships that 
could yield benefits in the future. In contrast, with the foreshortening shadow of the future 
after project Beta, the main contractor and subcontractor focused on project-specific tasks 
and profits that could be gained from Beta. Although social orientations were sustained, 
Office Plc. and Found Gamma had less shared learning and interacted with each other to 
jointly address project-specific tasks, co-produce solutions and increase profits. Figure 12 
illustrates the process of trust development. 
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Figure 12 The process of trust development 
9.1.2 The conditions for trust development 
The development and unfolding value of trust are subjective to structural conditions of 
multiple-level service ecosystem and time dimensions of past and future. The case 
findings demonstrate structural influences at the project, organisation and inter-
organisational networks levels and the influences of the past and future. 
Structural conditions 
Project conditions help balance the power relation between main contractors and 
subcontractors. Project complexity and uncertainty or specific requirements of the 
specialist project can reduce the number of qualified subcontractors, hence alternatives in 
the market. Although the use of power depends on contexts and embedded agency, a more 
balanced power relation can mitigate perceived inequity especially on the supply chains’ 
side, which is conducive to trustworthy behaviour. For instance, the uncertainty of project 
Beta limited the number of qualified piling contractors in the market, hence creating a 
more balanced supply chain relationship than in project Alpha. The contract negotiation 
was perceived as fairer in project Beta than in Alpha.  
At the organisation level, the case studies compared two types of organisational systems, 
shared systems between the main contractor and subcontractor as sister companies and 
independent systems. Comparing trust development between external and internal 
relationships reveals the positive influence of shared organisational systems. Shared 
organisation systems, including support functions, norms and practices, provide common 
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knowledge and standard procedures that facilitate joint activities. Organisational policies 
encouraging integration between internal units, as they are communicated between 
internal actors, can influence actors’ interpretations such as the meaning of internal 
relationships, ways of utilising internal resources and the intention of collaborating with 
internal companies. Organisational policies can also restrict the use of contractual 
mechanisms against sister companies and thereby sustain solidarity in relationships.  
However, actors’ interpretations also depend upon communication, power relations, and 
temporary norms and practices in A2A interactions. The positive effect of shared 
organisational systems and collaborative policy upon trust and value may be constrained 
by the organisational structure. Specifically, injecting market mechanisms and 
competition between internal units, though claiming to reduce complacency and maintain 
competitiveness, can hinder the structuring of internal systems and connections. In this 
vein, the mixed structure reduces the value of internal relationships and hence trust, on 
the one hand, and, on the other hand, facilitates the production, reproduction and eventual 
institutionalisation of the transactionally-based view of the internal relationship. In other 
words, the mix, if not well organised and structured, might promote discreteness and 
transactional practices.  
A tension can be created. On the one side is the recognised meaning of the internal 
relationship as long term, based in nature, and on the other side is capturing short-term 
profits in transactions even if it is at the expense of long-term benefits across internal 
units and for the parent organisation. Such tension can hinder trust and its value, 
especially intention trust. The belief in the internal relationship replaces intention trust in 
that the internal relationship and arrangements can facilitate resource allocation, hence 
social capital in the absence of intention trust. Sister companies might rely on the internal 
relationship, instead of the internal partner per se. However, a lack of intention trust can 
lead to suspicion, insecurity and relational risks when uncertainties occur. Moreover, 
contractual and hierarchical relations dominating trust relations can generate the 
perception of inequity on the supply chain’s side, which dramatically hinders the 
development of relationship and trust. For instance, in case Gamma, One Gamma’s policy 
was interpreted by the subcontractor as a rhetoric for using their resources to facilitate 
other units to be main contractors. 
From the perspective of structuration theory, the tension is caused by the twofold structure 
of domination. First, injecting market mechanisms enables allocative-resource structure 
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of domination, which is allocating resources based on price. Second, the hierarchy within 
the parent organisation forms an authoritative structure of domination, which allocates 
resources based on authority of the hierarchical relationship. The twofold structure 
influences interpretations and norms on the one hand and on the other hand, hinders the 
structuring of trust relations as an authoritative resource of domination. 
In summary, injecting market mechanisms into the internal relationship can cause the 
perception of inequity in actor-system interactions at the front end, especially in the 
shadow of a negative past, which hinders trust and value co-creation at organisation and 
project levels. The perception is also influenced by A2A interactions. Compared with 
external relationships, shared systems provide common knowledge, joint activities and 
facilitate shared understanding in A2A interactions at the project level. Organisational 
policies also help sustain solidarity in relationships by constraining the use of contractual 
mechanisms against sister companies. Organisational practices between sister companies 
sustain the continuity of the relationship but also help transfer value such as shared 
identities co-created at the project level to the organisation level. In this vein, processes 
at lower levels are able to influence events at higher levels of service ecosystems and 
shape a positive future for value co-creation.  
Furthermore, the case finding reveals the role of organisational systems, particularly 
knowledge management systems that are supported by information and communication 
technology (ICT) in generating trust as a rule of signification. ICT-supported systems 
gather, transfer, retain and transform supplier information across project and hierarchical 
levels. Such organisational systems supply reliable and comprehensive information about 
supply chains, hence creating a better condition for actors learning about their supply 
chains. For instance, in project Beta, the supply chain management systems provided an 
overview of the subcontractor’s past experiences and mitigated the negative influence of 
the recent project. In contrast, the lack of similar systems partly caused the prolonged 
influences of the recent project on the supply chain relationship in project Gamma. 
At the inter-organisational network level, the case studies compared three types of 
procurement systems: collaborative framework procurement for long-term collaboration 
between client and main contractor, two-stage procurement for collaboration within one 
project, and traditional competitive procurement.  
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In general, collaborative procurement routes create a better condition for trust than 
traditional competitive procurement. The case findings demonstrate that, under 
collaborative procurement, the clients of the Alpha and Gamma projects had more 
involvement at the project level. Client involvement can raise shared understanding of 
problems, risks and resource needs among the three parties, which increases the 
effectiveness of communication, value co-creation and the perception of trustworthiness. 
Also, client involvement can encourage openness and bounded solidarity between main 
contractors and subcontractors, especially in periods of considerable uncertainties. Power 
relations between main contractors and subcontractors are found to be more balanced in 
collaborative procurement systems, which induces the perception of equity and 
trustworthiness.  
Between collaborative procurement for long-term collaboration and for one-time 
collaboration, the former can furnish main contractors with a sense of confidence in terms 
of managing supply chains on a long-term basis. The experience of involvement in long-
term collaboration with the client ensures sustainable resources and increases the 
capability of structuring collaboration with supply chains at the organisation level. For 
instance, in project Alpha, the main contractor imitated the client’s collaborative 
framework to establish their own strategic framework with their supply chains. Although 
this indicates a relationship management approach based on transaction cost economics, 
relational contracting forms motivation for collaborative practices in A2A interactions at 
the project level and thereby lays a good foundation for moving towards the social capital 
side of the management approach. On the supply chains’ side, stable client-main 
contractor relationships can increase their perception of the reliability of main contractors 
and motivate proactive actions that signal trustworthiness at both organisation and project 
levels. 
The shadows of the past and future 
The shadow of the past created conditions for trust at the front end. Past relationships at 
the individual level can facilitate key interactions and mutual learning at the organisation 
level, such as the cases of Alpha and Beta. At the organisation level, the influence of past 
experiences is mediated by cognitive and behavioural learning. The key is to identify 
problems in the past, accept mistakes and take responsibility – that is, learning from the 
past to exploit positive experiences while mitigating the negative ones. Learning at the 
organisation level can be carried to the project level, which was through boundary agency 
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or ICT-supported organisational systems. In all three cases, the shadow of the past 
negatively influenced the initial trust in supply chains. Whereas main contractors and 
subcontractors in projects Alpha and Beta cognitively and behaviourally learnt from the 
past, those in project Gamma refused to accept their responsibilities. As a consequence, 
while the negative past had few effects on the supply chain relationships in cases Alpha 
and Beta, it had a prolonged influence in project Gamma.  
The shadow of the future creates conditions at the completion stage. Case Beta illustrated 
that the foreshortening future mitigated the scope of joint activities and shared learning 
as actors focused on project-specific tasks and profits that could be gained in the current 
project. Moreover, without a well-structured inter-organisational relationship or future 
business, it was hard to move value co-created at the project level to the organisation level 
and lever value for future service. Agency can be relied upon; but the value can be lost 
when actors are reallocated. In contrast, in projects Alpha and Gamma, actors and 
organisations were motivated to engage in future-oriented learning since relationships 
and knowledge obtained in the present might be transformed and reused in the future. 
Social reciprocity also emerged in service interactions. However, value co-created at the 
project level still faced the challenge of transferring to the higher levels, especially for 
external relationships, due to the weak system between the organisation and project 
levels. 
9.1.3 The phenomenon of trust 
As trust is recursively constituted by interaction processes – that is the bottom-up part of 
duality of trust, the phenomenon of trust is formed. The phenomenon of trust consists of 
trust perceptions, orientations and trusting behaviour, which, from the perspective of 
structuration theory (Giddens, 1984), can influence communication, power relations and 
normative practices between main contractors and subcontractors. 
Trust perceptions 
The case findings reveal that, at the organisation level, competence trust and intention 
trust were generated through learning from the past at the front end. After execution, trust 
perceptions were transferred to the project level through boundary agencies on the one 
hand, and on the other hand, discontinued at the organisation level. In other words, the 
development of trust after procurement mostly relies on service interactions at the project 
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level. Furthermore, whereas competence trust can be initiated in indirect interactions, or 
agency-structure interactions in the S-DL sense, intention trust is found to emerge in 
direct interactions, or actor-to-actor (A2A) interactions. Competence and intention trust, 
under the shadow of the future, can be transferred to the organisation level and influence 
the structuring of supply chain relationships. 
The case findings differentiate three levels of competence trust and intention trust. Low 
competence trust means that main contractors have discursive learning about at least one 
aspect of the subcontractor’s capability. Competence trust is suspended until further 
evidence that develops or erodes trust. Medium degree of competence trust means that 
main contractors perceive the subcontractor as capable of completing the contract to the 
minimum requirements and managing planned changes. Planned changes are changes 
specified ex ante, either formally or informally. Under a high degree of competence trust, 
main contractors believe that the subcontractor can manage emergent changes not 
specified ex ante.  
Under low intention trust, the emphasis of interactions is on openness, meaning that main 
contractors seek transparency in service interactions. Medium degree of intention trust is 
featured as perceived honesty and integrity. No deception and opportunism are key to 
maintaining intention trust at the medium degree. A high level of intention trust involves 
perceived benevolence. Main contractors believe that the subcontractor is willing to go 
the extra mile and help in the face of problems, such as prioritising resources and adapting 
their own programmes. Table 8 illustrates different degrees of competence and intention 
trust.  
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Table 8 Different degrees of competence trust: illustrative quotes 
The degree of competence trust 
Low competence trust 
“We also brought up issues we had had on the previous project. And we knew that they addressed 
those… because the two items they’ve come to site to do have gone well. So, our confidence is 
increasing in … [Surface Ltd.’s] ability. But they are sort of small bits of work. The big bit of works 
[are] still yet to come.” (Project manager, Road Ltd.) 
Medium competence trust 
“I think … [Found Gamma] probably do reduce the risks. We know that they can do the job. We know 
they are big and are not going to go under.” (Quantity surveyor, Office Plc.) 
“Because the piling was very close to … [City Ltd.] assets... [Found Gamma] have done that, have 
worked in those conditions before. So technically they were ahead of their competition… [Found 
Gamma] are very educated… Whereas you may get other contractors that are not technically aware of 
what the contract conditions really mean, so they don’t ask questions...But ... [Found Gamma] would 
ask searching questions. At the end of the day, it is good because it protects everybody.” (Project 
director, Build Gamma). 
High competence trust 
“I think they’ve got quite a good structure within their organisation. They resource jobs properly. They 
don’t take on too much work, just take on what they can handle… So we relied on them to come in and 
fix a problem… their help to plan the works with the profile planning and everything. That is where we 
need their expertise: to tell us how to do that.” (Site agent, Road Ltd.) 
“[Found Gamma] They are good at doing the big or abnormal piling works. They got the key; they got 
the backup, they got the resources…. And they have brought solutions [to] the table to keep the project 
moving forward along with ourselves…” (Project director, Office Plc.) 
“If it was another company and we have the same situation where the design is open there, and the 
project is in an uncertain phase, we could have a lot of problems with the subcontractor because other 
people might not be able to turn around the design quickly. They might not be able to adapt to the 
changes quickly.” (Construction manager, Build Gamma) 
The degree of intention trust 
Low intention trust 
“…we speak openly on anything, any issues coming up. So, I feel that they seem a good team down 
there. We all talk, and I think this is the most important thing.” (Commercial manager, Build Gamma) 
“They are transparent with us about that [technical] stuff. Very easy to talk to. And from us, we share 
with them how we deal with [a] client if there’s an issue that affects … [Build Gamma] and … [Found 
Gamma], probably more than we would if it is a third-party contractor.” (Construction manager, Build 
Gamma). 
Medium intention trust 
“I trust them not to apply anything that I wouldn’t believe is true… you just know that they raise a 
question straight away and in front… Straight away. They are not trying to hide anything” (Site agent, 
Road Ltd.). 
“We’ve had some problems on the project because of tunnels and other things and… [Found Gamma] 
have worked with us to solve any problems on site, which has been very good. They are certainly not 
looking to take advantage of situation. You know we’ve had various problems, which haven’t been 
solved [by] a long away. So, they’ve been working with us to solve those problems.” (Project manager, 
Office Plc.) 
High intention trust 
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“…they are trying their best to do it… they put together their best people to do the job, what they can 
do for us. And they will be used [again], I have no doubt, and perform very well” (Site agent, Road 
Ltd.). 
“… [Found Gamma] were prepared to work with us in keeping the works moving forward… You know 
what you get in [the project], you know you can have a sensible conversation, you know people are 
open and honest, you know that they won’t leave your life, try to screw you for more money when they 
are not down to [get any more]. And you know that they say what they are going to do. They can do it 
and they will do it’ (Project director, Office Plc.) 
Trust orientations 
Apart from trust perceptions, trust is differentiated by main contractors’ orientations of 
investing in trust relations, which can be self-interested or socially-oriented. Self-
interested trust does not necessarily mean profiting from subcontractors, but it implies the 
possibility of taking advantages from supply chains when opportunities arise, hence 
opportunistic behaviour in interactions. While self-interested main contractors do not 
consider supply chains’ value, socially-oriented main contractors recognise social and 
relational influences in the pursuit of value and thereby consider mutual benefits. 
Furthermore, social orientations can be project-based, which considers the benefits that 
can be realised within the duration of project delivery. It can also develop beyond the 
current project towards future service, thus involving the organisation level. Table 9 
illustrates self-interested and socially-oriented trust. Table 10 summarises different 
degrees of trust attitudes. 
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Table 9 Examples of self-interested trust and socially-oriented trust 
Self-interested trust 
“So, the level of attention you paid to the subcontractors is probably related to the value of the 
subcontract, how critical it is [in] meeting your programme.” (Project manager, Road Ltd.) 
“…we know that when we get a price from… [Surface Ltd.] we don’t have to have extra money for risk 
or anything else. So that should allow us to deliver more competitive tenders when we try to win future 
work.” (Project manager, Road Ltd.) 
“So, whatever terms and conditions we have with the client we would try to make sure that subcontract 
is back to back with our terms and conditions. There, often [what] we are finding is that we do get some 
kicked back, perhaps with some items we’ve agreed to but they don’t want.” (Quantity surveyor, Office 
Plc.) 
“…it’s just an asset to have to win jobs. We’ve got the resources and we can do this through working 
together. We can use them to help [with] the technical systems. I wouldn’t say we rely on them because 
we can still run it competitively.” (Commercial manager, Build Gamma)  
Socially-oriented trust (Project-based) 
In the second-round interviews in project Alpha, an interviewee talked about how to manage early 
warning of compensation for profile planing from Surface Ltd.: 
“We will tell them our position on it. And they will tell us their position on it. We will talk [it] through. 
We will listen to what they have to say, and they will listen to us, what we have to say. Hopefully we 
can come to a mutual agreement.” (Site agent, Road Ltd.) 
In the last interview of project Alpha, the interviewee talked about the result of early warning: 
“So, we went through that. We agreed on the number basically at the end of the day, which satisfied 
[us] all. We just talked around the table, and we agreed on the figure. It didn’t go any further. It was 
rectified amicably.” (Site agent, Road Ltd.) 
To deal with disagreement: 
“We would generally either speak to them on the phone or email them but with reasons why: ‘…we 
don’t feel it’s safe because…we will suggest this might be a better way to do it.’…. But generally just 
conversation that happens between the two parties to try to make sure everybody is happy with what 
we are going to do.” (Quantity surveyor, Office Plc.) 
“And there’s always got [to be] a bit of give and take from both parties to make it work. You cannot all 
be one way.” (Project director, Office Plc.). 
“We told them [Build Gamma] that and they completely understand, and they come back to ask, ‘What 
can we do to help?’ So that’s the kind of thing we have.” (Site engineer, Found Gamma)  
Socially-oriented trust (Future-based) 
“We have agreed that the metre squared with GPS is the future. That is the way forward. It worked very 
well on this project. It will work on other projects.” (Site agent, Road Ltd.). 
“They don’t get people working against them but together with them. We are not only looking at for 
ourselves; we are looking at the whole… [Gamma UK] together.” (Construction manager, Build 
Gamma) 
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Table 10 A summary of trust attitudes 
Trust 
Attitudes 
Description Degrees 
Competence 
trust 
In the procurement: 
depending on the price, 
programme, financial and 
technical capabilities, 
resource reliabilities 
Low degree: main contractor perceives specific aspects of 
subcontractor’s capability that might negatively influence 
the project delivery. 
Medium degree: main contractor perceives subcontractor 
to be able to complete the project to the minimum 
requirements and manage planned changes. 
High degree: main contractor perceives subcontractor to 
be able to complete the project but also manage emergent 
changes. 
In the execution: depending 
on the project performance 
and the capability of 
managing planned and 
emergent changes 
Intention 
trust 
Emerging in direct 
interactions 
Low degree: main contractor perceives subcontractor as 
open and seeks transparency in communication. 
 Medium degree: main contractor perceives subcontractor 
as not deceptive, honest and has integrity. 
 High degree: main contractor perceives subcontractor as 
benevolent and willing to help when needed. 
Trust 
orientation 
Drivers for investing in trust 
relations 
Self-interested: using subcontractors for own benefits 
with little concern about subcontractors’ value; indicating 
the possibility of opportunism when opportunities arise. 
 Socially-oriented: recognising social and relational 
influences on value; concerning mutual benefits; the 
perception of mutual benefits might be project-based or 
beyond the project and including future business. 
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Trusting behaviour 
Figure 13 illustrates the data structure of trusting behaviour.  
 
Figure 13 Data structure: trusting behaviour 
Competence trust is related to main contractors’ openness to seeking and taking advice 
and responsiveness to subcontractors’ needs and requirements. For example, in the case 
of Beta, the main contractor provided quality information as required by the subcontractor 
during the design stage. The belief was that by having sufficient resources the 
subcontractor was able to mitigate risks and improve the value proposition. In the case of 
Gamma, the main contractor frequently asked for the subcontractor’s technical advice 
and suggestions in building relationships with stakeholders. They also persuaded the 
client to accept the subcontractor’s programme. The belief was that the subcontractor was 
capable of completing the programme and that the programme produced by Found 
Gamma was optimal to the overall project. In contrast, in case Alpha, though the main 
contractor asked Surface Ltd. about the programme, rates and bill of quantities for 
surfacing works, the main contractor had their own research. The communication was 
one-way prior to and during the front end. 
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Intention trust is related to main contractors’ openness about their own problems and 
mistakes and tolerance of uncertainties in the subcontractors’ actions. For instance, with 
high intention trust during the execution of project Alpha, the main contractor admitted 
their own mistakes, and doing so was built upon the belief that the subcontractor would 
not take advantage of their mistakes and problems. The intention was to stimulate open 
discussion and find solutions suitable for both parties. Further, when the subcontractor 
delayed test information as specified in the contract and failed to produce the required 
paperwork, the main contractor chased the information in an informal way and formatted 
the paperwork for the subcontractor. Competence trust and intention trust also encourage 
delegating operational authorities to supply chains. At the completion stage of the three 
cases, subcontractors perceived more flexibility in operations in that they were able to 
decide about more specialist issues by themselves. 
Trust orientations are related to the use of trust relations to facilitate resource allocation 
and integration in the pursuit of value. Specifically, with social orientations, main 
contractors are willing to share risks, and maintain and comply with relational norms such 
as equity, reciprocity and bounded solidarity. Social orientations also mitigate blame 
culture in the service interaction. In the case studies, main contractors’ orientations 
developed from self-interest to a social orientation, which was accompanied by a change 
of behaviour from manipulating or maintaining discreteness to sharing risks and taking 
responsibilities. 
From the perspective of structuration theory, the above behaviour can be further 
consolidated into three types, learning and sharing, tolerating and delegating, and taking 
responsibilities, which influence the communication, power and sanction of service 
interactions respectively.  
9.2 The value of trust 
From the perspective of structuration theory, trust as rules and resources, as it is 
recursively constituted by interaction processes, reflexively fed back into service 
interactions and influenced communication, power relations and normative practices 
between main contractors and subcontractors. The value of trust unfolds in this process. 
From the lens of service-dominant logic (S-DL), trust levers service value as it induces 
informative service communication, effective resource integration and cohesive service 
coordination in service experiences. Better service experiences are linked to and feed back 
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to enable higher performance by reducing transaction costs, enhanced knowledge 
application and other effective ways of working at the project level as actors and 
organisations gain shared understanding, intentions and identities that benefit current and 
future collaboration and value co-creation. This improves outputs at different stages of 
the project lifecycle and ultimately the project as service outputs. Figure 14 illustrates the 
data structure of the value of trust. 
 
Figure 14 Data structure: the value of trust in construction supply chains 
9.2.1 Informative service communication and shared understanding  
Trust as a rule of signification induces the interpretation of trustworthiness and drives 
main contractors to seek advice and learn from subcontractors. Service communication 
becomes more intensified. Competence trust encourages main contractors to explicate 
problems and issues verbally in order to help their partners better interpret and internalise 
meanings. Trust in the supply chain’s integrity and benevolence increases main 
contractors’ openness, admitting their own mistakes and sharing problems in order to be 
straight forward in communication. From the subcontractors’ perspective, main 
225 
contractor openness is perceived as one of the first signals of trust, which gives them 
confidence to question the main contractors’ plans and methods, advise on better 
solutions, and share project problems and their own difficulties. In this vein, 
communication goes beyond conveying one-way information towards two-way A2A 
dialogue and increases the depth of communication. With a higher level of trust at the 
procurement and preconstruction stage of project Beta, communication at the 
organisation level was more open and proactive than that in projects Alpha and Gamma.  
Dialogic communication combines reasons and enquiries, so it can increase shared 
understanding of project issues, and also of the other party’s preferences and ways of 
organising businesses, which facilitates the internalisation of the other party’s 
communicative intent in interactions. For instance, in case Alpha, the main contractor and 
subcontractor formed a good shared understanding at the project level, through jointly 
managing a series of changes. Such shared understanding enabled them to quickly 
understand the changes, reach solutions and adapt resources to ensure mutual benefits as 
well as the effectiveness of outputs for stakeholders. Therefore, shared understanding 
makes collaboration and value co-creation more absorptive to changes.  
Moreover, the perception of trustworthiness can increase the density of communication 
at the project level – that is, to build communication with wider stakeholders. For 
instance, in case Gamma, the main contractor’s trust in the subcontractor’s knowledge 
and experience motivated the main contractor to involve the subcontractor in the client 
meeting. The subcontractor was able to directly communicate with the client about their 
needs and requirements, which increased the effectiveness of communication and the 
viability of solutions. In this case, the level of interactions between these businesses was 
trust based, enabling enhanced interactions between the subcontractor and client, also 
with the potential for value co-creation.  
In other words, trust as a rule of signification specifically levers service value by making 
the service experience more informative and increasing shared understanding between 
main contractors and subcontractors.  
9.2.2 Flexible resource integration and shared intentions 
As discussed, trust enables main contractors to delegate authority to subcontractors and 
tolerate uncertainties in subcontractors’ actions. Using trust relations as facilities of 
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resource allocation affects the power relation between main contractors and 
subcontractors. Delegating authority and eliminating excessive monitoring reduces 
redundant resources, for instance. From the perspective of supply chains, they have more 
autonomy in their own operations. Equity, reciprocity and bounded solidarity can emerge 
while resources are allocated through relationships, which drive serial equality. Serial 
equality means exempting immediate returns of relational investment but expecting a 
balance of exchange within the project lifecycle or long-term relationships. Furthermore, 
relational control and the perception of trustworthiness can suspend judgements and 
restrain the use of contractual mechanisms under uncertainties.  
Shared intentions can emerge as actors and organisations continuously use trust relations 
to allocate resources, provide mutual service and exchange reciprocal value propositions. 
Under shared intentions, resource allocation and integration become more adaptive to 
changes. Actors and organisations are more willing to mobilise and adapt their own 
resources to achieve common goals. From the perspective of subcontractors, main 
contractors provide effective services to facilitate their operations under changes, such as 
giving sufficient notice, keeping them informed about site issues and coordinating other 
operations to give them safe areas for operations. From the perspective of main 
contractors, subcontractors are able to give them viable solutions and help them satisfy 
clients’ requirements.  
Trust as a resource of domination levers service value by making resource integration 
more flexible and nurturing shared intentions between main contractors and 
subcontractors. 
9.2.3 Cohesive service coordination and shared identities 
The level of commitment increases as main contractors using trust relations as resources 
start to generate mutual benefits and take responsibility in the pursuit of service and 
project value. From the perspective of subcontractors and service value, main contractors 
are more responsive to their needs and pay more attention to their suggestions. Perceived 
equity and reciprocity increase subcontractors’ commitment to the relationship. In 
reciprocation, they are more willing to mobilise their own resources for the benefits of 
both parties. From the perspective of main contractors, subcontractors are more 
cooperative and responsive to their needs.  
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Trust as a rule of legitimation maintains relational norms in service interactions by 
forming relational thinking and expectations that guide collectively-accepted behaviour 
between main contractors and subcontractors. Particularly at the completion stage, actors 
and organisations were found to refrain from opportunism and seek collaborative ways to 
deal with disagreements. Supply chain relationships became more stable. Moreover, 
shared identities can emerge as main contractors and subcontractors form relational 
expectations of each other and have social orientations.  
In this vein, trust as a rule of legitimation levers service value by making service 
coordination more cohesive and forming shared identities between main contractors and 
subcontractors. 
9.2.4 Service outcomes 
The more informative, flexible and cohesive processes engender shared understanding, 
intentions and identities as service outcomes co-created in supply chain relationships, 
which enables main contractors and subcontractors to generate more resources (social 
capital) and secure more financial resources (offset against any transaction cost savings), 
specifically operant resources such as knowledge and relationships, in future service for 
project delivery. Service experiences, including the process and outcomes, also lead to 
improved outputs at different stages of project lifecycle. For instance, shared 
understanding built in the early involvement optimised value propositions and enabled 
both parties to secure contracts. Shared intentions at the execution stage ensured viable 
solutions, adaptive resource allocation and effective delivery of project contents. Shared 
identities helped structure inter-organisational relationships and secure future projects. 
Value was co-created and benefited both parties. This is in line with S-DL. The co-
creation of value therefore takes place through trust development – investment in social 
capital that yields a return – to improve project outcomes. The totality of these actions is 
part of the service experience, which has outcomes in terms of efficiency and 
effectiveness in execution and also an improved experience for those involved in delivery, 
hence an enhanced service outcome. 
Shared understanding, intentions and identities are co-created at the project level. Under 
conditions of the shadow of the future and linking systems between the project and 
organisation levels, service outcomes can be transferred to the organisation level, 
influence events and structures at higher levels, and enhance the dynamics of the service 
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ecosystem for co-creating value. However, the emergence of the service ecosystem from 
the bottom is challenged by weak systems of project business between project and 
organisation levels, between organisations, and because of heavy reliance on agency to 
transfer resources across hierarchical levels.    
9.3 Summary 
This chapter consolidated and compared findings from individual cases. It reveals 
implications for S-DL, structuration theory and social capital theory as well as 
construction project and supply chain management. The next chapter will discuss findings 
in relation to theories and by doing so the theoretical framework will be refined.  
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Chapter 10 Discussion  
This chapter brings together what has emerged from the analysis to draw out the 
theoretical implications. On this basis it proceeds by developing dialogues between 
empirical research and theories. The purpose is to build a theory of the value of trust in 
construction supply chains.  
The present research has identified that trust and value co-creation can form a series of 
virtuous cycles in the service process. This is linked to effective interactions to generate 
valuable outcomes in service experience and post-completion. As trust develops in supply 
chain relationships, it can facilitate service communication, resource allocation and 
integration, and service coordination. Service efficiency and equity are critical to 
initiating and sustaining the perception of trustworthiness, hence trust as a rule of 
signification. Joint problem-solving offers opportunities for building shared 
understanding.  
To use trust relation as a facility of resource allocation requires bounded solidarity and 
reciprocity, which helps form shared intentions. Social orientation might also emerge in 
this process, under which actors and organisations are concerned not only for their own 
benefits but also the other party’s – that is, value co-creating. Relational norms emerge in 
actor-to-actor (A2A) interactions at the project level, which enable trust and 
trustworthiness and constrain opportunism. The norms commence the structuring of the 
trust development process and this helps the norms to develop too as processes emerge 
and become structured.  
Zooming out, this is a layered process of value co-creation through interactions at the 
inter-organisational, organisational and project levels that takes into account power and 
legalities in ways where engagement is facilitated rather than constrained, so that security 
and confidence are formed. Norms at the project level, under conditions of structures of 
service ecosystem, can also transfer to the organisation level, hence influencing the 
structuring between organisations.  
10.1 The underlying process and foundation for trust 
Based on case findings, learning as the underlying process and security and confidence 
as the foundation for trust are added to the original theoretical framework.  
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The development of trust consists of intentional and unintentional learning that combines 
rationality and intuition (Smyth, Gustafsson and Ganskau, 2010). Generating the 
interpretation of trustworthiness – that is, trust as a rule of signification – does not 
necessarily involve rational calculation at a discursive level, an insight that is opposed to 
central assumptions of rational choice theory (Coleman, 1990) and transaction cost 
economies (Williamson, 1993) that regard trust as a strategic result of calculating the 
gains and losses or risks. Experiential and reflexive learning underneath the discursive 
learning about performance and problems adds a dimension to the development of 
collaborative relationship and trust (Ring and Van de Ven, 1994; Doz, 1996).  
The repetitive learning about the other party’s trustworthiness in the context can 
transform discursive learning to reflexive and experiential learning, whereas uncertainties 
that increase perceived risks beyond the current tolerance level can bring the learning 
back to the discursive level (Nooteboom, 2002). The permeable distinction between 
discursive learning and reflexive and experiential learning is fundamental to the 
structuring of relationships in actor-to-actor (A2A) interactions. The two-way 
transformation involves reflexive monitoring of actions and reflexive self-regulation that 
enable the duality of structure and system reproduction (Giddens, 1984), in this case the 
duality of trust and continuous supply chain relationships. The transformation occurs “not 
[as] a string of discrete actions, involving an aggregate of intentions, but a continuous 
process… influenced by knowledge which agents have of the mechanisms of system 
reproduction and employ to control it” (Giddens, 1984, p.376), meaning that learning 
about the other party’s trustworthiness is the underlying process of daily interactions. It 
can be in a calculating manner based on the precise, though not necessarily complete, 
knowledge – learning from the past at the front end, for instance. But this is an exceptional 
step out of the daily routine that rests on good reasons, “as a reassuring consideration” 
(Luhmann, 1979, p. 36).  
Learning induces shared understanding, intentions and identities, hence the collective 
agency between main contractors and supply chains, as will be discussed soon. This 
collective agency might further enable the service ecosystem emergence (Taillard et al., 
2016), although in construction project businesses weak systems between project and 
organisation levels and discontinuity of inter-organisational relationships across time 
make it difficult to move such ‘sharedness’ across projects and from the project level to 
higher levels (and vice versa) (Khalfan and Maqsood, 2012), thereby generating new 
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properties of service ecosystems. Related to the service-dominant logic (S-DL) 
characterisation of the service ecosystem, processes moving between micro-, meso- and 
macro-levels occur “in a sea of change, making all the systems inherently dynamic” 
(Lusch and Vargo, 2014, p. 170). The dynamics of service ecosystem and value co-
creation activities in construction project businesses are mitigated by the discontinuity 
across hierarchical level and time, which is caused by the project-by-project management 
approach prevalent in construction project management. 
On the other hand, learning at the project and agency level presupposes a certain level of 
mutual knowledge, “the knowledge of how to ‘go on’ in forms of life… the necessary 
condition of gaining access to valid descriptions of social activity” (Giddens, 184, p. 375). 
This includes the understanding of institutional arrangements (e.g., contract), norms of 
conduct and other tacit or practical knowledge (Bachmann, 2001; Bachmann and Inkpen, 
2011). Mutual knowledge provides the sameness and continuity in interactions.  
Controlling can form mutual knowledge and confidence in the other party’s behaviour 
because of structural influences (Möllering, 2005; Bachmann and Inkpen, 2011). Power 
is one of the control mechanisms and, from the perspective of structuration theory, is 
enabled by allocative and authoritative resources. In the context of construction, 
authoritative resources reside in the hierarchy between the main contractor and 
subcontractor; hierarchy might be enabled by institutions and institutional arrangements 
such as contracts. For internal partners, such hierarchy might be caused by the 
organisation system of the parent organisation. Allocative resources are embedded in the 
market between independent actors.  
Structuring formal mechanisms creates a common form of symbolic communication, 
collectively accepted norms of conduct and systematic learning that provides a reliable 
track record for those involved, so both parties have a sense of security (Bechky, 2006; 
Maurer, 2010; Enberg, 2012; Suprapto et al., 2016). Control in this manner accords to 
Bachmann's (2001: pp. 358-359) conceptualisation of system power: 
…system power which is anonymous and is carried out through the structures of 
hierarchy and the authority of institutions. This form of power… can hardly be 
(mis-)used by them [individual actors] for opportunistic strategies. Thus, it can 
provide generally acknowledged guidelines of behaviour, and for this reason, 
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system power can foster the efficient production of a high level of trust in trans-
organisational relations. 
Therefore, using power at the structure level, or system power in Bachmann’s words, can 
provide a condition of, rather than an alternative to, trust. Positive control develops trust 
and solicits win-win and enhanced win-win outcomes with the promise of further 
enhancements by building trust and increasing social capital – and investment 
contributing to the shadow of the future. 
This insight contradicts the studies arguing that control through contracts is more likely 
to be detrimental than conducive to the constitution of trust (Bradach and Eccles, 1989; 
Lyons and Mehta, 1997). There is a difference between reproducing legal norms and the 
fierce ‘battles of contracts’ (Sako, 1992), whereby the former can help structure positive 
relations. Contracts and monitoring occupy a neutral position; it is what supports them 
and flows from them that is decisive in building or eroding trust. 
Furthermore, system power at higher levels of the service ecosystem can create a positive 
condition for trust and value co-creation at lower levels (Bachmann, 2001; Das and Teng, 
2001; Möllering, 2005). Establishing formal roles and positions, adopting standard 
procedures and structuring projects at the organisation level regularise expectations, 
increase predictability, and ensure consistency and shared meanings at the project level. 
Consistent interactions and shared understanding of technical and relational issues enable 
the dynamics of trust. Although the relationship development unit might have the key role 
of finding new businesses and making propositions before and at the front end, the 
actualisation, satisfaction and future business are the results of the coordinated and 
collaborative actions of actors in multiple functions across project lifecycle (Enz and 
Lambert, 2012). Trust as rules and resources established in relational contracting at the 
organisation level therefore can transfer to the project level and induce better value co-
creation. Meanwhile, trust co-created in A2A interactions at the project level in execution 
can move to the organisation level, influencing events and structures of higher levels in 
order to lever value for the service ecosystem.  
Hence, power may not necessarily substitute trust (cf. Luhmann, 1979). At least if 
mobilised in certain manners, it can enhance trust as an authoritative resource by creating 
opportunities for developing the perception of trustworthiness or promoting trust and 
trustworthiness as norms of conduct, which in turn sustains the powerful position or even 
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escalates the power of the relationship in wider systems (Sydow, 1998). From the 
perspective of structuration theory, this recursiveness is caused by the interrelations 
between elements of structure and action.  
Agency across boundaries is important. With frequent changes trust established through 
system power at the front end might be problematic because predefined common 
knowledge might be insufficient to represent the differences and dependencies now 
present at the project level (Carlile, 2004). Ties embed shared meanings and informal 
socialisation mechanisms that help reconcile discrepancies in meanings, goals and value 
(Grant, 1996; Carlile, 2004; Lawson et al., 2009; Ballantyne et al., 2011), and maintain 
the sense of security and confidence in changes (Lawson et al., 2009). However, as 
mentioned, heavy reliance on boundary agency and weak systems induce discontinuity 
of trust across levels and boundaries when agency is reallocated, pointing to the need for 
linking structures and strong systems between project and organisation levels as well as 
across organisation boundaries.  
Power can also be used by one party to control the other party against its wishes by 
extracting extensive safeguards for its own self-interest and taking advantage of the other 
party. Controlling in this manner invokes defensive behaviour and discourages trust. 
However, using power to control supply chain relationships does not necessarily mean 
distrust. Whereas power is used on the basis of the undesired possibility of a general 
future, distrust works on the negative assumption of the other party’s incompetence 
and/or opportunism.  
Taken together, the relation between trust and control is traditionally opposed (cf. Inkpen 
and Currall, 2004), except where relational contracts apply (cf. Poppo and Zenger, 2002). 
However, the intensification of interactions has been shown in this research to be more 
powerful than the contract per se and can lead to trust development where the control is 
there to structure the systems in support of norms and behaviour.  
10.2 Trust as a rule of signification 
Whereas system-actor interactions can raise competence trust, to increase intention trust 
requires shared experiences in A2A interactions. Project efficiency is the first driver for 
supply chain collaboration. The aim is to use resources in supply chains to address site-
specific problems and tasks that either the main contractor or the subcontractor cannot 
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deal with alone. In construction projects, collaboration for efficiency starts at the 
organisation level, usually between business development or marketing units. To sustain 
collaboration in project execution, however, requires perceived equity to make ‘fair 
dealing’ (Ring and Van de Ven, 1994, p. 93), in which main contractors and 
subcontractors seek benefits proportional to their investments, with the condition of 
maintaining social relationships (Tsanos and Zografos, 2016). Assessment on efficiency 
and equity demonstrates that supply chain relationships consist of economic but also 
social aspects (Blau, 1964; Venselaar, Gruis and Verhoeven, 2015). Collaborating only 
for efficiency and equity is largely self-interested. Under self-interested trust, actors and 
organisations are forward-looking at the transaction-end payoffs (and other business 
benefits) within the boundaries of transactions that are treated in isolation even in repeat 
businesses (Smyth and Edkins, 2007). Self-interested trust does not necessarily mean 
profit from subcontractors in real actions; yet it implies the possibility of doing so when 
opportunities arise, hence opportunism in interactions.  
In contrast, under socially-oriented trust, as will be discussed soon, actors and 
organisations recognise social relations and focus on the process in the pursuit of value 
(Lyons and Mehta, 1997). Mutual benefits can be more than direct financial ones, 
including growth and competiveness, hence reputation as business benefits, and include 
social benefits, such as job satisfaction and general well-being, to employees in both the 
main contractor and subcontractor organisations. The intersection between business and 
social benefits is the social capital that trust engenders and supports. 
Nevertheless, collaborating creates shared experiences where actors are able to learn 
about the other party and form the interpretation of trustworthiness – that is, generating 
trust as a rule of signification. For construction supply chain relationships, competence 
trust is closely related to the supply chain’s capability of allocating and integrating 
operand and operant resources from different levels of the service ecosystem to deliver a 
high-quality service, especially in the context of changes. Intention trust is related to the 
supply chain’s capability of communicating in an open and honest way, ensuring service 
consistency, understanding and helping main contractors beyond contract specifications 
and agreements (Mayer, Davis and Schoorman, 1995; Nooteboom, 2002). The latter 
points to the importance of shifting from firm-controlled customer-orientation towards 
service-driven and dealing with value co-creating customers (Vargo and Lusch, 2008). 
On the other hand, the main contractor’s capability of understanding supply chains, 
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technically and relationally, and maintaining equity in service interactions is important 
for trust development. Main contractors and subcontractors need to have equivalent 
knowledge bases in the sense that they are able to understand each other (Nooteboom, 
2000) in order to mitigate potential conflicts and suspicion due to cognitive distance and 
misunderstanding.  
Therefore, to generate competence and intention trust and sustain collaboration requires 
relational and ethical interaction capabilities of both main contractors and supply chains 
to enhance the connection of social and emotional links and to act in a fair and non-
opportunistic way towards each other (Söderlund, Vaagaasar and Andersen, 2008; 
Karpen, Bove and Lukas, 2012). Both organisation and project levels need to develop 
these capabilities to co-create “a commitment to collaborative processes with customers, 
partners, and employees” (Lusch, Vargo and O’Brien, 2007, p. 5). At the project level, 
this needs relational interactions and relationship building with supply chains, structuring 
routines, joint problem solving, sharing risks, and learning in relationships (Brady and 
Davies, 2004; Söderlund, Vaagaasar and Andersen, 2008), which require the 
accumulation of knowledge and resources at the organisation level in support (Newell, 
Tansley and Huang, 2004). Apart from agency, resources and efficient service flows, the 
notion of equitable relations is important for sustaining trust and collaboration.  
The capability and process of developing trust are aligned with S-DL that is focused on 
communicative interaction, reciprocal value propositions, resource sharing and value co-
creation (Ballantyne and Varey, 2006; Ballantyne et al., 2011). Trust as rule of 
signification enhances service communication in terms of its intensity, depth and density. 
Competence and intention trust help create an open environment where actors and 
organisations share and learn with each other. Shared meanings are co-created and 
adapted in dialogic communication. Dialogic communication is a key manifestation of 
trust and relational interaction. It helps problem solving, strengthen ties and transform 
local understandings and (re)create the common ground beneficial to current and future 
interactions (Bechky, 2003; Ballantyne and Varey, 2006; Söderlund, Vaagaasar and 
Andersen, 2008). Actors clarify their own opinions but also invite the other party to 
explain theirs, so both parties become more aware of each other’s needs and preferences 
(Senge, 1990).  
Shared understanding as a service outcome lays a good foundation for trust development 
and value co-creation (Etgar, 2008). Main contractors and subcontractors who have 
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shared understanding of technical and relational issues are able to know about the 
changing context quickly, mobilise and transform their own resources to jointly produce 
solutions, and satisfy project requirements but also each other’s expectations. In this vein, 
collaboration and value co-creation become more absorptive of uncertainties and risks 
(Staber and Sydow, 2002; Berggren, Sydow and Tell, 2017).  
10.3 Trust as a resource of domination 
Trust as a resource of domination is built upon relational investment that nurtures 
confidence in using trust relations to allocate resources and deal with changes jointly. 
Relationship-specific investment signals commitment and thus reduces perceived risks 
(Nooteboom, Berger and Noorderhaven, 1997; Swärd, 2016), which could be small 
actions such as surpassing goals or big actions such as prioritising the other party’s needs 
and going the extra mile in undertaking works. To maintain or develop trust requires 
reciprocity of relational investment. Actors and organisations might initially be driven by 
the expectation of gaining economic returns, hence economic reciprocity (Swärd, 2016; 
Tsanos and Zografos, 2016). The economic reciprocation means that what the main 
contractor and subcontractor receive from each other is contingent on what they give to 
each other. Returns are specific and, in an economic sense, the logic of managing 
relationships through economic reciprocity is largely aligned with transaction cost theory 
(Williamson, 1985). Transaction cost theory emphasises the role of legal and private 
orders, such as insurance and economic hostages, in maintaining cooperation in 
contractual relationships (Williamson, 1985). Legal and private orders create a fear of 
legal sanction or losing economic hostages that drive actors and organisations to continue 
cooperation. Transaction cost theory also allows for relational contracting, hence trust, 
but more proactive management from firms (rather than governed by the contract of 
exchange) goes beyond transaction cost theory and towards the social capital side of 
relationship management, which can tie actors and organisations together by contributing 
to positive expectations that form the desire to uphold the relationship for value co-
creation (Pervan, Bove and Johnson, 2009).  
The notion of bounded solidarity and social reciprocity, which emerge in project-level 
interactions, links the research to social capital theory and provides a complementary 
perspective of relationship management to transaction cost theory. Main contractors and 
subcontractors form bounded solidarity to ensure that the two parties are fairly treated by 
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the client and gain benefits. To continuously use trust relations needs concern for the other 
party’s value, hence social orientations. Social orientations may be project-based, under 
which actors and organisations pursue the collective benefits within a project as singular 
transactions. Alternatively, social orientations may extend beyond the duration of a 
project and focus on continuous benefits that could be achieved through collaboration 
with the specific party, which usually occur when actors and organisations perceive future 
business opportunities. In this vein, paybacks for mutual service may become diffuse and 
the balance of exchange is achieved over time – that is, social reciprocity. Trust relations 
bring about social capital to enhance communication quality, reduce transaction costs and 
increase efficiency (Sako, 1992; Zaheer, McEvily and Perrone, 1998). 
Social capital theory as an emergent area of this research has been an emerging area in 
the domain of S-DL (Laud et al., 2015). Despite differences in the conceptualisations 
among researchers (cf. Bourdieu, 1986; Coleman, 1988), social capital is believed to 
reside in the structure of relationships and represent the ability of actors or collective 
actors as organisations to obtain benefits by virtue of relationships in certain social 
structures such as inter-organisational relationships or networks of relationships (Portes, 
1998).  
Social capital theory is aligned with the conceptualisation of operand and operant 
resources in S-DL, both of which have a broader sense of resources than mainstream 
economics. Actors can use trust relations to gain access to operant and operand resources. 
Co-creation is as strong as the relationship, including trust and power, and other resources 
when dynamically combined in interactions (Fyrberg and Jüriado, 2009; Laud et al., 
2015). However, to possess social capital, actors and organisations must be related to 
others; it is those others who are the actual source of strategic advantage (Lin, 1999, 
2002). The acquisition and maintenance of social capital requires investment of resources 
and the processes of transforming social capital to economic capital, relative to 
transactional exchange, bring about uncertainties, unspecified obligations and the 
possible disappointment of reciprocity expectations (Portes, 1998). Despite such 
uncertainties and risks, actors and organisations who invest and maintain social capital 
may see it as primarily the accumulation of obligations and expect repayment in the 
future, either from the recipient per se (Coleman, 1994) or the collective consisting of 
both the investor and recipient, in the form of status and reputation, for instance. Further, 
actors and organisations exchanging social capital may be motivated by the emergent 
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identification of each other as a community and the recognition of the limits of their 
community (Portes, 1998).  
In relation to S-DL and structuration theory, social capital theory offers a micro-
foundations perspective along side transaction cost theory to explain higher-level 
constructs – that is, the motivation of maintaining trust and value co-creation. 
Relationship-specific investment might start as relational contracting at the organisation 
level, but the research reveals the role of bounded solidarity and social reciprocity 
emerged in intensive A2A interactions at the project level.  
Value co-creation between main contractors and supply chains involves co-production of 
value propositions and core offerings (Vargo and Lusch, 2006); the latter refers to 
construction projects in this case. In the process of co-producing, main contractors and 
subcontractors provide mutual service, lever value for service beneficiaries in use and in 
doing so, bring benefits for their own organisations (Grönroos, 2008). Co-production is 
in essence self-interested, although common goals that satisfy both parties’ short-term 
interests may be temporarily initiated.  
On the other hand, value co-creating as another type of value co-creation is associated 
with social orientations. In value co-creating, collaboration goes beyond ‘win-win’; actors 
and organisations consider not only their own but also the other party’s value (Lusch and 
Vargo, 2014). In this service experience, moreover, main contractors and subcontractors 
gain shared intentions and identities that can improve service communication, resource 
integration and service coordination, and lever value in future service use. Value co-
creating sustains the use of trust relations to allocate resources, hence trust as a resource 
of domination, which embeds more social capital for future use. The totality of the service 
experience, thereby, goes beyond co-producing per se.  
Trust as a resource of domination influences the power relation in interactions. In using 
trust relations, main contractors delegate authority and tolerate uncertainty. From the 
perspective of S-DL, this empowering means to regard supply chains as operant 
resources. They have knowledge, skills, ideas and relationships that can drive effects 
within a service system, and the capability of empowering supply chains enables the 
supplier to allocate operand and operant resources in networks of relationships for 
resource integration and therefore co-create value propositions and solutions with the 
customer and their networks (Cova and Salle, 2008; Karpen, Bove and Lukas, 2012; 
239 
Tsanos and Zografos, 2016). Value is created in networks of relationships (Cheung, 
Myers and Mentzer, 2010) rather than in any individual firms (Corsaro, 2014; Akaka, 
Vargo and Schau, 2015), especially when sources of specialist resources are widely 
dispersed, as the case of the construction industry.  
In this vein, trust relations are not only about risk mitigation but also risk sharing (cf. 
Laeequddin et al., 2012). The effects of using trust relations as facilities of resource 
allocation accord with McEvily, Perrone and Zaheer (2003: pp.93-94): 
…trust influences organizing through two main causal pathways: structuring and 
mobilizing…From a structuring perspective, trust shapes the relatively stable and 
enduring interaction patterns in and between organizations… From a mobilizing 
perspective, trust motivates actors to continue, combine and coordinate resources 
toward collective endeavours. 
In terms of value co-creating, the structuring effects include reducing the use of 
contractual mechanisms and redundant resources for micromanagement and the 
mobilising effects include enabling serial equality and suspending judgements in times of 
uncertain conditions. Each party invests in the relationship and expects balance to be 
reached in a series of exchanges and commitments to be honoured in the future (Dyer and 
Chu 2003). The ability to operate on the basis of reciprocity and bounded solidarity 
enables the adaption of the best structuring process for problem solving. In this vein, trust 
as a resource of domination makes resource integration more flexible.  
Shared intentions are co-created as trust relations are recursively used and social 
orientations emerge. Under shared intentions, actors and organisations are more willing 
to open resource access and mobilise resources for better integration (Laud et al., 2015). 
In other words, shared intentions as a service outcome can lever value in use by making 
service and value co-creation more adaptive.    
10.4 Trust as a rule of legitimation 
The effectiveness of value co-creation in the service provision and outcomes encourages 
the repetition and eventual routinisation of using trust relations to allocate resources; the 
more trust-based service is repeated, the more trust develops, social capital increases and 
benefits are secured. In return, trust as an appreciating asset supports the continuity of 
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value co-creating. As actors and organisations continuously act in a trusting and 
trustworthy pattern and co-create value in the service process, they share and legitimate 
norms of conduct in day-to-day interactions – that is, ‘actor-generated norms’ (Vargo and 
Lusch, 2016). As stated in previous sections, equity, reciprocity and bounded solidarity 
emerge in the service interactions and may act as normative rules of conduct between 
main contractors and subcontractors. Following normative rules helps maintain the 
relationship stability, equitable and reciprocal service process and outcomes, which in 
return strengthen rules of conduct and routines. In this manner, actor-generated relational 
norms form relational control that initiates trust as a rule of legitimation and sustains the 
third cycle of trust and collaboration.  
Routinisation of trust-based service does not mean blind trust, which is closer to instinct. 
Routines are repeatedly proved a success but are also susceptible to change, whereas 
instincts are hereditarily acquired and are ‘hard-wired’ (Teece and Pisano, 1994; 
Nooteboom, 2002). 
Routine is psychologically relaxing, but in an important sense it is not something 
anyone can ever be relaxed about. The continuity of the routines of daily life is 
achieved only through the constant vigilance of the parties involved – although it 
is almost always accomplished at the level of practical consciousness 
(Giddens, 1990, p. 98) 
Routines are structured out of the norms and designed processes to become systematic. 
They include actions and behaviours that both support and generate trust; they show intent 
and are based in organisational competence. They occur at the practical level and create 
continuity in interactions as actors “know tacitly about how to ‘go on’ in the context of 
social life without being able to give them direct discursive expression” (Giddens, 1984, 
p. xxiii). Nevertheless, when uncertainties and risks go beyond tolerance level, routines 
may be shattered, and a new process is created at the discursive level (Nooteboom, 2002). 
Trust as a rule of legitimation creates a “capacity for the evolution of a 'shared 
organisational mind'” (Morgan, 1997, p.104) that encourages risk sharing and 
responsibility taking. Actors and organisations complied with these norms and controlled 
their own behaviour to maintain relationships. Relational norms seen here control the 
behaviour of those involved by generating a sense of responsibility, instead of 
241 
accountability. Accountability ties actions with “the normative component of the 
rationalisation of action” (Giddens 1979, p. 85). Whereas accountability at healthy levels 
is good, excessive accountability erodes trust and relationships. This is because it tends 
to discourage learning about the substance of performance or the other party and 
encourage decision making satisfying the criteria of accountability. Responsibility, on the 
other hand, is more likely to induce care, empathy and appreciation in interactions. 
Service coordination therefore becomes more cohesive under the shared mind that 
promotes collaborative behaviour of both main contractors and supply chains 
(Granovetter, 2005; Yi and Gong, 2013; Laud and Karpen, 2017). 
Trust as a rule of legitimation and relational norms form relational thinking and 
expectations on each other, which generates shared identities in supply chain relationships. 
Shared identities lever value in future service use by helping align goals and values, 
increasing commitment, maintaining stability and cohesion, and shaping expectations on 
collective behaviour and intentions (Kramer, Brewer and Hanna, 1996). Moreover, as will 
be discussed in the next section, under the condition of linking systems between 
hierarchical levels and across boundaries and the shadow of the future, shared 
understanding, intentions and identities can be moved to the organisation level and lever 
value at higher levels of service ecosystem in future service. 
10.5 Structural conditions of service ecosystem 
From the service ecosystem perspective, the recursiveness of trust development and value 
co-creation involves actors and resources from multiple levels of the service ecosystem. 
Structures of the service ecosystem can form a conducive condition for learning about 
trustworthiness, help balance power relations between main contractors and 
subcontractors, and increase confidence in supply chain collaboration. 
At the organisation level, systems linking projects and the organisation and boundary 
agency facilitate learning at the front end. Comparing trust development between external 
and internal relationships reveals the positive influence of shared systems at the 
organisational level. Shared organisation systems, including supporting functions, norms 
and practices provided common knowledge, standards and procedures and thus could 
facilitate joint activities and mutual understanding. Organisational policies, as they were 
continuously communicated between units, influenced individuals’ interpretations such 
as the meaning of internal relationships and way of utilising internal resources.  
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However, the positive influence was reduced by injecting elements of market and 
competition between internal units. Transactional elements discourage learning, 
relationship building and resource sharing between internal partners. The finding points 
to the dark side of the hybrid organisational form, as suggested by Teece and Pisano 
(1994, p. 540): 
…we recognize the inherent limits [of the task of management to inject markets 
into firms] and possible counterproductive results of attempting to fashion firms 
into clusters of internal markets. In particular, learning and internal technology 
transfer may well be jeopardized… as we discuss what is distinctive about firms, 
we stress competences/capabilities which are ways of organizing and getting 
things done which cannot be accomplished by using the price system to coordinate 
activity. The key point, however, is that the properties of internal organization… 
cannot lead to the immediate replication of unique organization skills through 
simply entering a market and piecing the parts together overnight.  
The organisation, including internal units and the parent organisation, as a reasonably 
permanent structure can be transactional and constrain trust. It reproduces transactional 
views and practices between internal relationships. The internal relationship also offers 
other types of social capital substitutes for trust. Internal companies might collaborate 
with each other on the basis of the belief in their shared identity through having the same 
parent organisation. Such belief in a shared identity might reduce reflexive learning about 
the other party’s competence, integrity and benevolence. This results in a lack of belief 
in the other party’s intentions as it is difficult to determine if observed trustworthy 
behaviour is a result of actors’ volition or role constraints (McEvily, Perrone and Zaheer, 
2003). Lacking belief in the other party risks internal relationships in disagreements, 
especially when there are few organisational policies or systems available for dealing 
with internal disputes.  
Different from other businesses, the service ecosystem includes the project as an extra 
meso-level layer. Inter-organisational relationships therefore occur at both the 
organisation level and project level. Whereas the organisation level is deeply involved at 
the front end, in execution, it is the interaction at the project level that develops trust and 
co-creates value. As analysed at different levels and across the data, weak systems 
between project and organisation levels, heavy reliance on boundary agency and 
discontinuity of inter-organisational relationships across time make it difficult to move 
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value co-created in projects to the organisation level and vice versa. Both the continuity 
(top-down) and emergence (bottom-up) of a service ecosystem are disrupted, resulting in 
difficulties in realising relational contracting at the project level, inducing inconsistent 
practices across projects and losing value for the service ecosystem (Bresnen, 2007; 
Smyth, 2015b).  
At the inter-organisational networks level, client involvement helps balance the power 
relationship between main contractors and subcontractors, inducing the perception of 
equity, openness and trustworthiness. Long-term relational contracting between clients 
and main contractors increases the confidence in supply chain collaboration (Brahm and 
Tarzijan, 2016). From the perspective of main contractors, the experience of relational 
contracting with clients ensures sustainable resources and increases the capability of 
structuring collaboration with supply chains at the organisation level. From the 
perspective of supply chains, long-term collaboration between the client and main 
contractor can increase perceived reliability of the main contractor and motivate 
relationship-specific investment at both organisation and project levels (Khalfan and 
Mcdermott, 2006). 
10.6 Conditions of time 
The path from prior history to trust and present projects is indirect (Poppo, Zhou and Ryu, 
2008). The influence of past experiences is mediated by cognitive learning of how 
cooperation should take place and behaviour learning of how to make the cooperation 
work at the organisation level (Doz, 1996; Poppo, Zhou and Ryu, 2008; Hartmann and 
Caerteling, 2010; Elfenbein and Zenger, 2014; Buvik and Rolfsen, 2015). Relational 
contracting is based on learning and knowledge at the organisation level, which relies on 
boundary agency to transfer to the project level and in execution. Relying on agency and 
lack of relationship management can cause difficulty in realising relational contracting in 
projects as well as inconsistent practices across projects (Bresnen, 2007; Kadefors and 
Badenfelt, 2009; Smyth, 2015b).  
The shadow of the future influences the present project, relationships and hence trust 
through the process of future-oriented learning (Brahm and Tarzijan, 2016). Future 
relationships and business opportunities affect the continuity of shared learning and 
future-oriented learning at the project level (Poppo, Zhou and Ryu, 2008), hence value 
co-creating activities.   
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Chapter 11 Conclusions 
11.1 Summary of research development 
Trust and its value are explored in the development of supply chain relationships in 
construction project settings in this thesis. It starts with the question “Why has it been so 
difficult to induce and sustain collaboration in the construction industry, especially among 
supply chains?” Complexity in terms of both content and management is certainly one 
reason. Relational contracting, partnering, best practices and supply chain integration 
have been promoted, but their effects vary (cf. Cicmil and Marshall, 2005; Brady and 
Davies, 2014). These mechanisms are mostly promoted through markets and by clients 
to benefit themselves. Supply chains are reactive, pointing to the second reason for the 
difficulty of collaborating with them – the institutionalised logic in the construction 
industry, including goods-dominant logic (G-DL) and project-focused logic (P-FL). G-
DL and P-FL enable and are enabled by the recursive use of transactional approaches, 
such as transferring risks along supply chains, pursuing self-interests at the cost of other 
parties and managing projects in a project-by-project way instead of managing collective 
value across projects. Relationships are fundamental to establishing and maintaining 
collaboration. However, a further review on current construction project and supply chain 
management approaches indicated a lack of attention to relationships and their 
management, especially in supply chains. Second-tier subcontractors and suppliers have 
less understanding of partnering or collaboration with main contractors and clients, what 
it is, how to operate it and – most importantly – what benefits can be derived.  
Complexity, the institutionalised logic and lack of attention to supply chain relationships 
point to a managed relational approach as a way forward that places supply chain 
relationships at the centre of analysis and theorising, offers a complementary logic to G-
DL and P-FL that goes beyond value-in-exchange, and concerns the process of inducing 
and sustaining collaboration as well as value for both main contractors and supply chains. 
Trust is fundamental to relationships. Investigating the process of constituting trust in 
delivering construction projects and the influences of trust on service provision and 
outcomes offers a relational perspective of viewing collaboration. Taken together, 
research questions were formulated:  
1) Whether and if so how does trust, from the main contractor to second-tier 
subcontractor, develop during service interactions between the two?  
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2) Whether and if so how does trust, from the main contractor to second-tier 
subcontractor, dynamically help increase service value during service interactions 
between the two? 
Detailed objectives were: 
1) Identifying the process of trust development in construction supply chains; 
2) Providing an institutional logic at least complementary to G-DL and P-FL as a lens 
of analysing value and value-creating activities in construction; 
3) Shedding light on the value of trust for those involved, including main contractors 
and subcontractors, as well as a broader view on value beyond points of transactions 
towards value-in-use in the course of time (Vargo and Lusch, 2004; Saxon, 2005).  
To answer these research questions, the empirical research was process-based and used a 
case study method. First, a pilot case study was conducted to identify trust-related themes. 
The findings then helped develop a case study protocol, including a topic guide and 
interview questions. Three cases were selected based on the case selection criteria. To 
study the process of trust development and unfolding value of trust, data were collected 
in three waves in the lifecycle of subcontracted projects, first during the procurement and 
preconstruction, then execution and lastly completion. Seventy-one semi-structured 
interviews were conducted with informants from both main contractors and 
subcontractors. This thesis took a critical realist view and studied the process of trust 
development and unfolding value by investigating the generative mechanisms and 
phenomenon of trust. Data were analysed in four steps to construct chronological histories 
of cases and identify interactions influencing trust, different dimensions of trust 
phenomenon and the value of trust.  
Before the empirical research, theoretical points of departure were determined through 
the literature review on trust theories and service-dominant logic (S-DL) as a 
complementary logic to G-DL and P-FL, which helped identify a conceptual framework. 
The conceptual framework consisted of five building blocks, which were 1) trust 
phenomenon, 2) interactions, 3) structures of service ecosystem, 4) time dimension of 
past and future and 5) value as perceived by both main contractors and subcontractors. 
These building blocks served as theoretical expectations of this research and guided the 
empirical research.  
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The literature review led to the need to consider interaction processes, structures and the 
interplay between structures and interaction processes in trust research under S-DL, 
which requires more open, dynamic, and reflexive management and organisation theories 
(Bygballe, Swärd and Vaagaasar, 2016; Sydow, 2017). Structuration theory (Giddens, 
1984) emerged at the early stage of data analysis and was employed as a theoretical lens 
of analysis. Through the lens of structuration theory, trust can be regarded as a structural 
property of relationships. Generating trust is to raise the perception of trustworthiness 
(interpretative rule), use trust relations as resources to allocate resources (facility of 
resources), and legitimate relational norms that constrain opportunism and encourage 
trusting and trustworthy behaviour (normative rule). In turn, trust influences actors' 
interpretative schemes, facilities of resource allocation and norms of conduct, hence 
project processes and practices (Sydow, 1998). The recursive and dynamic relations 
between trust and interaction processes and practices provide an analytic approach to 
understanding the dynamics of supply chain relationships. 
It is notable that the author did not use structuration theory in a deductive way and 
remained open to the meanings of concepts in order to give rise to the refinement of 
concepts according to empirical findings. Research questions were subsequently 
addressed, as detailed below.  
11.2 Question 1: The process of trust development 
The first set of propositions explores the question: whether and if so how does trust, from 
main contractor to second-tier subcontractor, develop during service interactions between 
the two? To answer this question, both the generative mechanisms and the dynamic 
phenomenon of trust were explored.  
In terms of the generative mechanisms of trust development, this thesis proposes: 
Proposition 1a: the development of trust is an engineered but also emergent process; it 
can be an intended or unintended consequence of learning in interactions. 
Proposition 1b: relating, controlling and routinising initiate and maintain a sense of 
security and confidence as the foundation of trust development. 
Proposition 1c: value co-creation initiates and sustains efficiency, equity, reciprocity, 
bounded solidarity and relational control, which recursively reinforce or develop trust. 
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Proposition 1d: the shadow of the past forms an initial condition for learning and 
generating a sense of responsibility that supports the exploitation of the past for the 
present and future service interactions.  
Proposition 1e: the shadow of the future can lead to future-orientated learning, relational 
investment and social reciprocity, which facilitate trust, relationships and other operant 
resources obtained in the present to be transformed and reused in the future. 
Proposition 1f: structures of the service ecosystem create conditions for trust 
development by balancing the power relation between main contractor and subcontractor, 
forming a conducive condition for learning and offering confidence in supply chain 
collaboration.  
This thesis identified five types of trust-generating interactions – learning, relating, 
controlling, collaborating and routinising. Learning is the underlying process that 
promotes trust development. The perception of trustworthiness can be a consequence of 
intentional learning – that is, to assess partners’ capabilities in order to make trust-related 
decisions. The potential trustee’s cognitive and behavioural learning from the past 
demonstrates responsibility and commitment and thereby can stimulate the perception of 
trustworthiness. On the other hand, learning about the other party’s trustworthiness might 
be unintentional, meaning that trust emerges as a consequence of experiential and 
reflexive learning in monitoring the project performance or joint activities. However, the 
heavy reliance on agency to transfer organisation-level learning at the front end to the 
project level and execution, and weak systems between the organisation and project levels 
hinder the consistency of trust development across hierarchical levels and time.  
To generate trust requires a sense of security and confidence to reduce perceived risks, 
swiftly establish roles, responsibilities and practices, and maintain stability when 
uncertainties occurred in delivering projects. At the organisation level, prior ties are the 
main source of security and confidence. Ties embed socialisation tactics and shared 
meanings. Structural control, in the form of negotiating contracts, for instance, helps 
strengthen perceived security and confidence at the organisation level but also transfer 
the perception to the project level. At the project level, a healthy level of structural control 
– such as establishing roles and positions, structuring procedures of systematic 
operations, having a reliable track record and maintaining consistency throughout the 
project lifecycle – creates common knowledge and codes of behaviour, regularises 
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expectations and increases predictability in operations. Relating helps build ties between 
actors and organisations in projects. These ties create familiarity and help sustain dialogic 
communication in changes and uncertainties to transform the common ground and 
recreate shared meanings. Relational investment nurtures the confidence in using trust 
relations to allocate resources and deal with changes jointly, which can be small actions 
such as surpassing goals or big actions such as prioritising the other party’s needs and 
going the extra mile. Further, having equivalent knowledge bases, in the sense that actors 
are able to understand each other’s specialised knowledge, reduces a trustor’s suspicion 
due to cognitive distance and thus the sense of insecurity.  
On the other hand, using power to control others’ behaviour against their intentions and 
extract safeguards for one’s own self-interest hinders trust. Controlling in this way formed 
a ‘win or lose’ perception that drives project partners to emphasise self-interest and ignore 
the benefits from trust-based relationships. Moreover, it led to a powerlessness perception 
of unfairness, insecurity and the behavioural manifestation of resistance.  
Routinising effective and efficient service processes further strengthens perceived 
reliability and predictability in daily interactions and operations. The process of 
routinising helps trust and collaboration form virtuous cycles where trust serves as the 
medium and outcome of collaborating. On the basis of security and confidence, value co-
creation creates shared experiences in which trust can develop. Project efficiency is the 
first driver for collaboration between main contractors and subcontractors. The aim is to 
use the other party’s resources to co-produce value propositions and core offerings and 
achieve one’s own goals. To sustain co-production requires perceived equity, in which 
both parties seek benefits proportional to their investments, with the condition of 
maintaining relationships. Co-producing creates shared experiences where actors are able 
to learn about the other party’s competence and intentions, hence generating trust as a 
rule of signification. 
A sense of reciprocity emerges as actors and organisations continuously exchange service 
in trusting and trustworthy ways. Actors and organisations might initially be driven by 
the expectation of gaining economic returns, hence economic reciprocity. Main 
contractors and subcontractors form bounded solidarity to ensure that the two parties are 
fairly treated by the client and gain benefits. To continuously use trust relations needs 
consideration of the other party’s value, hence social orientations and value co-creating. 
In the shadow of the future, groups of actors are motivated to exchange service with 
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unspecified returns in the current project but expect the balance of exchange to be 
achieved in future – that is, social reciprocity. Reciprocity and bounded solidarity tie 
organisations together and lead them to shared identities and the desire to uphold the 
collaboration and use trust relations to allocate and integrate resources.  
Relational norms that emerge in interactions can form relational control and sustain the 
collaboration by restraining opportunism and encouraging trust and trustworthiness. 
Relational norms control the behaviour of those involved by generating a sense of 
responsibility, which induces care, empathy and appreciation in interactions. In this vein, 
trust is not only about risk mitigation but also risk sharing. 
Zooming out, structures of the service ecosystem create conditions for trust development 
by forming a conducive condition for learning about trustworthiness, helping balance 
power relations between main contractors and subcontractors, and increasing confidence 
in supply chain collaboration. At the organisation level, systems linking projects and the 
organisation and boundary agency facilitate learning at the front end. Shared organisation 
systems also positively influence trust development. Shared organisational systems, 
norms and practices provide common knowledge, standards and procedures and thus 
could facilitate joint activities and build shared understanding. For internal supply chain 
partners, policies from parent organisations, as they are continuously communicated 
between units, influence individuals’ interpretations such as the meaning of internal 
relationships and way of utilising internal resources. However, the positive influence is 
reduced by injecting elements of market and competition between internal units. The 
organisation, including internal units and the parent organisation, as a reasonably 
permanent structure can be transactional and constrain trust. It reproduces transactional 
views and practices between internal relationships. 
Internal relations can also hinder trust development by offering social capital that replaces 
trust. The internal relationship and arrangements can bring about resources with little 
experiential and reflexive learning about internal partners’ actions. Internal partners 
might collaborate with each other on the basis of the belief in their shared identity through 
having the same parent organisation. This results in a lack of belief in the other party’s 
intentions as it is difficult to determine if observed trustworthy behaviour is a result of 
actors’ volition or role constraints.  
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Different from other businesses, the service ecosystem includes the project as an extra 
meso-level layer. Inter-organisational relationships therefore occur at both the 
organisation level and project level. Weak systems between project and organisation 
levels, heavy reliance on boundary agency and discontinuity of inter-organisational 
relationships across time render difficulty for continuous trust development across 
hierarchical levels and time. 
At the inter-organisational networks level, client involvement helps balance the power 
relation between main contractors and subcontractors, inducing the perception of equity, 
openness and trustworthiness. Long-term relational contracting between clients and main 
contractors increases the confidence in supply chain collaboration. From the perspective 
of main contractors, the experience of relational contracting with clients ensures 
sustainable resources and increases the capability of structuring collaboration with supply 
chains at the organisation level. From the perspective of supply chains, long-term 
collaboration between the client and main contractor can increase the perceived reliability 
of the main contractor and motivate relationship-specific investment at both organisation 
and project levels. 
The path from prior history to trust and present projects is indirect. Rather, history enables 
learning, responsible behaviour and relationship-specific investment in exploiting the past 
experiences for the present and future service provision. The shadow of the future leads 
to future-orientated learning, relational investment and social reciprocity since 
relationships and knowledge obtained in the present can be transformed and reused in the 
future. Without well-structured inter-organisational relationships or future business, 
actors and organisations tend to focus on short-term profits that could be actualised or co-
created through delivering the present project.  
In terms of the dynamic phenomenon of trust, this research proposes: 
Proposition 1g: the extent of trust development is determined by the perception of 
trustworthiness in terms of competence and intentions and the orientation of trust. 
Proposition 1h: competence trust develops from considering certain aspects of capability 
that might negatively influence project delivery, to perceived capability of completing 
contract specifications to the minimum requirements and managing planned change, and 
to perceived capability of managing emergent changes not specified ex ante.  
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Proposition 1i: intention trust develops from perceived openness in communication to 
perceived honesty and integrity, and to benevolence.  
Proposition 1j: the orientation of trusting behaviour develops from being self-interested 
to socially-orientated.  
Proposition 1k: the perception of competence and intentions and orientation of trusting 
behaviour enact patterns of behaviour demonstrating the extent of trust. 
This thesis examined the phenomenon of trust from multiple dimensions, the perception 
of trustworthiness (competence trust and intention trust), the orientation of trust (self-
interested trust and socially-orientated trust) and trusting behaviour.  
A low degree of competence trust means that the main contractor perceives specific 
aspects of the subcontractor’s capability that might negatively influence the project 
delivery. A higher degree is that the subcontractor is perceived as capable of completing 
contract specifications to the minimum requirements and managing planned changes. The 
highest degree, furthermore, is that the subcontractor is perceived as being able to manage 
emergent changes. Competence trust leads to main contractors’ openness and 
receptiveness in communication and responsiveness to subcontractors’ needs and 
requirements.  
From the dimension of perceived intentions, the threshold is that the main contractor 
perceives the subcontractor as open and seeks transparency in communication. Intention 
trust can grow if subcontractors are perceived as having honesty and integrity, and, to a 
higher degree, benevolence and willingness to help when needed. Intention trust 
encourages main contractors to share meaningful information and reduces the concern 
that the subcontractor might use the information to disadvantage them. The perception of 
trustworthiness may further be attributed to the delegation of authority and tolerance of 
uncertainty in the subcontractor’s actions. 
From the dimension of orientations of trusting behaviour, trust develops from being self-
interested to socially-oriented. Under self-interested trust, main contractors use 
subcontractors for their own benefit with little concern about subcontractors’ value, 
implying the possibility of opportunism. On the other hand, under socially-oriented trust, 
main contractors recognise the social and relational influences on value and consider 
mutual benefits. Furthermore, the perception of mutual benefits might be project-based 
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or beyond the project and include future business. Socially-oriented trust encourages 
actors and organisations to take responsibility and increases social capital in supply chain 
relationships that helps raise value for the current or future service exchange.  
11.3 Question 2: The value of trust 
The last set of propositions is related to the third research question: whether and if so how 
does trust, from main contractor to second-tier subcontractor, dynamically help increase 
service value during service interactions between the two? Based on the research, this 
thesis proposes: 
Proposition 2a: trust helps increase service value by improving service experiences for 
actors and organisations involved during service delivery; better service enables actors to 
reach higher performance levels. 
Proposition 2b: trust makes service communication more informative, resource 
integration more flexible and service coordination more cohesive. 
Proposition 2c: better service creates shared understanding, intentions and identities that 
lever value for future service. 
Trust as a rule of signification first increases the intensity of service communication as 
actors become more open to each other. From the perspective of main contractors, they 
are more willing to share information and ask for advice from the subcontractor. From 
the perspective of subcontractors, main contractors’ openness is perceived as one of the 
first signals of trust, which gives them confidence in advising and sharing project 
information. As perceived trustworthiness increases, actors exchange information beyond 
the current project, so the content of communication becomes thicker. Trust also helps 
form new relationships between previously unacquainted actors, groups and 
organisations, which increases the efficiency and effectiveness of communication in the 
project networks. By doing so, the phenomenon of trust forms a learning and sharing 
atmosphere in a network of relationships that makes actors and organisations more 
informative. Trust as a resource of domination mitigates the use of contractual 
mechanisms in resource allocation and generates the conditions for suspending 
judgements under uncertainties and expecting serial equity that reduces the need for 
instantaneous and equal compensation for relational investment. In this vein, resource 
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integration becomes more flexible. The virtuous cycles of trust and collaboration form 
relational norms and a sense of sharedness that induce relational thinking and 
expectations. Coordination based on collectively-accepted rules makes the service 
experience more cohesive.  
The totality of these actions is part of the service experience, which has outcomes in terms 
of efficiency and effectiveness in execution and also an improved experience for those 
involved in delivery, hence an enhanced service outcome. Having more informative, 
flexible and cohesive processes engenders shared understanding, intentions and identities 
as service outcomes are co-created in supply chain relationships, which enables main 
contractors and subcontractors to secure more resources, specifically operant resources 
such as knowledge and relationships, in future service for project delivery. Service 
experiences, including the process and outcomes, also lead to improved outputs at 
different stages of project lifecycle. 
Shared understanding, intentions and identities are co-created at the project level. Under 
conditions of the shadow of the future and linking systems between the project and 
organisation levels, service outcomes can be transferred to the organisation level, 
influence events and structures at higher levels, and enhance the dynamics of the service 
ecosystem for co-creating value. However, the emergence of the service ecosystem from 
the bottom is challenged by weak systems of project business between project and 
organisation levels and between organisations, and heavy reliance on agency to transfer 
resources across hierarchical levels.  
11.4 Contribution  
11.4.1 Trust theories 
This research presents a dynamic picture of trust, from the lens of structuration theory 
and service-dominant logic (S-DL). It demonstrates interactions and structures affecting 
trust development, trust phenomenon and the value of trust beyond the traditional 
economic sense in one study. By focusing on the duality of trust in the process of service 
interactions, the thesis dynamically illustrates the recursive relationship of trust and value. 
This dynamic view of trust is, to the author’s knowledge, one of the first among trust 
theories in various disciplines. 
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Structuration theory offers an explanation for how and why trust is created and recreated 
or transformed by interactions between collectives of actors, and, in turn, how and why 
trust influences the service experiences and outcomes. S-DL furnishes a broader 
definition of resources and value than mainstream economics of which trust has often 
been considered a part. Resource integration is not only about goods and services but also 
relationships and knowledge, which can increase social capital and hence lever value for 
the present as well as the future. The emergent findings relate trust to social capital theory, 
which adds to the logic behind complying with relational norms such as reciprocity and 
bounded solidarity, having a social orientation and continuing engaging in value co-
creating activities with other parties. In this vein, the model for trust development and the 
value of trust proposed in this research go beyond mechanisms for building perceived 
trustworthiness (e.g., Mayer, Davis and Schoorman, 1995; Hartman, 2000; Wong et al., 
2008; Lau and Rowlinson, 2009), the calculative or cognitive view on trust (e.g., 
Williamson, 1993; Lewicki and Bunker, 1996; Rousseau et al., 1998; Kadefors, 2004; 
Laeequddin et al., 2012) and investigating linear effects of trust (e.g., Doloi, 2009; 
Chalker and Loosemore, 2016). It depicts trust development in multiple dimensions, 
including the perception of trustworthiness, but also the orientation of trust and the 
behavioural enactment of trust, the unfolding value of trust over time and the structural 
conditions of trust. Trust is found to be an intended but also unintended consequence of 
service interactions under multiple-level structural conditions that influenced learning 
environment and power relations between collectives of actors. The value of trust is 
beyond facilitating goods and services for project efficiency and reducing perceived risks; 
trust can generate a sense of responsibility and commitment in relationships and enrich 
social capital for value creation.  
Methodologically, the process-based study enables the findings going beyond static snap-
shorts of trust. The zooming-in and -out observation and multilevel analysis facilitate a 
critical realistic approach to understanding a particular phenomenon over time in order to 
form a more comprehensive view of a given reality. By deconstructing reality and 
interpretations, this research analysed the phenomenon at different levels of scale and 
direction. Where one level has been chosen for the focus of observation, other levels can 
be used as the context. For instance, the thesis sheds light on the effect of power on trust 
at the macro-level (that of market power and hierarchical power from contract or legal 
systems), meso-level (that of structuring inter-organisational relationships and projects) 
and micro-level (that of manipulating prices in negotiation). In this vein, this research 
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sheds light on the interplay of trust and power. Structuration theory and social capital 
theory regard both trust and power as resources that can be used to consolidate the 
dominance of a social group through enabling resource integration. The use of power in 
a way that structures interactions to form a collective line of actions and achieve collective 
value is beneficial to trust and value. Nevertheless, imposing power upon other actors or 
collective actors might destroy trust and other operant resources, hence value. Trust, in 
contrast, can bridge different social groups, encourage co-creating of value and increase 
social capital for those involved to achieve higher-order value for the present and future. 
11.4.2 Construction project and supply chain management 
This thesis advances the relational approach to managing construction projects by going 
beyond transaction cost economics. It combines empirical findings with theoretical 
underpinnings and demonstrates collaborative relationships among supply chains as a 
strategic advantage that levers value for project businesses and organisations. The 
increase in the perception of trustworthiness and social orientation can improve resource 
integration in terms of allocating goods and services but also building shared 
understanding and gaining knowledge, hence a more adaptive and absorptive way of 
organising projects and higher performance level. The contribution is not only theoretical 
and conceptual in regard to trust; it responds directly to a call for empirical examination 
in the construction and project management domains (Smyth et al., 2016). 
It also enriches the understanding of relational integration in construction supply chain 
management by demonstrating detailed knowledge about the dynamics of relationships 
in the project lifecycle and the creating of value for both main contractors and supply 
chains. Extant research has highlighted the significance of aligning goals in collaborative 
procedures and tools to generate value for the end user (Kumaraswamy, Anvuur and 
Smyth, 2010). This thesis extends this line of thought and points out the necessity of 
understanding the dynamics of value co-creation in the project lifecycle and motivations 
to participate in and continue collaboration and value co-creation. The contribution of 
integrative activities to value creation and project performance is explicated. The research 
highlights the role of relational norms such as equity, bounded solidarity and reciprocity 
in forming and sustaining the phenomenon of trust and value co-creation in construction 
supply chain relationships, indicating a move towards the social capital side of the 
relationship management approach.  
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However, under current construction project and supply chain management practices, 
relational norms are mostly emergent and rely on personalities, interpersonal 
relationships and interactions between key actors. This points to the need for more 
systemic approaches to initiating and spreading relational behaviour and practices within 
and between organisational boundaries in order to realise consistent service across 
projects. 
11.4.3 Service-dominant logic 
This thesis contributes to service-dominant logic (S-DL) in several important ways. First, 
it introduces trust and other relational elements such as relational norms into the S-DL 
literature at a detailed level of empirical and theoretical investigation. The eighth 
foundational premise (FP8), “a service-centred view is inherently beneficiary oriented 
and relational” (Vargo and Lusch, 2016, p. 4) is therefore underpinned and strengthened. 
Taking relationships as the centre of theorising and analysis extends the understanding of 
value co-creation by explicating how service manifests itself within and among 
relationships that actors and collective actors are part of. Structuration theory offers a lens 
by which to analyse how trust influences collectives of actors’ interpretations (rule of 
signification), mechanisms for resource integration (resource of domination) and 
normative practices (rule of legitimation). Service interactions and value co-creation are 
enhanced as trust and relationships become intensified. The relational perspective offers 
a zoom-in opportunity for researching and demonstrating the significant role of 
relationship in service exchange and value co-creation. 
Second, the thesis depicts an interactive and multilevel picture of value co-creation. By 
weaving together structuration theory, social capital theory and S-DL, the thesis 
illustrates not only how the structures of multiple levels of service systems constrain and 
enable service interactions and value co-creation at the project level but also the 
motivation behind continuing value co-creating practices between actors and collective 
actors. It also shows how interactions between actors and collective actors can affect the 
phenomena and outcomes at the project and organisation levels. This in combination 
advances emerging social construction dialogue in the S-DL literature, which currently 
focuses on practices in interactions or the influence of relational structures on resource 
integration and value co-creating behaviour (e.g., Edvardsson, Tronvoll and Gruber, 
2011; Edvardsson, Skålén and Tronvoll, 2015; Laud et al., 2015; Laud and Karpen, 2017). 
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Focusing upon service interactions over time enables the research to identify what 
activities are conducted when and how value is co-created or emergent in an interactive 
way. The relational, zooming-in, interactive and multilevel nature of this research 
enriches the understanding of value co-creation. 
11.5 Implications for practices 
Although the research findings make clear that trust is often an unintended consequence 
of shared experiences, this does not mean trust cannot be generated by management 
intervention. On the contrary, trust can be intentionally and reflexively nurtured. To do 
so: 
(1) Clients and main contractors should extend long-term relational contracting to include 
tier-two contractors and structure open-end relationships so as to co-create a shared 
vision of future, increase supply chain engagement and achieve consistent value co-
creating performance across programmes of projects. 
(2) Main contractors and second-tier subcontractors should co-create relationship 
governance to set the tone of collaboration and initiate responsibilities, confidence 
and security, procedures and tools of interactions to sustain confidence and security, 
code of behaviour to clarify roles and duties, behavioural programmes to nurture 
interpersonal relationships and relational norms, and communication systems to 
ensure regular communication, shared understanding between different professional 
groups and functional units and multilevel relationships between two parties. 
(3) Main contractors and subcontractors should invest in internal knowledge and 
relationship management systems to link organisation and project levels and enable 
two-way transferring of rules and resources across hierarchical levels and projects. 
On the direction of top-down, these systems should ensure the consistent exercise of 
procedures, tools and programmes; on the direction of bottom-up, these systems 
should enable the improvement of the service ecosystem by embedding knowledge 
and relationships from the project level to the organisation level.  
(4) Managers, especially boundary agencies, should be able to reflexively learn in service 
experiences, relating structures of the service ecosystems to interactions by means of 
practices. 
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11.6 Limitations and implications for further research 
This thesis has some notable limitations which point out a number of paths for future 
research. First of all, the focus of this research is main contractor-subcontractor 
relationships in construction projects. Additional research can be carried out to go beyond 
this dyadic relationship as well as the construction industry context to promote analytical 
generalisation of the concepts presented here. Second, the findings of the interplay of trust 
and power need further attention. A comparable study can use the methodology and 
method to investigate the value of power and trust, and to compare findings of different 
cases. Third, although the thesis recognised the significant influence of time on trust and 
managed to conduct process-based case studies throughout the lifecycle of subcontracted 
projects, the duration of the research programme limited the amount of time available for 
fieldwork. A longitudinal study is helpful in deepening the understanding of the role of 
the past and future in project organisations beyond the most recent experiences. A longer 
study duration will also enable research on different levels of service ecosystems in 
different phases of the project lifecycle as well as between different projects. By doing 
so, these studies will be able to explore a wider range of structural conditions that are not 
considered in detail here, such as the institutional and cultural contexts. Fourth, the 
findings concerning trust and operant resources give rise to research questions about the 
link between trust and dynamic capabilities at the organisation level. Specifically, 
detailed research should be conducted to explore whether and how resources obtained or 
renewed within projects are integrated within the focal organisation and thus improve 
dynamic capabilities of the organisation.  
Trust can improve service experiences and enable actors and collective actors to integrate 
resources better. It can bridge different social groups, encourage co-creating of value and 
increase social capital for those involved to achieve higher-order value for the present and 
future. If we want to build trust, we need to think less about accountability through close 
monitoring and imposing power to control others against their wishes, and more about 
good governance and responsibility; less about transparency and more about limiting 
opportunism and encouraging trustworthiness. To achieve the latter, we shall have to start 
interacting in ways that form a sense of security and familiarity, equity, reciprocity and 
bounded solidarity. 
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Appendix: Case study protocol 
A. Introduction 
This research aims to investigate the value of trust in construction supply chains, in 
particular main contractor (MC) and second-tier subcontractor (SC) relationships. The 
primary research questions are: 
(1) Whether and if so how does trust, from MC to SC, develop during service interactions 
between MC and SC?  
(2) Whether and if so how does trust, from MC to SC, dynamically help increase service 
value during service interactions between MC and SC?  
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B. Data collection procedures6 
 Alpha Beta Gamma 
Context Surfacing for a highway 
improvement project 
Piling for an office 
building project 
Piling for a multiple-use 
building project 
Location Address: Address: Address: 
Main 
contractor 
Road Ltd. 
Main contacts: Project 
manager/Site agent 
Mobile: 
Office Plc. 
Main contacts: Project 
director 
Mobile: 
Build Gamma 
Main contacts: Project 
manager 
Mobile: 
Subcontractor Surface Ltd. 
Main contacts: General 
manager 
Mobile: 
Found Gamma 
Main contacts: Project 
director/Project manager 
Mobile: 
Found Gamma 
Main contacts: Project 
director/Project manager 
Mobile: 
Procurement stage 
Data collection 
methods 
☒ Interviews 
☒ Archival records 
☒ Observation 
     (Non-participant) 
☒ Interviews 
☒ Archival records 
☒ Observation 
     (Non-participant) 
☒ Interviews 
☒ Archival records 
☒ Observation 
     (Non-participant) 
Interviewee 
roles 
Main contractor 
☒ Project manager 
☒ Supply chain manager 
☒ Site agent 
☒ Quantity surveyor 
 
Subcontractor 
☒ General manager 
☒ Commercial manager 
☒ Supervisor 
Main contractor 
☒ Supply chain manager 
 
 
 
 
Subcontractor 
☒ Bid manager 
☒ Project manager 
Main contractor 
☒ Project director 
☒ Project planner 
 
 
 
Subcontractor 
☒ Bid manager 
☒ Project director 
☒ Operations director 
☒ Project manager 
Execution stage 
Data collection 
methods 
☒ Interviews 
☒ Archival records 
☒ Observation 
     (Non-participant) 
☒ Interviews 
☒ Archival records 
☒ Observation 
     (Non-participant) 
☒ Interviews 
☒ Archival records 
☒ Observation 
     (Non-participant) 
Interviewee 
roles 
Main contractor 
☐ Project manager 
☐ Supply chain manager 
☒ Site agent 
☒ Quantity surveyor 
☒ Subagent 
 
 
Subcontractor 
☒ General manager 
☒ Commercial manager 
☒ Supervisor 
Main contractor 
☐ Supply chain manager 
☒ Project director 
☒ Project manager 
☒ Quantity surveyor 
 
 
 
Subcontractor 
☒ Project director 
☒ Project manager 
☒ Quantity surveyor 
☒ Project engineer 
☒ Supervisor 
Main contractor 
☐ Project director 
☐ Project planner 
☒ Project manager 
☒ Commercial manager 
☒ Construction manager 
☒ Project engineer 
 
Subcontractor 
☐ Bid manager 
☐ Project director 
☐ Operations director 
☒ Project manager 
☒ Quantity surveyor 
☒ Project engineer 
 
 
                                                 
6 Some contents are anonymous for confidentiality. 
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Completion stage 
Data collection 
methods 
☒ Interviews 
☒ Archival records 
☒ Observation 
     (Non-participant) 
☒ Interviews 
☒ Archival records 
☒ Observation 
     (Non-participant) 
☒ Interviews 
☒ Archival records 
☒ Observation 
     (Non-participant) 
Interviewee 
roles 
Main contractor 
☐ Project manager 
☐ Supply chain manager 
☒ Site agent 
☒ Quantity surveyor 
☒ Subagent 
 
 
Subcontractor 
☒ General manager 
☒ Commercial manager 
☐ Supervisor 
Main contractor 
☐ Supply chain manager 
☒ Project director 
☐ Project manager 
☒ Quantity surveyor 
 
 
 
Subcontractor 
☒ Project director 
☒ Project manager 
☒ Quantity surveyor 
☒ Project engineer 
☒ Supervisor 
Main contractor 
☐ Project director 
☐ Project planner 
☒ Project manager 
☒ Commercial manager 
☐ Construction manager 
☐ Project engineer 
 
Subcontractor 
☒ Bid manager 
☒ Project director 
☒ Operations director 
☒ Project manager 
☒ Quantity surveyor 
☒ Project engineer 
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C. Outline of case study report 
1. Project overview 
2. Service ecosystems 
Project participants, Procurement systems, Organisational systems 
3. The shadow of the past and future 
Past experiences, future expectations, initial trust 
4. Procurement and preconstruction 
Chronology of events, Interactions, Trust phenomenon, Trust value 
5. Execution 
Chronology of events, Interactions, Trust phenomenon, Trust value 
6. Completion 
Chronology of events, Interactions, Trust phenomenon, Trust value 
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D. Interview topic guide 
1. General information about informants 
1.1. Position, key role and experiences in the company and project 
1.2. Working experiences 
2. General information about projects 
2.1. Projects characteristics 
2.2. Project progress 
3. The shadow of the past 
3.1. Established relationships between individuals and relationship quality 
➢ At the project level 
➢ At the firm level 
3.2. Past experiences between two companies 
➢ Average number of projects delivered together every year 
➢ The perception of past experiences: direct or indirect? If indirect, where the perception comes 
from? 
3.3. Relationship quality at the front of the frond end  
4. Structures 
4.1. Project organisation procedures/routines 
4.2. External or internal, organisation structures, organisational relationship and knowledge 
management systems 
4.3. Procurement systems, contract types 
5. Interactions 
5.1. Risk management practices 
5.2. Change management practices  
5.3. Relationship management practices 
5.4. Knowledge management practices 
6. Perception and behaviour 
6.1. The perception of risks, reliance 
6.2. Expectations on the other party 
6.3. Behaviour showing reliance  
7. Service experiences 
7.1. Service communication and coordination 
7.2. Resource allocation and integration 
8. Service outcomes  
8.1. Perceived benefits from the other party 
8.2. Benefits delivered to the other party 
8.3. Relationship quality 
8.4. Learning from the other party 
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E. Interview questions 
Main contractor set 
o How many years have you worked for this company and how many years have you 
held the current job position? 
o What are your key responsibilities in the company? 
o Could you please give me a brief introduction about [project name]? 
o How is your company’s relationship with the client of this project? 
o How did your company qualify subcontractors?  
o Could you please introduce me the project with [subcontractor name]? 
o How was your company’s experience with [subcontractor name] before this project? 
o Why did your company select [subcontractor name]?  
o Does your company put any demanding terms on [subcontractor name] that are 
applied on your company in the contracts with your clients? 
o What risks does your company perceive in this subcontracting project? 
o Is [subcontractor name] helpful in risk reduction? Why? 
o How are resources allocated in this subcontracting project? 
o Do your two companies make plan together? 
o Are there any changes in value propositions at this stage? If so, how? 
o What is your company’s approach to manage relationships with [subcontractor 
name]? 
o How is your company’s relationship with [subcontractor name]? 
o How about [subcontractor name]’s attitude in this project? 
o What is your company’s approach to manage knowledge and skills in this project?  
o Does your company rely on [subcontractor name]?  
o Are there any behaviour showing your reliance on [subcontractor name]? 
o What benefits has your company perceived? 
o What benefits has your company brought to this project?  
o What does your company expect from this project? 
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Subcontract set 
o How many years have you worked for this company and how many years have you 
held the current job position? 
o What are your key responsibilities in the company? 
o Could you please give me a brief introduction about this project? 
o How was your company’s experience with [main contractor name] before this 
project? 
o Why is your company interested in this project? 
o Why do you think your company was selected?  
o Does [main contractor name] put any demanding terms on your company that are 
applied on [main contractor name] in the main contract? 
o What risks does your company perceive in this project and level of risks? 
o Is [main contractor name] helpful in risk reduction? Why? 
o How are resources allocated in this subcontracting project? 
o Do your two companies make plan together? 
o Are there any changes at this stage? If so, how? 
o What is your company’s approach to manage relationships with [main contractor 
name]? 
o How is your company’s relationship with [main contractor name]? 
o How about [main contractor name]’s attitude towards your company in this project? 
o What is your company’s approach to manage knowledge and skills in this project?  
o Does [main contractor name] rely on your company?  
o Are there any [main contractor name]’s behaviours showing their reliance on your 
company? 
o What benefits has your company perceived? 
o What benefits has your company brought to this project?  
o What does your company expect from this project? 
F. Participant information sheet 
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INTRODUCTION  
This research aims to understand whether and how trust, from [main contractor name] to 
[subcontractor name], develops and dynamically helps enhance service value and benefit 
both parties. It focuses on the inter-organisational relationship between two companies. 
Potential findings of this research include: 
• Interactions between two companies in the project delivery 
• The process of trust and relationship development and its influence on performance  
• Value created or lost in the project delivery 
Potential benefits for your company include: 
• Optimising service process and outputs 
• Managing value creation and preventing value loss in service 
• Enhancing capabilities of relationship management and supply chain management 
• Networking opportunities with academia 
METHODOLOGY AND REQUIREMENTS 
We would like to conduct three-wave interviews in one of the projects between [main 
contractor name] and [subcontractor name]. Interviews are going to be conducted at the 
procurement/preconstruction stage, then execution stage and finally completion stage. 
Ideally, the project execution lasts 5 to 7 months.  
For each wave, we would like to interview 6 employees, 3 from [main contractor name] 
and 3 from [subcontractor name]. Ideally, we would like to interview the same 
interviewees or roles, during the data collection process. 
Each interview will last 1 hour. 
 
 
 
The response will be held with strict confidence, and interviewees will be referred 
by job position and organisations kept anonymous for data analysis purpose. 
